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ABSTRACT
A Systemic Meta-Model of Family Development
as a Framework for Family Therapy
(February 1986)
Scott J. Nielsen, M.Ed., University of Massachusetts
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by:

William J. Matthews

The family therapy field has chosen the Family Life Cycle (FLC) as
its developmental framework, but implicit developmental understandings
of family therapists are far more sophisticated than this model.

The

FLC fails to account for diversity of structure and complexity of pro¬
cess of families and is incongruent with systemic theory of family
therapy.

The FLC is based on demographics which portray families as

isolated from their context and in a static, normative manner.
This study offers a theoretical meta-model of family development
that remedies these issues.

The meta-model is a generative grammar

which allows an observer to specify how each family observed embodies a
unique structure.

The study consists of definitions of a series of

concepts, how they operate and how they are linked.
Families are self-defining, self-organizing systems consisting of
sets of meanings unifying members into a primary social group.

Develop¬

ment is successive, structural transformations of a system over its life
course.

Family development is described using rules, consolidations of

meaning which emerge out of interaction.
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Developmental interaction

requires novelty and confirmation, and results in a diversity of struc¬
tures across a class of systems.

The context of family development are

the Society, Culture, Family, and Individuals through which transforma¬
tions occur.

The Generations, Life course. Stages and Episodes of

family interaction are the temporal contexts of development.
The meta-model, called the Family Rules Model (FRM), has three
phases--Establishing, Consolidating/Diversifying, and Contracting.

Dur¬

ing the first phase the basic rules that form the identity of a system
are established.

A search for novelty dominates in the first phase.

In

the second phase, rule-making develops an economy as the rules are con¬
solidated into a unified whole.

Consolidation demands diversification

or elaboration as a system focuses now on its relationship with its
context.

In the third phase, some rules outlive their usefulness and so

they contract or shrink from usage.

A contract of meaning about those

rules continues to guide interaction as a system seeks confirmation in
this phase.

The phases then start again on a new level of meaning.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
Explicitly or implicitly, every orientation to therapy exhibits a
developmental framework through which therapeutic goals or directions
are formulated.

From training, experience and intuition a therapist

constructs an impression of how a client's understandings, relationships
and skills might evolve and change to reorganize their life more effec¬
tively.

To anchor a sense of how human life should develop, the field

of family therapy has chosen a concept which antedates the field by half
a century:

the family life cycle (FLC), which describes "typical

stages" of family life.
Examined initially, the FLC is an exciting concept, providing a
general sense of how families change over time.

As a guide for the

typical family's future, many family therapists rely on the FLC due to
its being simply constructed from obvious and time-honored data.
Some major family therapy theorists support the FLC as a develop¬
mental framework that blends individual and family change, but they
acknowledge that the models of this concept are limited by notions of
the typical, the obvious, and its simplicity (Bowen, 1980; Haley, 1973;
McGoldrick, 1983).

Other family researchers have criticized FLC models

(1) for having invariant and hierarchical stages that leave much of fam¬
ily life unexplained and (2) for implying that only nuclear families are
normal and the great majority of family forms are deviant (Clavan, 1969;
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Seegalen, 1974; Troll, 1973; Trost, 1974).

Additionally, an issue for

family therapists that is not frequently cited in the literature is that
the FLC was borrowed from a field with important theoretical differences
from family therapy.

The idea of a specific framework to outline the

life course of families holds appeal, but the FLC exhibits some serious
1

imitations.
The problem addressed in this study is that despite demonstrating

some appealing factors the FLC is inadequate as a developmental frame¬
work for family therapy.

The FLC fails to adequately describe the com¬

plexity of family process and the diversity of family structure of
families seen in treatment.

Further, the theoretical foundations of the

FLC and the systems-based family therapies are incongruent.
Purpose of the Study
In response to these problems, the purpose of this study is to pre¬
sent a framework and meta-model of family development that describes the
change and growth of a family's organization.

This study challenges, at

a fundamental level, the adequacy of the current developmental framework
of family therapy.

The aim of this research is to provide a qualita¬

tively different description of the developmental process that families
experience.

In contrast to the current framework, the model presented

in this study addresses change and evolution in families in a context of
greater diversity and complexity and in a language more congruent with
theoretical underpinnings of family therapy.

On a larger scale this
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research is viewed as contributing to the understanding of the psychol¬
ogy of families.
The process of designing the developmental framework and meta-model
involved:
(a) identifying how the FLC became an inadequate developmental
framework for family therapy;
(b) critiqueing the FLC concepts through a review of representa¬
tive literature;
(c) defining the method and procedures of this theoretical re¬
search;
(d) drawing information on the nature of change from epistemologi¬
cal, developmental, family and related literature;
(e) describing principles and processes of family development
leading to construction of a family developmental framework;
(f) elaborating a meta-model of family development based on evolv¬
ing rule-structures; and
(g) suggesting possible applications of the framework and meta¬
model to systems-based family therapies.
Definitional Issues
Definitions of almost all terms and perspectives are integrated
into the body of the study.

Terms are defined in a manner so as to make

their use consistent, but non-technical.

For example, developmental

framework is defined in the first paragraph of this study and epistemol¬
ogy is defined later as the study of "how we know what we know."

Per¬

spectives, coherent comprehensive frames of a field, are outlined in the
section in which they are most relevant.

For example, a systemic per¬

spective of family therapy is presented in Chapter IV.

The broader

epistemological perspective of this study is addressed in two places:
basic assumptions in Chapter I, and a fuller discussion of emerging
epistemological principles from many fields is offered in Chapter IV.
Rationale of the Study
A broadly agreed upon goal among family therapists is to facilitate
a family's development through the life cycle.

A study that broadens

and reorganizes a family developmental framework could have theoretical
and practical importance for the field of family therapy.

A revised

framework that describes evolution and change of families with greater
diversity and complexity and with more theoretical congruence with
family therapy theories could be useful in helping therapists to think
about families in general and intervene in families in particular.
The more explicit and comprehensive the developmental framework for
family therapy is, the easier it is to teach and evaluate family therapy
methods.

A vague, incomplete, and incongruent framework limits the

effectiveness and consistency of implementation of methods.

Using the

current narrow frame, therapists will either tend to stereotype families
and fit them to the model or abandon the model and use information that
the framework cannot provide.

If this author's meta-model can describe

a greater number of families and can identify more relevant organiza¬
tional issues with a similar amount of concepts as the current frame¬
work, then more families can be treated more flexibly and more uniquely
in therapy.
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While no leaders of the family therapy field are explicitly calling
for a revised developmental framework, as previously noted, major pro¬
ponents of the current model have criticized the FLC strongly.

Clearly

many family therapists have their own intuitive developmental principles
that are more sophisticated than the current framework.

McGoldrick

(1983) in particular recognizes problems of the FLC vis-a-vis the
sophistication of the family therapy field.

Suggesting that this is

representative of the field invites a suitably revised developmental
framework.
Family therapy, as an orientation to human problems, has grown in
sometimes dramatic and discontinuous leaps.

It has been a field that

has valued innovation even at the expense of long honored ideas and
practices.

There is a continual search for greater effectiveness of

practice and finer elegance of theory.

This study attempts to be a part

of that tradition of innovation by offering a new and significantly
different punctuation of family development than the current framework.
Problem Statement

The FLC is a concept that has been expressed through scores of
models over the past eighty years (Nielsen, 1981; Young, 1977).

Almost

every model is based upon the notion that there are succeeding stages
throughout family life and that these stages are best identified by the
changing structural configuration of family membership.

Drawing on

demographic data, individual development theories and stereotypes of the

6

ideal family these models attempt to combine the life course of indi¬
viduals in a sense of how a family changes as a whole.
As development is the central concept in this study, an examination
of the FLC as a developmental framework for family therapy suggests a
developmental perspective of the problems.

As broadly defined in this

study, a developmental view requires the historical examination of how a
system has evolved through a progression of changing contexts.

In this

case, the FLC is an abstract system, family therapy is a changing but
enduring context, and the notion of a developmental framework represents
a function that meaningfully connects system and context.
More particularly, the most productive critique will derive not
just from a statement of current problems, but from an understanding of
(1) how the FLC concept came to be associated with family therapy; (2)
how they usefully fit together; (3) how, as they evolved, discontin¬
uities emerged; and (4) what current problems exist.

This type of prob¬

lem statement will lead to an examination of what issues must be ad¬
dressed to develop an adequate developmental framework for family
therapy.
Chapter I assumes the first three points by tracing how family
therapy began; how it adopted systems theory and the FLC as foundations;
and how the family therapy field has evolved and outgrown the FLC.

In

Chapter II, as the literature is reviewed and critiqued, current prob¬
lems of the FLC as a developmental framework are discussed in depth and
issues leading to a more adequate framework are identified.
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Background of Family Therapy Practice and Theory
Family therapy emerged from traditional psychoanalysis as a more
practical, action-oriented approach to human problems.

Guided by a

deeply felt desire to help solve therapy-defying dilemmas, like schizo¬
phrenia and delinquency (Guerin, 1976; Haley, 1971), early family thera¬
pists abandoned what they saw as the overly complicated theory of uncon¬
scious pathology of individual psychotherapy.

Rather than emphasizing

the long term process of constructing insights into the unconscious
motivations of individual behavior, the pioneering family therapists
suggested that presenting problems in therapy involved the client's
social context.

In consideration of that context they believed that

those problems should be resolved in a manner which would prevent their
recurrence or the appearance of another symptom in the client or other
family member.

The originators shared a sense that interactions con¬

necting family members were a critical factor in maintaining and re¬
solving problems, but they did not have a clear theory to lead their
ventures.

From a wide variety of disciplines they experimented with the

transactions of families, finding more effective ways to change and
understand problematic behavior.

The family therapy field was, for a

considerable time, a therapy in search of a theory (Bowen, 1980; Haley,
1971; Minuchin, 1974).
From various fields like biology, mathematics and philosophy,
founding family therapists gathered concepts that fit their experience
that behavioral problems are interactional^ determined.

Eventually,

leaders in the field discovered that their clinical family therapy
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experience fit with the growing idea of General Systems Theory (GST)
(Berta!anffy, 1968).

GST is a meta-theory of science describing prin¬

ciples, qualities, and functions consistently evidenced across levels
and fields of systems.

GST operates as an open ended framework as it

accommodates not only systems theory, but cybernetics, information
theory, games theory, and others under its umbrella.

Theoretical family

therapy concepts such as homeostasis (Jackson, 1957), logical types
(Bateson, 1972), boundaries (Minuchin, 1974), hierarchy (Haley, 1977),
differentiation (Bowen, 1966) either came from or fit into GST.
The major value of GST to family therapy lies in its continual re¬
organization as it accommodates new ideas emanating from various fields.
Currently, the framework is undergoing major revision as family therapy
proclaims its "new epistemology" (Hoffman, 1981) discusses the "second
cybernetics" (Keeney, 1983) and the "emerging paradigm of evolution"
(Jantsch, 1980).

As GST is an expanding field of ideas, family therapy

is both a contributor to and a derivative of GST.
A word should be mentioned here about the special role of Gregory
Bateson.

He is the only person who has contributed fundamental work to

both the fields of family therapy and systems theory.

His epistemologi¬

cal reflections (1) have profoundly influenced the systems-based family
therapies:

structural, strategic, and systemic and (2) have given a

clearer sense of how life operates as a systemic whole in Mind—3nd
Nature (1979).
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(Exactly how a systems view and systemic therapy are defined in
this study is discussed in detail in the body of the study in Chapter
IV.)
Systems ideas have been fundamental to the understanding, within
the family therapy field, of how family systems function and malfunc¬
tion.

They do not, however, answer the question posed by Haley (1973):

towards what end is therapy directed?

The Role of the Family Life Cycle in Family Therapy
By definition, all living systems necessarily change and evolve
through time.

In a therapeutic context a developmental framework

acknowledges the inevitable transformation of client systems and hence
the importance of such a framework in therapy is apparent.

Haley's

question directs attention to the changing organizational patterns of a
particular type of client system:

families.

The notion of the FLC was

adopted by family therapists to describe the change and evolution of
family systems and thus provides a direction for family therapy.

In

this regard, one of Haley's points about Erickson is applicable to the
family therapy field.

"Therapy is most understandable if one takes into

account family development processes and the points of crisis that arise
when people go from stage to stage through the family life cycle"
(Haley, 1973, p. 40).
As usually described, the FLC is a concept describing typical
stages of family life.

There are numerous FLC models illustrating the

concept, each model organizing the stages in a slightly different
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fashion.

Passages between stages "are concerned with the shifting mem¬

bership over time, and the changing status of family members in relation
to one another" (Carter and McGoldrick, 1980, p. 8).
models are presented in Chapter II.

Four major FLC

The FLC concept has been in exis¬

tence since the turn of the century (Rowntree, 1910), but family thera¬
pists borrowed it as articulated in the 1950s by family sociologists
(Carter and McGoldrick, 1980).
Although the FLC is perhaps embedded in the multi-generational
assessment tools of Bowen (1966) and Satir (1964), it was Haley (1973)
who first explicitly stressed the FLC as a guide to family therapy and
used the term synonymously with the developmental process that families
experience.

While the field generally embraced this view, the concept

was not further advanced until Carter's and McGoldrick's book. The
Family Life Cycle (1980) promoted the concept as "a framework for family
therapy."

Carter and McGoldrick (1980) note that the FLC has "long been

a basic assumption of most family therapy approaches" (p. 7).

And "per¬

haps the family life cycle was not particularly focused on earlier
because it seemed to fall in the area of premises that 'everyone knows'"
(p. 8).
In describing the change and evolution of family systems three
principles derived from the FLC have been particularly useful in family
therapy.

Haley (1973) states that the transitions between stages of the

life cycle are the periods when symptoms are more likely to occur.
principle places dysfunction in a developmental context.

The second

principle, which describes the general developmental process of

This
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families, is that every time a member is added to or leaves the family
the system must reorganize (Haley, 1980).

Major changes of status

likewise occasion a significant restructuring of the family (McGoldrick,
1983).

The third, implicit in the FLC, is the notion of developmental

momentum.

Family therapists have long assumed that if a family can

successfully experience what was a problematic transition they can then
manage their future developmental progress on their own.

These continue

to be valuable principles in the assessment and resolution of presenting
problems.
There are a number of other factors that initially made the FLC
congruent with family therapy.

Underpinning both the FLC and family

therapy originally are assumptions that observable actions and simpli¬
fied descriptions of behavior are adequate for their purposes.

The FLC

describes the "normal or ordinary processes in the lives of people"
(Haley, 1973, p. 8); it is simply constructed and based on information
that has been known for centuries (Bowen, 1980); it is currently founded
on actual census data (Glick, 1947, 1977); and while it has a basic in¬
dividual orientation, it attempts to picture the changing status of
family members in relation to each other (Carter and McGoldrick, 1980).
McGoldrick has stated that their work has "oversimplified it (the FLC)
to think about the type of changes a family is required to make" (1983).
This simplification is quite appropriate at one level, in that a useful
sense of development in therapy must be organized by a few guiding prin¬
ciples that can be applied to diverse and complex situations.

The

simplicity of a therapeutic approach can be dangerous however, if it is
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used to stereotype families, as stereotyping reduces therapeutic effec¬
tiveness.

Emerging Discrepancies of the Family
Life Cycle in Family Therapy
It is these initially appealing factors that are the source of some
of the most serious problems with the FLC as a developmental framework
for family therapy.

Over the past thirty years, family therapy theories

have grown increasingly complex while maintaining their applicability.
Despite continual supplemental descriptions of life cycle events, the
FLC has basically remained at the same level of organization, a descrip¬
tion of changes of middle-class nuclear families.

The FLC models do not

include the cultural and structural diversity of American families nor
do they describe the systemic complexity of the developmental process
that families experience, and as systems-based family therapies have
grown more sophisticated the theoretical discrepancies of the FLC have
become more obvious.
By and large, it has been the endorsement of the FLC idea through
the writings of Haley (1971, 1973) and Minuchin (1974) and through the
therapeutic work of Bowen (Carter and McGoldrick, 1980) that have helped
secure the favorable position in the field that the FLC has today.

How¬

ever, Haley (1973), Bowen (1980), and McGoldrick (1983) are equivocal in
their support of the FLC.

Haley (1973), though certainly aware of the

census data base of the FLC models, complains about "how little informa¬
tion there is about the life cycle of families" (p. 42).

Presumably, he

means that there is little about the changing interactions of family
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members--the information that family therapists are interested in.

Fur¬

ther, he notes "that what understanding we do have about the development
of a family can be quickly outdated as the culture changes and new forms
of family life appear" (p. 42).

He makes a plea for recognizing the

diversity of families, for which the FLC cannot account and he acknow¬
ledges that the model he presents is a "rudimentary framework" (p. 43).
Bowen concedes that in constructing a comprehensive approach to the
family he has "chosen other concepts as more consistent for theory"
(1980, p. xviii).

McGoldrick has stated that thinking about the FLC "is

hard to do" as it has "a lot of limitations" and "is arbitrary at one
level" (1983).

Carter and McGoldrick (1980), along with Haley, admit

that the FLC model they present is limited to describing middle-class
families.

Despite their attempt to include some structural and cultural

variations (divorced families and Mexican-American families) such varia¬
tions are still portrayed as deviations from the idealized norm.
Currently, family therapy theorists are urging that the field con¬
sider "new epistemologies" (Allman, 1982; Dell, 1982; Hoffman, 1981;
Keeney, 1982).

There is no consensus on what constitutes a new epis¬

temology, as reference to the above citations will confirm, but there
are some agreed upon targets within the "old" epistemology.

Notions of

power hierarchy, homeostatic stability, and therapist objectivity are
all viewed as remnants of a linear model of causality that were not
expurged as the original systemic epistemology was applied through the
1950s, 60s and 70s.
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Originally, family therapy pulled itself up from individual ther¬
apy, using new systems ideas, but still with aspects of a linear world¬
view deeply embedded from cultural conditioning.

The FLC concept had

the individual and linear roots in common with family therapy.

Many of

the original systems concepts of family therapy which were at variance
with the FLC were not noticed due to the common roots.

Now, the new

epistemology makes these discrepancies all the more glaring.
Originally, the FLC was assumed from common knowledge and was con¬
sidered adequate as a developmental framework for the family therapy
field.

The FLC concept was initially useful as a tool to help form a

more pragmatically relevant therapy that dramatically differentiated
itself from traditional psychotherapy.

As family therapy originated it

was an appropriate first step to use the FLC to provide the requisite
perspective on the evolution and change of families.

As family therapy

has evolved into a more complex field, the shortcomings of the FLC as a
concept of evolution and change have become increasingly apparent and an
examination and revision of the developmental framework is due.
The problem addressed in this study has been outlined through a
brief exposition of the background of family therapy.

The issues of

complexity and diversity, necessary for effective practice of family
therapy, have been acknowledged, and the issue of congruence with the
evolving theoretical foundations of family therapy has been identified.
A number of issues referred to in the problem statement need to be
further explicated and are addressed later in the study.

A detailed

analysis of specific problems of the FLC concept and model is presented

15

in Chapter II.

An understanding of systems-based family therapies is

offered in Chapter IV.

A sketch of principles representative of the new

epistemologies from various fields is drawn in Chapter IV.

However,

basic epistemological assumptions of this study are outlined in the next
section of this chapter.

Epistemological Assumptions
Before examining in any more detail the problems of the FLC, it
will be useful to identify some of the basic assumptions grounding the
perspective used in this study.

Eight assumptions will be offered as an

adequate but not total explication of that perspective.

These interre¬

lated assumptions are all concerned with the process of constructing and
describing knowledge and thus are epistemological.

Offering such a per¬

spective can be helpful in understanding the limitations and measuring
the consistency of this research.
The first and most basic assumption has been most succinctly
stated by Bateson:

"The division of the perceived universe into parts

and wholes is convenient and may be necessary, but no necessity deter¬
mines how it shall be done" (1979, p. 38).

This statement infers that

our perception or division of the universe alters how we experience
reality as we interact.

The unavoidable role of perception in our ex¬

perience leads to the other assumptions.

The manner in which the per¬

ceived universe is divided in this study is by use of a systems perspec¬
tive.

In general, from a systems perspective, to understand the quali¬

ties, function and identity of a system it is more important to examine
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the relationships connecting elements of that system than to look at all
the separate elements.

The interrelated terminology of this view is

more fully defined in Chapter IV.
The second assumption is that more than a scientific undertaking,
this study is an epistemological enterprise.
from an Old English word meaning "to know."
reality and belief is implied.

The word science comes
No distinction between

Science, in general, has come to mean

the specification of replicable methods used to gain knowledge.

Epis¬

temology refers to the study of "how we know" and leads to a distinction
between what is true and what we perceive.

Epistemology has come to

imply that the values, the perception of the observer play a role of
equal importance to methods in the construction of knowledge.

This per¬

spective can be characterized by Greenebaum's statement that "reality
exists, but is only knowable from a point of view" (1981).

Throughout

this study, therefore, I will repeatedly refer to the point of view that
illuminates the content.
The third assumption, derived from the second, is that objectivity
is not possible.

An increasing number of thinkers from a diverse group

of fields are acknowledging this point of view (Bateson, 1979; Jantsch,
1980; Zukav, 1979).

An individual bias is inextricably woven into the

fabric of "knowledge."

In turn, that individual bias is influenced by

both known and unknown factors from the social whole.

Therefore, this

study is but one of many possible views, all in some way biased, on this
topic.
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The fourth assumption, paired with the third, is that identifica¬
tion of an observer's frames of reference is preferable to an attempt at
objectivity.

When an observer's frames of reference are included in a

description of a phenomenon a more thorough determination of its validi¬
ty can be made.

Discussion between disciplines and even within disci¬

plines is often unproductive due to a failure to identify similar and
different spatial and temporal punctuations.

This assumption is charac¬

teristic of the "new epistemology" in family therapy and of the "emerg¬
ing paradigm of evolution" (Jantsch, 1980).

For example, the original

systems (Bertalanffy, 1968) view considered a system within an unspeci¬
fied context.

The revised view that is currently being developed in¬

sists on viewing a system interacting with other systems, within a
specified context, all within an unspecified context.

Epistemological¬

ly, there is always a level of unspecified context that implies that the
extent of our knowledge is limited.
The fifth assumption is that human descriptions are incomplete
translations of reality, our experience of it and our perceptions of it.
Bateson (1979) notes that stability and change are part of our descrip¬
tion (p. 61).
process.

Jantsch (1980) made the same claim about structure and

Einstein claimed the same about space and time.

One of the

most famous examples of this assumption is Heisenberg's Uncertainty
Principle which states that it is impossible to capture precise, simul¬
taneous descriptions of space time.

The incompleteness of descriptions

is attributable not just to the limits of perception, but to the further
limits of language as well.

There is no language capable of expressing
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all of the contingencies of a situation, much less a language capable of
expressing its own effect on the reality being perceived.

This assump¬

tion is not an excuse for this study to be any more incomplete than any
other study.

Nonetheless, this research does not aim to provide a total

picture of its topic, but to offer one punctuation of the issue that
demonstrates theoretical consistency and practical applicability.
The sixth assumption is that time is not real, it is a concept de¬
scriptive of the reality of change.

Time and change have what Korsybski

(1941) describes as a map-territory relationship.
is a measure of the irreversibility of change.

More precisely, time

To the extent that

change is irreversible, time is a useful concept.

Within a context of

irreversibility time is a necessary concept for adequate description.
Reference to irreversibility is not a claim that time is linear nor that
it has a direction.

No claim is made that time is circular.

All of

these terms are spatial analogies and thus from a frame of reference
that cannot offer a valid description of the time aspect of change.

The

claim in this study is that the pace of change varies from context to
context.

As the varying rates of change are contrasted with each other

different types of time are yielded.

So while time within a context

measures irreversibility, the types of time define each other mutually
and reflexively.

(Irreversibility could be called a form of linearity

or directionality and the reflexive definition of types of time could be
called a form of circularity, but these are not only inadequate analo¬
gies, they are ultimately misleading epistemologically.
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The seventh assumption is that meaning is reflexive.

Harre and

Madden (1975) and Maturana (1978) claim that the structure of a system
determines its behavior.

Theorists in family therapy and many other

fields claim that context determines meaning.
not contradictory, but are complementary.

These two statements are

In a situation in which mean¬

ing constitutes structure, such as social systems, context is hierarchi¬
cal to structure.

That is, context determines which contingencies of

structure are expressible.

However, behavior is capable of creating new

contexts or of evoking different contexts and thus completes a reflexive
loop of context-meaning-structure-behavior.

Meaning is the central con¬

cept in this assumption because it is both an independent factor in the
loop and a determinant of how context and structure are perceived.

This

assumption draws on Cronen's Theory of Reflexivity (1980) as a source
and companion.
The eighth and summary assumption is that not only is social sci¬
ence not lawlike, but that it should not aim to be primarily lawlike.
In the physical sciences prediction is the primary aim.
sciences, prescription is as important as prediction.

In the social
For example, in

the People's Republic of China the prediction that if the present birth
rate structure continues, then the population will double by such and
such a date is not important primarily for either its predictive or its
lawlike quality.
necessity.

This prediction is a statement of contingency, not

Its importance, therefore, lies in the prescriptions that

emerge from it.

This assumption about social science is based on the

relationship of the contingencies of context and structure.

When
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perceived structure provides for few behavioral options, laws and caus¬
ality appear to be useful organizing concepts.

But, when the field or

context provides for numerous contingencies, then lawlikeness and
causality are not useful and prescription becomes the predominant part¬
ner to prediction.

(Causality, as shall be elaborated later, only makes

sense in a frame of structurally determined necessity.)

Some may be

more comfortable substituting the word heuristic for the word prescrip¬
tive but, if the prescriptive value of social science is ignored then
some accept descriptions as rigid truth and others scoff at the limita¬
tions.

If the prescriptive value is acknowledged, by specifying frames

of reference, then a distinction is made between the truth and a point
of view and one is freer to accept, modify or reject the prescription.
Prescriptive power, then, is of a lesser magnitude than predictive
power.
The preceding assumptions outline how the process of description is
viewed in this study and thus form the foundation of its perspective.
Repeated reference will be made to these assumptions throughout the
research.

They inform how the problem is perceived, how the methods are

designed, and how the results are yielded, as there is, of course, no
theory-free observations.
Overview of the Method

This study is a piece of theoretical research.

This is a time-

honored approach to epistemological and scientific difficulties with
luminous adherents from Aristotle to Einstein.

It should be obvious

21

that this study makes no claim to in any way rival the level of research
of the above noted immortals.

They are cited as a reminder in our

empirically minded era that there is still an important role for theo¬
retical work in the construction of knowledge.

Theoretical research

signifies the opportunity to begin a research program and to generate
descriptive hypotheses rather than signifying the empirical support of
research hypotheses.
Doing theoretical research means that the data needed to design a
new and hopefully useful punctuation of a dilemma currently exists in
accumulated human knowledge.

Data must be extracted from the library

rather than from the running or interviewing of subjects.

The burden is

on the researcher to creatively synthesize data for a reorganized view
of the topic that yields greater flexibility and options for theorists
and practitioners.

In the first step of the methodology, theoretical

and empirical data were used to design a framework and meta-model as the
basis of a theory of family development.
To obtain its final results, the study uses a conversational meth¬
od.

This term has been adapted from the ideas of Churchman (1982).

He

noted that his design of an ideal life was based on "conversations" with
historical and current figures that he admired.

It is a good name for

and useful guide for refining the method devised for this study.

Since

the appeal and to some extent the utility of a theory is often initially
determined by the response of those involved in similar pursuits, writ¬
ten and verbal "conversations" with family therapists interested in the
topic were recognized as a useful method to supplement and revise the
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theory.

After the data were organized into a framework and meta-model,

the second step of the methodology was an analysis by a number of family
therapy theorists recognized as contributing to the theoretical develop¬
ment of the field.

These "conversations" then explicitly influenced the

final version of the framework and meta-model.

The procedures of this

two step methodology are detailed in Chapter III.
Limits of the Study
The major limitation of this study is that it is theoretical re¬
search.

It does not provide for the support of specific empirical

hypotheses; it is merely a beginning that will generate possible hypo¬
theses.

The study's contact with human interaction is limited to

"conversations" with others engaged in similar pursuits.

The danger of

the conversational method is that its results could be taken for some¬
thing more than they are, at best a provisional consensus on the direc¬
tion of a developing theory.
As to the content of the study, its primary purpose is not to have
a direct clinical impact, but to lay down a theoretical base for the
design of clinically applicable models.

On a practical level, it will

not be a therapeutic technique, but a guide for the assessment of fami¬
lies.

While this theory aims at accounting for the diversity of fami¬

lies its scope is limited to the families of this country.

Even then,

it does not describe in detail any significant amount of the structural
and cultural variations of American families.

It offers a few examples
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of diverse structures to demonstrate how varying family structures can
be assessed in a non-deviant manner.
This model focuses on the changing relationships between systems.
In considering changing relationships the theory emphasizes one major
organizing principle:

the evolution of rule-making processes.

While

this focus and principle are viewed as central to the organization and
development of systems, there are certainly other factors that could be
used to describe the development of families.
The theory may well describe the development of systems other than
families, as it will depict systems interaction from a very general to a
very specific level.

However, no rigorous claim will be made for the

theory to extend beyond family systems.

Chapter Topics

The remaining chapters discuss the following topics.
Chapter II presents a review and critique of the FLC model most
influential to the family therapy field.
Chapter III presents the two step methodology and the procedures of
this theoretical dissertation.
Chapter IV presents information on the nature of change from
epistemological and content literature.
Chapter V presents a synthesis of the basic information into a
framework and meta-model of family development.
Chapter VI presents a discussion of and implications of the pro¬
posed theory.

CHAPTER

II

REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF THE LITERATURE
This chapter builds on the general problem statement and epistemo¬
logical assumptions presented in the first chapter to offer a thorough
critique of the FLC concept through discussion of major FLC models.

In

this critique, the following models are cited as representative of the
FLC concept:

Glick (1947), Duvall (1952), Rodgers (1962), Haley (1973),

Aldous (1978), Carter and McGoldrick (1980).

The last four models are

all primarily derived from Duvall, but Glick was the major influence on
Duvall and a secondary influence on the others.
Only Haley and Carter and McGoldrick originally aimed to be rele¬
vant to family therapy.

However, since these models are based on the

others, all can be fairly evaluated under criteria for family therapy
applicability.

The issues of complexity, diversity, and theoretical

congruence shape the questions and sub-questions below that are the lens
for this critique.
What is it that FLC models describe and predict?
To what extent do they explain principles, processes, phases,
and events of the evolution and change of families?
To what extent do they discuss family development in dynamic
time frames?
Whom do these models include?
To what extent do they depict the diversity of culture and
structure of families seen in family therapy?
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To what extent do they examine relationships between members
and with other systems?
How well do they fit the way family therapists conceptualize fami1 ies?
To what extent do they characterize families as systems of
interaction?
To what extent do they portray the expected and unexpected
transitions that change family systems?
Both the philosophical view underpinning the FLC concept and the
methodology used in designing the models reveal significant limitations
in applicability to family therapy.

The problems of the FLC as a thera¬

peutic framework are interconnected to such an extent that discussion
could begin at any number of points.

Since the philosophy of a concept

is frequently only apparent after a model has been constructed, the
methodological issues are addressed first.

There are two sub-groupings

in both the methodology and philosophy section.

In weighing the method¬

ological issues, the demographic statistics base and the structural
method of abstraction are discussed.

In considering the philosophical

difficulties, the normative values and the organizing concepts are
assessed.
Methodological Problems

Statistical Base
Click's Model.

The FLC began to gain popularity as a sociological

and policy making tool following Paul Glick's massive undertaking at the
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United States Census Bureau in the 1940s (1942, 1947, 1957, 1965, 1975,
1977).

His demographic analyses of American families continue to dis¬

play some utility in a variety of fields with a macroanalytic scope.
Glick uses census data from 1790 on, to describe a series of changes of
typical families (1947).

His FLC models describe (a) the usual ages of

the couple at different stages, (b) changes of family composition and
(c) changes in economic characteristics over the FLC (1947).

Glick's

models vary somewhat from publication to publication, but the basic
seven stage model is outlined in the table below and contrasts 1890 with
1940 according to median ages of husbands and wives at different stages
(1947, p. 165).
Being rooted in actual data could have appeal for family therapists
as they emphasize the importance of observed sequences of behavioral

TABLE 1
MEDIAN AGE OF HUSBAND AND WIFE AT EACH STAGE OF THE
FAMILY CYCLE, FOR THE UNITED STATES, 1940 AND 1890

Median Age of Husband
Stage of the
Family Cycle

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

First marriage
Birth of first child
Birth of last child
Marriage of first child
Marriage of last child
Death of husband or wife
Death of husband, if last
Death of wife, if last

Median Age of Wife

1940

1890

1940

1890

24.3
25.3
29.9
48.3
52.8
63.6
69.7

26.1
27.1
36.0
51.1
50.4
57.4
66.4

21.6
22.6
27.2
45.6
50.1
60.9

22.0
23.0
31.9
47.0
55.3
53.3

73.5

67.7
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interaction as the basis of their work.

However, any tool organized

primarily on a statistical base will evidence deficits of applicability
in relation to family therapy.

As Caplow (1949) states in reference to

Glick's work, "a coherent formulation of a family life cycle in terms of
modal values offers many difficulties . . . (one) cannot combine vast
dispersions of a factor into a single sequence" (p. 152).

Along the

same line, Hareven (1978) points out that Glick's models "measures mean
patterns of change, but does not examine variance from the norm or
differentiation by ethnicity or occupation" (p. 3).

Despite some

regional and racial breakdowns, the variations of American family life
cannot be usefully distinguished from Glick's model.

And when the

statistical data are collapsed into a single FLC model, a strong norma¬
tive influence is exerted as only a minority of American families are
portrayed.
Some reviewers of FLC research have concluded that the concept is
not empirically useful in accounting for change within families (Nock,
1979; Spanier et al., 1975).

Trost (1974) notes that these models have

no way to describe divorce of childless couples.

His own research

claims that after five years only 38 percent of families were following
the FLC path (cited in Feldman, 1975).

One researcher presents data

from a U.S. Census Statistical Abstract (Sussman, 1978) that clearly
shows that the nuclear family pictured in the FLC models is a minority
form (approximately 30 percent).
Confusion of household and family.

Not intending to picture

interaction in families, the statistical method characterizes the FLC as
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a group of isolated, demographic events.

This type of demographic

analysis describes families as if they were an additive collection of
members, a perspective incompatible with the systemic idea that a family
is more than the sum of its parts (Carter and McGoldrick, 1980).

The

fundamental flaw that confounds the statistical data beyond reclamation
is the continual equating of a household with a family (Hareven, 1974;
Winch, 1971).

For economic purposes households may be useful, but for

family therapy and other social concerns families must be defined in
terms of meaningful relationships between members, not in terms of popu¬
lation units.

This statistical approach is obviously incapable of

mirroring the vibrancy of the living organizations that are families.
FLC models based on statistics are useful for large scale economic
or social purposes that do not require an understanding of the diversity
of American families.

However, the difficulty is that the models that

purport to describe the FLC in greater developmental detail (Aldous,
1978; Carter and McGoldrick, 1980; Duvall, 1972; Haley, 1973; Hill and
Rodgers, 1964) are all significantly influenced by Glick's model and his
use of household as a synonym for family.

Despite the vast quantity of

data Glick uses, the quality of information needed to offer a develop¬
mental view relevant to therapy cannot be simply added on to overcome
the statistical limitations.

Structural Method
Haley's model.

Haley (1973) admits that the FLC model he presents

is a "rudimentary framework" (p. 43).

This is a problem that plagues
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all FLC models.

The rudimentary structural method used to abstract

social FLC models from the demographic models seriously limits the FLC
concept in describing family development as it is a mechanistic view.
Haley's six stage model, outlined below, addresses the FLC in very
simple terms in order to present common patterns of dysfunction in the
development of middle class families.
I. Courtship Period
II. Marriage and Its Consequences
III. Childbirth and Dealing with the Young
IV. Middle Marriage Difficulties
V. Weaning Parents from Children
VI. Retirement and Old Age
While this model meets Haley's requirement for simple theories to guide
clinical action (1977), it does not meet the criterion that makes sim¬
plicity useful:

the elegant portrayal of complexity.

This model offers

information that "everyone knows" (Carter and McGoldrick, 1980, p. 6),
but it does not provide a strong theoretical base for the understanding
of development.
Hays (1977) criticizes family researchers for not specifying their
theoretical base and its assumptions.

Going even further, Christensen

(1969) states that most family research does not even qualify as theory.
These statements particularly apply to the FLC concept.

The type of

structuralism used to depict a family's changes is far too limited to
describe the developmental significance of family reorganization.

The

criteria delineating the stages are problematic, the transitions between
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the stages are undefined, and the complexity of time as a variable is
ignored.
Problems of the stage concept.

Grounded in the demographic events

by Glick (1947), the FLC models relevant to this discussion (Aldous,
1978; Carter and McGoldrick, 1980; Duvall, 1971; Haley, 1973; Rodgers,
1962) chronicle a series of stages.

The stages, the central concept in

the FLC, are founded on events that result in the changed configuration
and/or changed status of membership (marriage, childbirth, schoolchil¬
dren, launching, aging, etc.).

However, these stages are not the only

events that provoke developmental change.

Developmentally, the stage

approach is problematic as the structure of membership is inadequate to
capture much of significance.

Minuchin's (1974) point about subsystems

in families is relevant as an analogy to FLC stages.

In understanding

the structure of a family, the membership of subsystems is not nearly as
important as the transactions between subsystems.

In family development

it is the transitions through and between stages that are of concern,
not the membership configuration of the stage.
A critical difference in family therapy from psychoanalysis has
been the quantum leap it made from the psychoanalytic one-to-one
approach in which the client presented a carefully painted picture of
their past.

In contrast, family therapy brought multiple members into

the session and had them interact, which more closely approximates a
live video newsreel.

Yet, for one of its grounding concepts, family

therapy has retained the static FLC stages, which resemble a series of
snapshots (Hareven, 1974) that do not account for significant periods of
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time and important family actions.

Revolving around single events, each

stage leaves the impression that a family is preoccupied with one uni¬
fied task (see Rhodes, 1977).

Implicitly, the suggestion is made that

the duration of each stage is homogenously organized, when, for example,
the "beginnings" of each new stage may be more interactionally similar
than a "beginning" and a "middle" of one stage.
Alpert (1981), critiqueing the utility of the FLC, summarizes the
three common criticisms of the stage theory approach.
stage theory is too biologically based on age.

The first is that

She points out that

stage changes may be due to the "joint impact of age-graded, historygraded and non-normative life events as they are mediated through the
developing family" (p. 26).

The second criticism relates to the "as¬

sumption that each stage occurs in an orderly, unidirectional and
irreversible sequence" (p. 26).

The third criticism is that stage

theory assumes a universal course followed by all people.
Aldous (1972) vigorously defends the stage concept as currently
constructed, "our use of the word stage indicates that the framework
does not specifically handle short episodes encompassing a limited
number of interactions ... the family life cycle stages cover sizeable
time spans, and, even though one shades into the other, there are breaks
or discontinues between them that give each stage its distinctive char¬
acter" (p. 90, quoted in Trost, 1973, p. 38).

In previously challenging

just such a view, Rodgers had stated that the "stages are in no sense
real entities, though some of the literature in the area would appear to
approach the point of reification" (Rodgers, 1968, p. 500, quoted in
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Clavan, 1969, p. 313).

Hareven (1974) used the snapshot analogy to

criticize the static quality of the FLC stages that Rodgers wished
to change.
Rodgers (1962), recognizing the limited number of families that
Duvall's FLC described, attempted to include a broader range of family
forms by devising a 24-category FLC.

However, using the same basic cri¬

teria to define development--variations in family membership configura¬
tions--!^ constructed a model that was unwieldy by his own admission.
Rodgers tripled the number of stage "snapshots," and his attempt to
describe changes in terms of position and role additions and deletions
was therefore \ore complicated than useful.

For example, he identified

five stages of launching families and that only accounts for two married
parents and the ages of the oldest and youngest child.

The position and

role sequences proliferate so rapidly with more than four members that
it is an unmanageable solution.

The model ended up intensifying the

static-dynamic issues by primarily emphasizing the possible myriad fam¬
ily forms and was not able to provide a useful sense of how transitions
are made.
Static vs. dynamic view.

It is precisely the transitions between

stages that Haley (1973) indicates are of greatest concern in family
therapy.

The FLC models do not account for transitions from one stage

to another; they state merely that the events of changing membership
evoke new stages.

About Rodgers' efforts to revise the FLC stage notion

Clavan (1969) states that he fails to "emphasize the 'ongoingness' of
one period to the next" (p. 313).

Hareven (1974) and Nock (1979) concur
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that the stage notion represents family life as basically static and
that the traditional FLC fails to capture action in families.

In

Clavan's (1969) terms, the idea of process with plateaus is needed to
better portray the stable and dynamic aspects of family life.
Schram (1979), citing three major studies using the FLC as a pre¬
dictor for marital satisfaction, says that these research results are
noteworthy for their "inconclusiveness, inconsistency and ambiguity" (p.
7).

Echoing Haley, understanding FLC transitions is Schram's prime

concern:

"We need to explore junctures which function as a bridge from

one stage to the next" (p. 11).

The entire developmental approach to

the FLC stages needs to be reevaluated, according to Schram.
Christensen (1969) asserts that "perhaps the greatest challenge
facing the (family) field today and at the same time, the greatest prom¬
ise for rewarding theory development is this methodological problem of
comparative research which requires the handling of time and space
simultaneously" (p. 221).
quately.
gression.

The FLC handles neither time nor space ade¬

It assumes time as a constant, an undifferentiated linear pro¬
It describes changing space in terms of the changing member¬

ship of only the nuclear family form.
Hareven (1974) complains that the FLC models do not distinguish
between "family time" and "social time" (p. 325).

The FLC models keep

social time constant (based on how changing social conditions affect
family development), while varying family time (based on the changes of
the internal workings of a family).

This ignores the continual, but

differing, movements and the mutual influence of both types of time.
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Clavan (1969) suggests that the "temporal boundaries" (p. 313) 0f
FLC stages—the focus on the past and present situations, but excluding
expectations of the future—disqualifies the stage models' utility, as
development necessarily involves "anticipated social conditions" (p.
313).

A further temporal limitation is evident in Aldous' admission

that the stage concept "doesn't handle short episodes of interaction"
(1972, p. 90, quoted in Trost, 1973, p. 38).

These are the sort of

difficulties that need to be addressed in responding to Feldman's (1975)
call for improvements in the FLC in terms of both microanalysis and
macroanalysis.

Despite Carter and McGoldrick's effort to include three

generations in their model, the FLC still represents a two generational
view of families and so do not include a broader view of time—multiple
generations—nor a more specific time frame—episodes within stages.

To

be useful in family therapy the FLC must evidence a temporal flexibility
as well as accounting for family variations.
The methodological approach of the FLC models is not a clearly
thought out structuralism.

Reviewing Piaget's book. Structuralism

(1973), Manfred (1972) points out that structures are at once "structur¬
ing and structured" (p. 181) organizations.

FLC models emphasizing sta¬

tic configurations in families rather than stressing the developmental
processes and transitions that result in changed membership patterns,
present families as structured, but neglect the structuring aspect of
their lives.

Weigert and Thomas (1971), in examining the universality

of families, assert that "function precedes structure, but . . . to
grant primacy to structure is to hypostatize the past" (p. 191).

This
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is precisely what FLC models do as they assume a structure that somehow
determines functions, rather than a dialectic between the two aspects of
family process.

If structure is primary, then interaction between fam¬

ily systems and their context, and between elements of the systems, is
constrained.

Structure in FLC models is conceptualized at a level that

is of limited effectiveness for family therapists.

Rather than focusing

on the structure of membership, it would be more useful to abstract
structure from patterns of relationships.

These models view families,

as shall be explained in more detail later, as closed systems.

Manfred

(1972), again referring to Piaget, but applicable to the FLC, warns
researchers not to stereotype specific individuals or families (p. 181)
on the basis of such a closed, structural view.

As the next section

explains, this is what FLC models unfortunately do.
In summary, the particular structural approach that marks all of
these FLC models does not provide a comprehensive and flexible basis
from which the complexities of development can be delineated.

In gener¬

al, the statistical and structural limitations render the FLC methodolo¬
gically unsuitable as a family therapy developmental frame, for it is
like a net that is too small to catch many American families and for the
families who are on target, the webbing is too gross to capture the
complexity of development.

36

Philosophical Difficulties
Normative Values
Duvall1s model.

Like the Macy conferences in 1946 and 1947 that

heralded the emergence of general system theory (Bateson, 1972), the
1948 White House Conference of Families, chaired by Evelyn Duvall and
Reuben Hill marked the genesis of the developmental FLC models (Duvall,
1971).

This conference was one part of the effort to renormalize Ameri¬

can family life after World War II.

The participants faced and were a

part of strong socio-political pressures that emphasized the conceptual¬
ization of the American family as a homogenous group.

This was one so¬

lution to such problems as what to do with returning servicemen who had
been killers in the war and how to get the female labor force back in
the home.

The FLC models that came out of the conference were an aspect

of the attempt to provide a unified view of family life in the face of a
rapidly changing world society whose differences threatened to destroy

it.
As Duvall led the charge in promoting the FLC, she built on Glick's
work, which as noted had a narrow normative bent.

The models generated

from this effort used the white, middle-class, two-parent nuclear family
as the ideal.

Duvall's eight stage model is outlined below with impor¬

tant member positions and major developmental tasks.

This model deline¬

ates the FLC in terms of the predictable evens and typical tasks of an
isolated nuclear family.

There are a number of reasons why the applic¬

ability of this model as a developmental framework for family therapy is
severely limited.
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Iheminority nuclear family as ideal.

Like the criticism leveled

at Glick's (1947) model, Duvall's FLC fails to picture a great number of
American families.

One needs only to acknowledge some of the important

social issues of the past decade--teenage pregnancies, alternative life¬
styles, divorce, homosexuality, the plight of the elderly, the feminiza¬
tion of poverty--and it becomes apparent that the life course and devel¬
opmental tasks that Duvall proposes as typical exclude significant num¬
bers of people and family forms.
A point could be raised that these social issues, which have
changed the structure and meaning of American families, have arisen only
recently and that the nuclear family was predominant when the FLCi odels
were originally designed.
view.

However, some researchers challenge this

Winch (1970) notes that contrary to the expectations of sociolo¬

gists in the 1950s the isolated nuclear family has not become the pre¬
dominant form, implying that this structure was not the majority even
then.

Deutsch (1983) concurs that the nuclear family was never the

dominant form as she suggests that it was only "the typical family in
the Dick and Jane primers."

Winch's research shows that the majority

family form is what he calls the embedded nuclear family, which has a
strong network of extended kin.

Yorburg (1975) suggests that modified

extended and modified nuclear families are the most frequent forms in
America.

And in a warning particularly relevant to the FLC, she states

that "individual variability subverts typologising" (Yorburg, 1975, p.
5).

The typologising of families in FLC models results in a narrow

range of normative values being promoted as ideal.
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Hareven (1974) marshalls evidence to challenge the notion that
American families were any more nuclear in the 19th century than they
are now.

She claims that the structure of individual families varied

significantly through their life course.

Trost (1973) and Leichter

(1970) identify a number of variations of family structure that are ex¬
cluded from the FLC.

Even Glick (1977) acknowledges the narrowness of

the normative values in the FLC when he predicts that half of all cur¬
rent American children will live in single-parent households during
their lifetime.

Even if families had changed from primarily nuclear,

the FLC has remained basically the same over the past thirty years.
While there is a diverse range of family forms which are excluded
by the normative values of the FLC, the issue of how many of what kind
of families exist is thoroughly confused by researchers' failure to dis¬
tinguish between households and families.

A household is a population

unit in a particular domicile, while families may extend far beyond a
single dwelling.
a quandary.

For years, defining the family has left researchers in

Many major texts either lack or offer contradictory and

confusing definitions (Wiegert and Thomas, 1971).

Segalen (1974) re¬

ports that at the 13th Seminar on Family Research there was no agreement
on the FLC as there was no agreement on the nature of the family.

What

is apparently least disagreed upon is the idealized form called the
nuclear family.
As Duvall's, Glick's and others' work makes clear, family research¬
ers have frequently incorporated a narrow range of normative values in
their FLC models that limits their utility.

Clavan (1969) holds that
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researchers have long offered positive sanctions of the romanticism
surrounding marriage.

Bernard (1981) cites research that has reinforced

overly positive myths about marriage and overly negative myths about
divorce.

Nock (1979) notes that the FLC demands that all couples with¬

out children should want them.

He goes on to indict the family develop¬

mental approach (as outlined by Hill and Rodgers, 1964) because it must
assume that "families are without exception in abiding by normative
constraints" (Nock, 1979, p. 16).
The claim of the predictability of developmental stages and tasks
further illustrates the normative limitations of the FLC.

Duvall (1971)

states that "since families grow through predictable stages of develop¬
ment it is possible to anticipate what lies ahead for any given family
at any one point in their development" (p. 332).

Ignoring for the

\oment that this is obviously false, emphasizing predictability for such
narrowly defined stages and tasks is a step towards defining one family
form as ideal and others as deviant.
Troll (1973) takes Duvall to task for the assumed notion "that all
families must go through the sequence of stages in the correct order
. . . and must accomplish all the developmental tasks ascribed to each
stage to enter properly into the next stage" (p. 69).

"The families

that are successfully chalking up merit badges for accomplishing their
developmental tasks are clearly the suburban 'Better Homes and Garden'
set, dedicated to stereotyped sex roles, regular church attendance,
faithful fulfillment of military service and the Protestant Ethic" (p.
73).

Duvall (1971) carries her emphasis on predictability to the point
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which she states

it is the unexpected quality of much in family living

that makes it hazardous" (p. 512).

She not only suggests the type of

desired family, but prescribes what kind of lives those families should
live.

This "assumes desirability of conformity to standards or norms

and allows no place for change, confusing variability or uncertainty"
(Troll, 1973, p. 69).
The deviance of other family forms.

The FLC is one example of how

the attempt to discover universals in the social sciences is confused
with identifying the normative which is in turn confused with the ideal.
Levine (1981) cites a number of family researchers (Birdwhistell, 1970;
Jackson and Lederer, 1968; Schorr and Moen, 1979) who concur that iden¬
tifying one family form as normal sets it up as an idealized model which
leads to the pejorative labeling of other family forms as deviant.
Weigert and Thomas (1971), writing on the universality of the family,
state that in naming one family form as universal, any variations are
implied to be aberrant.

Nock (1979) and Segalen (1973) both acknowledge

that FLC models lead to the labeling of non-nuclear families as deviant.
Hareven (1974) notes that '"family breakdown' has been subject to the
demonology of the theorists of 'social disorganization'" (p. 325).

And

in the field of family therapy, Haley (1973) reminds clinicians that
they "labor under the burden of myths of how families ought to be rather
than how they are" (p. 42).
In outlining the Developmental Approach, which forms the foundation
of the FLC, Hill and Rodgers (1964) assert that a number of family types
without an appropriate number of positions filled, such as childless and
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one-parent families, exhibit a "deficit in structure" (p. 185).

Con¬

versely, family types with additional positions to those prescribed,
such as families with three generations, with stepchildren and with out
of wedlock children, have an "excess of structure" (p. 185).

Hill and

Rodgers follow with a claim that such deficits and excesses "would
present problems in boundary setting and boundary maintenance" (p. 185).
Even if their views have changed since that time, the FLC, which was
built on these values, has not.
Glick (1977) in acknowledging that we do not yet know the impact of
growing up in a single-parent household, implies that we need to examine
the effects of diverse family forms before promoting one form as ideal.
FLC models continue to present the overly idealized nuclear family as
preferable, relegating variations to undesirable status.

Levine (1981)

thoroughly documents the deleterious effects of overly idealized or
overly negative expectations on self-image and performance.

In applying

a developmental framework to family therapy, it is critical to chances
of success that such pitfalls be avoided.
Christensen (1969), writing in support of normative theory, admits
that value-free research is probably impossible.

He suggests that re¬

searchers should (a) try to be value-free anyway or (b) clearly state
their values.

To the extent that they fail to do either, FLC composers

limit the utility of their models.
Aldous1 model.

Some FLC researchers have attempted to address the

narrow range of normative values of these models.
sents five FLC models based on various criteria.

Aldous (1978) pre¬
Four of the models
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offer different punctuation of nuclear family life cycles.

One model is

based on membership patterns and another on the age and role transitions
of the oldest child.

The third model combines the criteria of the two

preceding ones and results in the Duvall model.

The fourth model, which

Aldous chooses to base her book on, is basically the same as Duvall's
with very slight changes.

As one exception to the nuclear family, she

proposes FLC "stages for single-parent families of divorced women"
(1978, p. 93).
Stage I
Stage II
Stage
Stage
Stage
Stage

III
IV
V
VI

Establishment of the Single-Parent Family
Women Institute or Reinstitute their Work-Life
Career
Women with Adolescents
Women with Young Adults
Women in the Middle Years
The Retirement of Women from Work-Life Career or
Responsibilities for Parents (Aldous, 1978, p. 93)

The assumption of the ideal nuclear family values still underlies this
model and by Aldous' own admission much is left out.

This approach of

adding on a variation to the basic nuclear family in some ways intensi¬
fies the normative problem.

Despite the desire to affirm varying family

structures, as long as the nuclear model remains the central or ideal
form, others are implied to be deviant.
Carter and McGoldrick's (1980) model suffers from the same diffi¬
culty.

It should be noted that McGoldrick is a well known advocate in

the family therapy field for recognizing the importance of ethnic diver¬
sity.

She pleads eloquently and forcefully that therapists should

assume that FLC stages vary significantly across ethnic groups.
Addressing those concerns. Carter and McGoldrick present FLC models of
divorced, poor

and-.

Mexican-American families.

However, using the
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middle-class nuclear family as a prototype as they do, implies that
other forms are not as desirable.

In some ways, these models identify

deviancy as much as they affirm diversity.
It is not useful to view the values problems inherent in the FLC as
being the researchers' intentions or beliefs.

These philosophical dif¬

ficulties can be more usefully identified as being associated with the
view of a family as a collection of members and to the problems of stage
theory.

The next problem section sheds further light on this issue.

Organizing Concepts
Definition of family.

On a more abstract level than the normative

values issue, there are a number of assumed philosophical concepts basic
to the FLC that hamper its utility when applied to family therapy.

From

a systemic perspective these concepts have to do with how levels of
organization and boundaries are used to picture family life.

The parti¬

cular problematic concepts discussed here are (1) a confusion of class
and member in the definition of families, (2) a view of families as
closed systems, and (3) an individual orientation to family development.
How a family is defined--on what level and by what boundaries-reveals problems with the FLC.

Researchers refer to "the family" and

"the family life cycle" rather than "a family or families"
life cycles."

and "family

In so doing they suggest a homogeneity that does not

exist or at least an ideal that many will not achieve.

The difference

between "the" and "a" may appear to be picayune, but this semantic
problem has fundamental repercussions for how researchers organize their
concept of families.

By trying to define "the family" with a particular
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instance or prototype of "a family" researchers confuse the class of
families with one of its members.
Watzlawick et al. (1967) in explaining Bertrand Russell's theory of
logical types point out that a class--a set of members or elements--is
not organized in the same manner as one of the members.

For example,

families in general are not a family; there are not parent-child nor
sibling relationships in the way that there are between members of a
family.

The member-class distinction has been a basic issue in family

therapy.

While it may be argued that the FLC was not designed to meet

family therapy criteria, as the FLC has been proposed to serve as a
developmental framework for family therapy (Carter and McGoldrick,
1980), it must now address those criteria.

Even in different fields,

the FLC could benefit from a clarification of class and member.
Researchers are correct in suggesting that developmental notions
should apply to the class of families.

However, defining family devel¬

opment by a prototype is a mismatch of levels.

The prototype is too

specific to portray the diversity of families and it is not flexible
enough conceptually to capture the complex specifics of the families it
is supposed to describe.

The prototype approach is not general enough

in some ways and not specific enough in others.

This violates what

Mogey (1966) calls the twin principles of theory building:

a minimum

number of concepts and a maximum level of generality.
Carter and McGoldrick's model.

This is the difficulty underlying

Aldous' (1978) and Carter and McGoldrick's (1980) attempt to supplement
the basic FLC with variations.

It not only identifies, apparently
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unintentionally, the variations as not quite normal, it also makes one
realize that there are possibly endless permutations of the FLC when it
is organized in this fashion.

Carter and McGoldrick's FLC is now the

fcjcr model in the family therapy field and is presented on the next
page.
Carter and McGoldrick (1980) use a combination of Duvall's and
Haley's FLC models to define the basic FLC in a more interactional
manner than Duvall and in a more systematic manner than Haley.

To flesh

out the six stages, they describe "key principles of the emotional pro¬
cess of transition" for each stage and the "second order (discontinuous)
changes in family status required to proceed developmentally" (p. 17).
The key principles and second order changes replace Duvall's more
individually oriented positions and developmental tasks.
ciples and changes represent ideal values or goals.

These prin¬

For example, the

key principle in Stage I is "accepting parent offspring separation" (p.
17) and one of three second-order changes in stage IV is "refocus on
midlife marital and career issues" (p. 17).

Once again, the values sug¬

gested are those frequently ascribed to the middle class nuclear family.
In addition to the basic FLC, a model describing dislocations and
restabilizations of divorced families is proposed.

This supplemental

approach of adding on differing forms to the basic model portrays struc¬
tural variations as deviations with dangerous implications for develop¬
mental progress.
The presentation of the Duvall, Aldous and Carter and McGoldrick
models illustrates the points that applicability of the FLC to family
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Second Order Changes in Family Status
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therapy is severely limited by (1) the narrow range of normative values
prescribed and (2) the use of a prototypical family, which either misses
the diversity and complexity of family development or generates so many
different FLC models as to be confusing.

By trying to overcome the

problems of the basic FLC model by adding on supplemental features (such
as multigenerational, ethnic diversity and interactional emphases)
Carter and McGoldrick's (1980) model is a first order solution (Watzlawick et al., 1974) to a problem that requires second order change.

Once

a sauce is burnt, no additional flavorings will remove the taste; one
must start over.

(First order change refers to shifts that leave the

basic organizational pattern of a system intact.

Second order change is

indicated by a thorough, discontinuous reorganization of a system.)
Closed system view.

Constructing the conceptual foundation of the

Developmental Approach to the study of the family. Hill and Rodgers
(1964) define a "family as a closed system of interacting personalities"
(p. 177).

Hill and Hansen (1960) also specified as one of five basic

assumptions of the approach that "the individual in a social setting is
the basic autonomous unit" (p. 309).

These closely related philosophi¬

cal assumptions have fundamentally constrained FLC models and reveal how
boundaries are used in explaining family systems.
Bertalanffy (1928) first defined open and closed systems.

A system

is considered relatively open to the extent that it could regulate its
input and output.

A closed system, then, is one in which input and

output functions are predetermined and cannot be altered by the system.
Hill and other FLC researchers use the term closed to indicate that a
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DISLOCATIONS OF THE FAMILY LIFE CYCLE REQUIRING ADDITIONAL STEPS
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system's development is primarily determined by its own internal
rhythms.

A system can be viewed as closed to the extent that its action

can be explained without resorting to events or conditions external to
the system.

To explain a family in this manner was the aim of the De¬

velopmental Approach to the family (Hill and Rodgers, 1964) and is how
the term will be used here.
The closed system assumption indicates impermeable family bounda¬
ries prohibiting developmental influence from or to a family's environ¬
ment.

The impact of culture and society on family development is

ignored.

The individual orientation suggests that a family system is

composed of entities, thus minimizing the relational aspect of family
life.

Both assumptions are atomistic in that they organize their target

of observation into units or things that can be separated from their
context.

These philosophical principles impact conceptualization of

families at every level.
One of the major consequences of the closed systems assumption is
that environmental and interactional influences in the FLC are minimized
as biological development is viewed as the primary force in families
(Clavan, 1969).

The shifting membership configurations based on aging

are the basic biological or internal rhythms that determine development.
Biology is a necessary but insufficient force to explain family develop¬
ment.

In all orientations to therapy the controversy rages over the

causal functions of biology.

The success of family therapy, however,

has come through the emphasis on family interaction within a social
context.
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Interactionally, FLC models do acknowledge that children go to
school and most assume that at least one family member attempts to
secure work.

Carter and McGoldrick's (1980) is the best in that regard,

but the examination of family development through those spheres stops at
those minimal recognitions.

In one FLC model the authors state that "an

isolated conjugal family" is necessary to perform life cycle analysis
(Lansing and Kish, 1957, p. 513).

This is part of a process that

Mishler (1979) calls context stripping.

Ignoring societal and cultural

factors legitimizes the prototypical family approach to the FLC in that
as soon as a family is seen as an open system in exchange with its con¬
text, differences between families appear that cannot be explained with
a prototype model.
Regarding the closed system approach based on biology, many re¬
searchers have recognized the need to examine the FLC in the actions of
a social context.

Feldman and Feldman (1975) and Hareven (1974) both

note that the FLC does not account for the impact of societal factors on
family development.

Clavan (1969) suggests that the FLC should consider

the social milieu of families.

And Leichter (1970) and Stolte-Heiskanen

(1975) call for an examination of the institutional linkages that fami¬
lies experience.

An interesting consequence of a closed systems view is

that many of the FLC critics recommend that the environmental and inter¬
actional limitations should be remedied by taking a more individualistic
view of the FLC (Clavan, 1969; Feldman and Feldman, 1975; Hareven, 1974;
Weigert and Thomas, 1971).
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Individual orientation.

An individual orientation to family life

is an expected occurrence if one prefers to explain a family by its in¬
ternal factors, for in a closed systems view a family appears to be made
up of individual members, rather than the patterns of relationships that
unite them.
Carter and McGoldrick (1980) note that Duvall conceptualized
"family primarily as a collection of individual life cycles" (p. 6).
Duvall's work borrowed heavily from Havighurst (1953) for basic defini¬
tions of development and developmental task.

As she basically substi¬

tuted the word family for individual in these definitions, development
is depicted mainly as individual efforts which are fit alongside the
tasks of other family members.

There is no inherent problem with using

individually oriented information in building family development theory
as long as one remembers that an individual human organism is arranged
and develops quite differently than a family organization.

Duvall de¬

scribes each member in terms of positions and roles, which are recipro¬
cally related, but she only minimally addresses interaction as a devel¬
opmental mode.
function.

Leichter (1970) states that a role is an entity, not a

The individual orientation of Duvall is necessarily a build¬

ing block approach of using the entities of roles and positions to add
up to an individual entity, which summed with other individual entities
combines to form a family as an entity.

Referring to families as a col¬

lection of members, though, is similar to referring to individuals as a
collection of organs; the undeniable, essential quality of the living
whole is missed.
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Like Duvall, Carter and McGoldrick (1980) define their model by
shifting membership patterns, the mark of a closed system.

While their

major developmental tasks are more interactional than previous models,
almost all are related to "internal" requirements of families.

Despite

their belief that "the family is more than the sum of its parts" (1980,
p. 4), in the primary theoretical chapter in their book the purpose of a
family is defined as providing "a context that supports need attainment
for all its individual members" (Terkelson, 1980, p. 25).

No mention is

made of a family's necessary function in its culture and society.

This

individualistic view ignores possible purposes of families as units in
relation to other systems.

This view would limit a family therapist's

effectiveness if they assumed this as the primary purpose of a family.
In summary, a major problem resulting from the combination of the
closed system and individual orientation assumptions is that boundaries
are used to emphasize entities in the FLC.

Each stage is pictured as a

more or less closed system, a unit unto itself that arises abruptly from
biological and/or status changes of family members.

While FLC research¬

ers view stages as distinct units (Aldous, 1972), they also state that
performance in one stage facilitates or inhibits performance at a
succeeding stage (Duvall, 1971).

This type of determinism is more remi¬

niscent of Bertalanffy's definition of closed system in that input and
output cannot be regulated by the family system because previous stages
are supposedly irreversible.
Further, in the FLC, individuals are viewed as entities and fami¬
lies are portrayed as collections of entities.

This is precisely the

60

approach that family therapy tries to avoid.

Whitaker notes that he "no

longer believes in individual persons . . . individuals are fragments of
families" (1983).

For a developmental framework to be useful in family

therapy a family must be seen as a unity of relationships, not a collec¬
tion of entities.

CHAPTER

III

METHODOLOGY
This study constructed a theoretical framework and meta-model of
family development.

These tools were designed to describe the change

and growth of a family's organization in a manner relevant to systemsbased family therapies.

In Chapter I, the Overview of Methods section

of this theoretical research outlined a two step method.

The first step

was the initial theory building of the framework and meta-model by this
author.

The second step was refinement of the theory through conversa¬

tions with family therapy theorists.
Consistent with the epistemological emphasis of this research, as
the specific procedures of the methodology are detailed, two aspects of
theory development will be discussed to illuminate the author's assump¬
tions.

(1) A systemic perspective on the genesis and focus of a theory

and (2) the criteria of an acceptable theory will be integrated into the
procedures of the methodology.
The integration of the abstract description of theory development
with the concrete description of method procedures may seem tangential
or confusing at times.

But it is viewed here as necessary, as one level

ultimately explains the organization of the other level.

This is not a

one way influence, from abstract to concrete, but a continuing recipro¬
cal influence.
seem confusing.

It is the repeated transition between levels that may
There is no excuse for confusing sentence structure.

Development of a theory in this case is viewed as a series of re¬
cursive loops or a cybernetic process, in which one factor modifies
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other factors which in turn (eventually) modify the original factor.
The most vivid illustration of this process is a drawing by Escher which
pictures two hands with pencils, each drawing the other hand.

This

cybernetic nature is the reason why the perspective of theory develop¬
ment is integrated into the procedures rather than presented separately.
The first major step in the development of this theory has two
aspects:

the collection of data from various literatures and the syn¬

thesis of a framework and meta-model derived from this data and the
author's assumptions.

Collection of Data
The raw information necessary to the theory development of this
study was gathered from two bodies of knowledge:
content literature.

epistemological and

The underlying theme that unites the literature

from these areas of knowledge is the concern with the nature of change.
The epistemological literature was drawn from a wide variety of
fields, including evolution, philosophy, physics, biology, chemistry,
philosophy of science and topology.

All the concepts fit coherently

with or contribute to the expansion of this author's systemic perspec¬
tive in that they explain change as whole systems interacting within a
specific context.

This literature is deemed epistemological in that the

identified concepts are relative to the content literature, more ab¬
stract and therefore more descriptive of how change happens and how we
know it.

These concepts serve as guides in describing how change occurs

in families, rather than describing specific changes in families.

The
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following authors and topics from the respective fields mentioned above
appear to fit the systemic criteria:

Jantsch on the Self-Organizing

Paradigm (1980); Bateson on the Isomorphism of Mind and Mature (1979);
Heisenberg on the Uncertainty Principle (1972); Mataurana on Structure
Determinism (1979); Prigogine on Dissipative Structures (1972); Giddens
on Structuration (1975); and Thom on Catastrophe Theory (1972).
The content literature was drawn from investigations of families,
human development, and cultural differences.

Again the criteria for use

in this study were concepts explaining change from a systemic perspec¬
tive.

The content literature is more specifically concerned with the

nature of human systems and their development.

The following authors

and topics appear to fit the systemic criteria in this area:

from

family sociology--Broderick on the General Systems Approach (1979), and
Sprey on Conflict Theory (1974); from individual development--Piaget on
Genetic Epistemology (1970), Kegan on Equilibration (1981), and Gilligan
on Women's Development (1981); and from the study of cultures--Highwater
on the Cultural Bases of Perception (1981).
These literatures were selected according to this author's assump¬
tions, but they also modified those assumptions.

Abstractly from a

systemic perspective, the development of a theory is a reciprocal, or
more complexly, a cybernetic process.

Jantsch (1975), drawing on

Vickers' concept of the appreciated world (p. 106), proposes that humans
utilize a cybernetic appreciative system to design their view on and
interaction with the world.

An appreciative system synthesizes new

information from the differences "between the world as we want it to be
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(myths) and the world as we actually perceive it" (Jantsch, 1975, p.
106).

Intolerable differences between our myths and actual perception

result in the emergence of new models of the world, which eventually
become our myths in a deepened appreciated world.

In Jantsch's design

process myths and models inform each other over time in a cybernetic
loop.

Jantsch views design as the basic mechanism through which we

perceptually organize and interact with the world.

From this systemic

perspective, theory building is a special type of human design.

The

genesis of theory comes from the resulting designs of the appreciative
system.

The focus of systemic theory building is the modeling process.

A systemic perspective considers how a system is organized as a whole to
be its most critical feature.

A successful model captures that sense of

the whole with a minimum number of concepts.

Systemic theory building

starts with the outline of an emergent model and culminates with a sup¬
plemental and refined model.

Construction of a Framework and Meta-Model

The second aspect of the initial theory draws on data gathered from
the epistemological and content literatures to formulate a framework and
meta-model of family development.

More precisely, differences within

the literature data, filtered through the values and assumptions of this
author, resulted in the framework and meta-model.
It was previously noted that systemic theory development begins
with an emergent model and indeed such a model outline did pre-exist
this dissertation (Bloomfield, Kaplan and Nielsen, 1981).

The research
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in the present study involved constructing a more comprehensive theory
that explains and enriches the model.

In comparison to other studies,

this model outline resembles the initial hypotheses before they are put
into empirical form.

So the model is a starting point and the great

bulk of the theory development remains to be done.

This model will not

be presented in this chapter as that is not necessary to determine the
utility and consistency of the methodology.

What will be offered, how¬

ever, is the central organizing principle of the model abstracted into a
theoretical hypothesis.
Central Hypothesis
In constructing an adequate family developmental theory for system¬
ic family therapy the diversity of family structure, the complexity of
family process and the theoretical congruence with a systemic perspec¬
tive will be the focal issues.

The central organizing principle of the

initial model of family development addresses all three issues.

This

principle is that the evolution of rule-making processes and structures
of families is an appropriate level of discourse and an adequate de¬
scription of the development of family organizations.
Rules may not be accepted by all family therapy theorists as useful
as they are inferences by an observer of how family interaction is
guided.

They are viewed in this study as a special type of pattern of

family interaction.

It is because they are derived from the concept of

pattern, a common term among almost all family therapy theorists, that
rules are deemed an adequate term for this study.
defined in Chapter IV.

Rules are fully
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The central principle is viewed as evidencing congruence with sys¬
temic family therapy as it utilizes pattern (rules) and organization as
its major concepts.

Family therapists analyze families in terms of how

patterns (relationships and/or rules) are organized into a whole to pro¬
duce behavior.

Therefore this central principle operates at a level

which is necessary for the practice of family therapy.
This principle adequately addresses the diversity issue as it
examines families in terms of rule making and organizational change, not
in terms of membership structure.

Further, it is at an appropriate

level of generality so that no particular membership structure can be
identified as normal.

Therefore, all families are described as differ¬

ent and none are necessarily normal and deviant according to their
structure (Jackson, 1983).
This principle addresses complexity as the concept of rules is
flexible.

It can account for very broad time frames with very general

sequences of interaction involving many people and can also account for
very specific time frames with sequences involving one or two people.
In addressing diversity and complexity the principle shows adequate
generality and specificity to address the criteria for a developmental
theory.

Criteria of a Theory
The questions at the beginning of Chapter II also served as guiding
hypotheses to the construction of a theory of family development for
systemic family therapy.

So the central organizing principle and the

above mentioned questions, representative of this author s values and
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assumptions, modified and were modified by the collected literature
data.

Through this process, a framework and meta-model were abstracted,

leading toward the construction of a theory of family development.
It is now appropriate to ask the questions:

what are the criteria

of an adequate theory; what must a theory do and how can it be struc¬
tured?
In general, a theory is concerned with the connections of elements
within a specified domain (scope).

More specifically it is important

for a theory to describe, explain and predict and/or prescribe the na¬
ture of the connections that the theory addresses.
tion is:

The critical ques¬

what is the nature of the connections that theories describe?

Theories attempt to describe the regularities of the connections that
activate a system.

In the view espoused here, it is not required that a

theory describe necessary and sufficient (causal) connections.

To be

useful, a theory must describe a necessary level of observation for the
identified discipline.

But once that necessary level is identified, a

theorist can discuss the contingencies of those connections rather than
the necessity of connections.

In this study there are four descriptive

levels of the regularity of connections.

The levels are organized in

concentric circles with conditions of sufficiency represented by the
innermost circle, conditions of necessity the next, conditions of con¬
tingency next, and random conditions representing the outermost circle.
A theory is viewed here as more useful if it can describe necessary and
sufficient connections, but even then contingent and random conditions
should be specified to show limitations of the theory.

(The difference
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between contingency and random is that under contingent conditions the
likelihood of an occurrence can be estimated, and under random condi¬
tions it cannot.)
Chapter IV.

These concepts will be more fully explicated in

The connections can be described in terms of structure

and/or process but, a theory must exhibit conceptual consistency through¬
out.

In brief summary, the minimum that a theory must do on an abstract

level is to identify its domain or scope, describe the nature of the
connections within that scope and do so with conceptual consistency.
While pieces of the above argument can be found in many places, this
author cannot find anyone else to hold responsible for the whole of
those views.
How a theory can be structured has found reasonable agreement in
the social scientific community.

Abstracting from Harre (1970) and

Stryker (1964) a typical theory can be described as (1) a set of assump¬
tions used to approach some domain, (2) a set of concepts used to de¬
scribe that domain, and (3) a set of propositions based on the assump¬
tions and concepts that serve as laws of that domain.
Harre's (1970) alternative view to the typical theory has informed
the conception of a theory in this study.

Here, the notion of a theory

has been expanded and modified to fit the assumptions outlined in Chap¬
ter I.

The first aspect of a theory includes not only the assumptions

of the researcher, but a statement of their values as well.

The second

aspect of a theory incorporates steps 2 and 3 from the typical theory
above.

Specific frames of reference are used to define a scope,

critical concepts are defined to describe the domain and a set of
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interrelated principles are constructed to describe how the domain
operates.

(This modification of the term propositions into principles

is important because (a) it removes the lawlike inference and (b) it
implies a more explicit role of the theorist's values.

No one ever

makes a stand on his or her propositions, but some are moved to make a
stand on their principles.)

The third and last aspect of a theory for

the sake of this study is only a supplement in the typical approach and
is drawn from Harre (1970) and Jantsch (1975).

The most central aspect

of a theory is a model, a representation of the process and/or structure
of the identified system wthin the specified domain.

A model is central

because, as mentioned previously, it captures a sense of the whole
process/structure of the system with the least concepts.
The second aspect describes the framework that shall be offered;
specified frames of reference, defined concepts, constructed interre¬
lated principles, all synthesized into a framework of family develop¬
ment.

The third aspect describes the meta-model of family development

that shall be proposed.

It is a model because it will be the represen¬

tation of a structure and process of families; it is meta because it
will be capable of generating other models of family development.
It is important to note that the criteria of an adequate theory
were presented in this manner for the sake of conceptual clarity.
Theory development does not proceed in that order.

Theory development

from a systemic perspective occurs in a cybernetic fashion.

While the

modelling process is the focus of systemc theory development, the
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various aspects of theory reciprocal!y and continuously affect each
other until the theorist is satisfied with their depiction.
The second step of the methodology will now be easier to describe
than the first step as the theoretical foundations have already been
outlined.

Conversational Review Method
To obtain its final results the study will use a conversational
method.

This term has been adapted from the ideas of Churchman (1982).

He noted that his design of an ideal life was based on "conversations"
with historical and current figures that he admired.

It is a good name

and useful guide for refining the method devised for this study.
Almost every book and article in a professional field acknowledges
the influence of informed reviewers.
formalized through this method.

In this work that process will be

Since the appeal and to some extent the

utility of a theory is often initially determined by the response of
those involved in similar pursuits, written and verbal "conversations"
with family therapy theorists interested in the topic were recognized as
a useful method to supplement and revise the theory.

The conversational

method, then, is viewed as a continuation and refinement of the recur¬
sive modeling process in theory development.
are outlined below.

The aspects of the method
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Identifying Reviewers
This author generated a list of family therapy theorists he consi¬
dered interested in the topic.

That list was then circulated locally to

four practicing systemic family therapy trainers.

People at this level

of practice were considered knowledgeable enough to help identify a
reasonable group of theorists.

From their input, a consensus was ab¬

stracted on which theorists to contact.

A letter was sent to those

theorists outlining the project and requesting their participation.

If

someone's reply was not received within one month, it was assumed they
were not interested in participating.
Design Synopsis of Theory
A twenty-five page synopsis of the research—problem, assumptions,
data, framework and meta-model—was designed for review by the identi¬
fied theorists.

This aspect was monitored by the dissertation committee

and thus, the synopsis is not presented in this dissertation.

The

synopsis was abstracted from the results of initial theory development.
Open-ended questions were incorporated into the synopsis to gener¬
ate the widest possible range of responses.

The questions concerned

(1) the internal consistency of the theory, (2) the theory's coherence
with various concepts and perspectives currently in the forefront of the
systemic family therapy field, and (3) the theory's potential utility in
practice.
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Model Refinement
When the responses were received by the author they were weighed
against the model and against the responses of the other reviewers.
responses were then discussed with the dissertation committee.

The

These

comparisons and discussions were used to refine the model and theory.
It should be stressed that these responses were not treated as
empirical data.

Firstly, they were opinions, not the results of an

empirical test and secondly, they cannot be separated out and measured
without destroying their quality.

These responses are part of a recur¬

sive, cybernetic loop process (feedback or feedforward depending upon
one's perspective) and thus are part of a whole system not to be under¬
stood if reductionistically broken down into constituent parts.

As part

of this cybernetic process, this researcher made the final determination
of the influence of the responses on the theory based on his stated
values and assumptions, rather than relying on some statistical or
"objective" measure.
The ideas, criticism and influence of the responses on the theory
are credited to the particular reviewers to the extent possible.

The

final version of the theory in this study, then, shows explicit evidence
of the conversational method.
As a supplement to this dual methodology, applications of the meta¬
model are discussed in the concluding chapter.

These applications

include a case example of a family that was assessed using the meta¬
model.

These applications are a supplement as this study is primarily

theoretical and not concerned with demonstrating its practical value as
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part of this dissertation.

Also, these applications are not intended to

be rigorous, empirical tests, but only to hint at possible uses.
research will have to be part of a further study.

Such

CHAPTER

IV

FOUNDATIONS OF THE THEORY
The second half of this study begins with Chapter IV.

The first

half identified philosophical assumptions grounding the study, problems
with the current developmental framework of family therapy and the meth¬
ods used to construct an alternative framework and model of family
development.

The term meta-model will be used to include both framework

and model.
This half consists of three chapters.
foundation of the meta-model:

Chapter IV presents the

basic concepts of the meta-model, cri¬

teria for an adequate framework of family development, and fundamental
principles of development.

Chapter V presents specific contexts through

which family development occurs and the process model of family develop¬
ment that is the heart of this study.

Chapters IV and V are like a

language, or more specifically, like a generative grammar as they define
terms that can be used to describe family development.

Chapter VI pre¬

sents applications and implications of the meta-model for family ther¬
apy.
The results of this study yield a meta-model of family development.
The meta-model is a series of concepts.

It is presented by defining the

concepts, their conditions of operation and how they are connected to
one another.

It is called a meta-model as it is a model of development

in its own right and is capable of generating other models of family and
social system development.

In response to a reviewer s comment
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(Doherty) it is important to state that much of the process of development that the meta-model describes is unconscious, and overall con¬
sciousness is basically irrelevant to the theory.

It was noted in Chap¬

ter III that presentation of the meta-model will involve providing
abstract descriptions supplemented with concrete examples.

Although

repeatedly moving from an abstract to a concrete level and back may at
times interrupt the flow of the explanation, this format was chosen as
the best for elucidating the meta-model.

Most of the examples of family

development are micro-examples, which discuss brief interaction.

While

the meta-model is capable of explaining broader time frames, these types
of interactions are the most appropriate considering continuity and
conciseness of presentation.
The study focuses on family development, but the meta-model also
has application to other living systems.

One of the measures of the

systemic quality of a concept is not only how well it connects informa¬
tion within a system, but also how well it explains the operation of
other levels and types of systems.

Therefore, while most of the exam¬

ples cited will describe family interaction, it will be useful at times
to refer to examples from biological, physical and other social systems.
The examples are like thought experiments which allow an observer to
examine the utility of a concept under particular conditions.

There is

a brief description of the general concepts of a systemic view early in
this chapter, but most systemic ideas on the occurrence of change and
development are integrated into the other categories.
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In addition, some comments of reviewers of the condensed version of
the meta-model will be integrated throughout the text.
comments will be briefly summarized in Chapter VI.

The reviewers'

Reviewers will be

cited in the text only by their last name in parentheses [ex. (Hoffman)]
and will be listed in a separate appendix.

One of the reviewers

(Doherty) suggested that statements of personal values would be useful
in supplementing the philosophical assumptions discussed at the begin¬
ning of the study would help further clarify the meta-model.

So,

throughout a number of statements of personal values and beliefs will be
integrated into the text.

General Criteria of Theory

The nature and criteria of an adequate theory have been debated for
many centuries.

All theories have some similarities at a general level.

A theory creates a domain of discourse about a particular phenomenon.
Theories create a domain by unifying and simplifying knowledge about a
range of phenomena.

For example, Newton's theory of gravity related

many previously unconnected phenomena and made explainable events that
were previously baffling.

However, of equal importance to unifying and

simplifying, theories allow distinctions to be drawn where none were
possible and thus promote a more complex understanding of a phenomenon.
In family therapy, Jackson's theory of family homeostasis (1957) offered
an explanation of many puzzling actions and thus allowed therapists to
develop a wide variety of sophisticated techniques in response to
resistance."
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Beyond these general similarities the structure of theories varies
widely.

As Sprey (1978) notes the form of a theory is arbitrary.

Kelly

(1955) states that the more accurately a theory can predict and control
events the more scientific it is.

Prediction and control are not seen

as desirable values in this study, so the theory resulting from this
study is epistemological, in that it provides new ways to construct
knowledge, not control reality.

Giddens (1979) claims that when used in

a theory, the term description means an elucidation of the relations of
the phenomenon under observation and the term explanation means a state¬
ment of the generative mechanisms of the phenomenon.

While that is

generally how those terms will be used here, it should be clarified that
explanation will refer to generative conditions and those conditions are
not linearly causal.
in designing a theory.

Dubin (1970) suggests omitting causal assertions
That finds agreement here, as causal assertions

are seen as a refuge of the unimaginative.

The generative conditions

are the regularities of operation of a system which allow novel behavior
to emerge.

As noted in Chapter III, this study's particular approach to

theory design uses models as the central aspect of a theory, not laws of
traditional theories.
Mogey (1966) states that a minimum number of concepts which allow
maximum generality are the keys to successful theory building.

Thus, a

theory's power or effectiveness rests on (a) its economy of exposition
and (b) its breadth and detail of description.
tional measures of effectiveness of a theory.
identify its effect on the observed.

Here, there are addi¬
One is (c) its ability to

For example, current theories of
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the nature of light recognize that by setting certain conditions light
behaves like a wave and under other conditions like a particle.

In fam¬

ily therapy, a number of schools acknowledge that the mere presence of
an observer alters the way a family interacts.

Further, consistent with

Kelly (1955), this approach to theory measures effectiveness by (d) the
ability to reveal the uniqueness of each case.

A Systemic View
It has been previously noted that family therapy is both a deriva¬
tive from and contributor to systems theory.

Just like the nature of a

theory, what constitutes systems theory is the subject of endless asser¬
tion and revision.
debate.

It is not the concern of this study to clarify that

What is offered is a summary of the critical concepts necessary

to understanding the meta-model of this study.
There are three concepts basic to a systemic view:
wholeness, relations and context.
nature of a system.

organized

Wholeness is the essential defining

It refers to the belief that the whole cannot be

explained by the sum of its parts and that the operation of the system
cannot be understood without reference to that wholeness.

Perhaps one

of the best examples of wholeness/nonsummativity of a system is humor.
Ideas connected in ways unexpected make humor projected and laughter
detected.

On the other hand, a joke dissected to explain why it is

funny is one of the world's dullest experiences.
stituents of a system into a whole.

Relations unify con¬

Relations do not merely connect the

constituents of a system, those constituents are included in, are an
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aspect of the relations.

The constituents, members, elements of a sys¬

tem are in themselves patterns of relations.
in relation to a child.

A father is only a father

And one looks at the nature and quality of the

relationships, not merely the content.

Using relations as the primary

tool to describe systems suggests that when one aspect of a system
changes the rest of the system must change some way in response.

Circu¬

lar causality has been used as a metaphor to explain this aspect of
systemic relations.

A classic example is an argument between spouses.

It is impossible to tell who or what started it, but it is also impos¬
sible for one not to be affected in some way by the other's actions.
Context refers to the conditions which allow a system to be viable.
meaning is linked to a context.

All

Thus, context influences the specific

structure of a system, but context can also be influenced by the systems
it supports.

The concept of culture shock provides a social example of

the importance of context and jet lag an analogous biological example.
Providing an elaboration of a systemic view, Maturana and Varela
(1980) have used the term organization to refer to the essential rela¬
tions of a system, structure to specify the actual relations of a system
in time and space and the term coupling to describe how a system fits
with its context.

These terms are a valuable tool in understanding the

meta-model of this study and bear explanation.
The biological organization of all male humans is the same.

The

biological structure of male humans varies widely and, in fact, the
structure of each is unique.
of all humans is alike.

One could also say that the organization

This shows the critical role of the punctuation
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of an observer in defining a system.

The structure of a biological sys¬

tem changes over its lifetime, but the organization remains the same.
If.a person received an artificial heart, their structure would change,
but their organization remains the same.

The specific structure of a

system is influenced by how it fits or couples with its context.

Ini¬

tial contextual conditions allow a system to establish its organization.
Biologically, one thinks of the primordial ooze being struck by lightn¬
ing that allowed various amino acids to combine into a self-perpetuating
system.

Socially, one thinks of a singles bar catalyzed by music, drugs

and loneliness that allows participants to establish a relationship of
unknown duration.

The specific organization of the system is determined

not by the context, but by the resources of the constituents and how
they can be fit together.

A singles bar may provide an arena for people

to meet, but how they get along depends on how they psychologically fit
together.

The structure of an existing system is coordinated, negotia¬

ted between the system and the context.

This accommodation on the part

of both the system and context is called coupling.

The complementary

relationship between the plant and animal kingdoms as they exchange
oxygen and carbon dioxide is an example of how systems and context
couple with one another.

The skin color of humans in response to envi¬

ronmental conditions is another biological example of how a system
couples with its context.

How these concepts--organization, structure

and coupling--apply to social systems will be further elaborated in the
definitional section on families.
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There is one more set of systemic concepts that will be useful to
define before proceeding with the meta-model:
participant.

observer, observed and

Maturana (1978) claims that all statements made are made

by an observer.

These statements connect the observer in a unique rela¬

tionship with the observed.

What the observer observes may be other

living systems, inanimate systems, themselves, etc.

The important point

is that the observer is never separate from the observed, even though
they have distinct identities.

A participant is someone who defines (by

their actions) that their primary interests are served by being a number
of a particular, human social system.

By these definitions a person can

be simultaneously or sequentially viewed as both an observer and a par¬
ticipant.

The utility in distinguishing between observer and partici¬

pant status is that it is a distinction between epistemology and ontol¬
ogy.

An observer can only engage in epistemology, can describe what

they know from their particular point of view.

A participant engages

directly in the reality of the systems of which they are a constituent,
but must use observer status to communicate that experience.

Highwater

(1981) provides an example of the difference between being a participant
and an observer:

"[I]f you want to tell someone about a dream you've

had, you must change the dream in order to facilitate its being ex¬
pressed in language.

You simply cannot get to what happened in the

dream that is so vivid to you . . ." (p. 5).

This distinction will be

important in the definition of family later on.
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Definitions of Basic Concepts
The meta-model begins with definitions of basic concepts:
development, rules, and levels.

family,

Each of these concepts has definition-

ally suffered from a lack of clarity and/or agreement among those who
use them theoretically.

Perhaps, this has been a problem because theo¬

rists have tried to define the total reality of the concepts and have
come up disappointed with only a piece of that reality.

Here, it is

believed that it is impossible to define the reality of these concepts
as they are epistemological notions; they describe what an observer
"sees," not the reality of what is seen.

Therefore, these definitions

are not offered as true, but as useful in their domains.
Each section presents a definition, a thorough explanation and the
philosophical concepts that are the foundation of the definition.

As

the meta-model is a series of definitions, these concepts are like
primary colors that are combined to create all the other colors
(concepts) in the meta-model.

Family
During this century there has been a multitude of definitions of
family in the social sciences.

These definitions have ranged from the

systemic, but overly inclusive and general "unity of interacting per¬
sonalities" (Burgess, 1926), to the reductionistic, but overly exclusive
"mother-child unit of interaction" (Reiss, 1965).
interesting, but incomplete definitions:

In between are other

"a group of people related by

marriage, birth or adoption" (dictionary definition), "a unit of
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nurturant socialization" (Hill & Hansen, 1978), or "a set of mutually
contingent careers" (Aldous, 1978).
them is satisfactory (Segalen, 1974).

The only agreement is that none of
In response, but not resolution,

to this issue, this study offers definitions of family on a number of
levels.
The definition of family depends on the level and field of observa¬
tion.

To gain a full understanding of the values of this study it is

necessary to define family from a number of perspectives.

Pragmatical¬

ly, a family will be defined as any group that identifies itself as
such.

Systemically, a family will be defined as a self-organizing, non¬

equilibrium, dissipative system.

Conceptually, a family will be defined

as a set of meanings unifying people into a primary social group.

Func¬

tionally, a family will be defined as an abstract human unity that gen¬
erates its members' species' and context's reasons and ability to sur¬
vive.

These particular definitions are not suggested as necessary or

true definitions, but it is suggested that multiple perspectives of the
definition of a family are necessary for a systemic approach.

All defi¬

nitions are partial, so multiple definitions provide a flexible and
fuller perspective.
The most basic definition is that a family is any group that de¬
fines itself as such.

This principle of self-definition is not an

avoidance of definition, but an acknowledgement that participants, not
observers, are the key to defining human social systems.

Further, this

means that families are self-defining just like individuals and cultures
are self-defining.

In an analogous example, the problems resulting from
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White, American culture trying to define Black, American culture, rather
than encouraging self-definition, have been multitudinous.

On an indi¬

vidual level, the actions of a young child which indicate that they
"would rather do it by myself" is an example of the imperative of self¬
definition.

Adults insist on self-definition more subtly.

This principle of family self-definition is critical to systemic
family therapy (an example is the Ericksonian principle, accept what the
patient brings you) and so is important for family development theory.
This definition allows theory to be non-normative or more precisely it
allows a family to be self-norming according to its society, culture,
members and unique organization.

One of the reviewers (McGoldrick)

disagreed with the self-definition principle and gave a group of homo¬
sexuals as an example of a group she would not accept as a family.
Any excursion into social theory presents an interesting dilemma
for the observer's relationship with the observed, as they are both an
observer and in some way a participant.

All families are self-defining

and all therapists, by virtue of their participation in primary fami¬
lies, have defined what family means to them.

In therapy the family

system is self-defining, but the definition of the therapy system-family + therapist(s)--is negotiated.

The negotiation is based on a

family's self-definition and the therapist(s) self-definition of what
constitutes a family.

As observers of their own family and other fami¬

lies they continually use their own definition of family to negotiate
what constitutes a family in each therapy situation.

And in a broader

context, every system's self-definition is constantly undergoing
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revision as its subsystems interact and as it interacts with other
systems.

What this explanation leads to is a claim that the self¬

definition assertion is not contradictory with the three following
observer based definitions, but is instead the basis for multiple
perspectives on families.
The principle of self-definition is based on the second definition,
drawn from work of Jantsch (1980) and Maturana and Varela (1980).

The

second definition is that a family is a self-organizing, non¬
equilibrium, dissipative system.

Maturana and Varela wrote about biolo¬

gical systems when they said that living systems renew themselves in a
way that preserves their integrity.

They refer to their own essential

organization to determine what types of changes are permissible, not
primarily to environmental conditions.

They call living systems auto-

poietic because they maintain the small organization throughout their
lifetime via self-reference.

Reference to DNA to determine the permis¬

sible patterns of growth in a human body is a good example of autopoiesis.

Maturana and Varela disagreed on whether or not social systems

are autopoietic.

While it depends on the point of view, here, social

systems are not seen as autopoietic, as they do not necessarily maintain
the same organization over their life course.

They are, however, seen

as self-organizing, as their essential relations are determined by how
the resources of the constituents can be fit together, not by environ¬
mental conditions.
lish a relationship.

For example, two people may meet in a bar and estab¬
Their interaction in the bar may be influenced by

the bar setting, but their relationship is determined by how they
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psychologically fit together, not by the bar or any subsequent settings.
Such a social system is self-referencing in that the growth and endur¬
ance of the relationship is determined by whether or not the relation¬
ship provides an adequate source of novelty and confirmation for the
members no matter what the environmental conditions.
and confirmation will be elaborated later.)
are relatively closed.

(The terms novelty

Organizationally, families

While organization determines the parameters of

structure, structurally, families are relatively open.
trayed in Fiddler on the Roof offers an example.

The family por¬

When one daughter of

this Jewish family wanted to marry someone other than the arranged
groom, but who was Jewish, the father determined that the family organi¬
zation had the flexibility to accommodate that structural change, even
though he would incur disfavor within his culture.
relative structural openness.

This demonstrates

However, when another daughter wanted to

marry someone outside the faith, the father agonized as he tried to
accommodate that structural change.

He realized that such a change

violated the family (not just cultural) organization and felt compelled
to disown his daughter.

This shows the limits of structural openness

relative to the family organization, in this particular case.

Each

family sets its own limits of flexibility according to what they per¬
ceive to be necessary for the psychological survival of the family.
Additionally, families are called non-equilibrium systems (Jantsch,
1980) as they maintain a dynamic order and avoid equilibrium.

Often

problems brought into therapy are those that threaten a system with
equilibrium or in the vernacular, stuckness.

Equilibrium for a living
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system means death.
scale.
ager.

Families constantly change, if only on a small

Relations fluctuate continually, ask any parent that has a teenThese fluctuations create the order of the relationship in the

sense that parties come to have a range of expected interaction based on
their various experiences together.

These fluctuations are most clear

in relationships like parents and teenagers, in which the pace of change
can get so rapid that nobody knows what to expect next.
involves an aging parent and their adult children.

Another example

They may feel the

need to reaffirm or revise major decisions on a frequent basis in re¬
sponse to the elder's failing health.

The fluctuations may be tiring

but are necessary to maintain the integrity of the relationship.

In

these types of situations fluctuations provide the order of the rela¬
tionship most obviously, but it is held here that that is the case in
all relationships.

This means that relationships are never stable.

The

value in this study is that stability is an inappropriate metaphor for
social systems because it does not fit with the more fundamental notion
of dynamic order.

Certain conditions endure longer than others, but

none are actually stable.

While steady state is better, in examining

patterns of family relationships change should be paired with endurance,
not stability.
Families are dissipative systems.

Biological and chemical dissipa¬

tive systems dissipate entropy (non-useful resources) as a way to main¬
tain a dynamic order (Jantsch, 1980).
lies.

Information is the fuel of fami¬

It is the interplay of differences that continually revises the

relational structure of a family.

Families are seen here as systems of
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conflict, that through the examination of differences establish and re¬
vise an enduring structure.

What they dissipate is infonration that has

little or no use in their current structure.

A simple example is the

point that people generally retain only about 20 percent of information
that they hear.

They contrast the various points of the information and

discard (dissipate) the rest.

The process of dissipation is necessary

to determine which aspects of information is of value.
cated example is an argument.

A more compli¬

Two parties may hurl threats, suggest

useful solutions, call names, occasionally try to stop fighting, etc.,
at various points in the argument.

If an action fits the momentary

structure of the relationship-name calling fits with "we are fighting,
for whatever reason"—a particular action will be taken as confirmation
of the relationship and it continues in the same manner.

If they do not

fit the momentary structure of the relationship, they may well be
ignored (dissipated) at the time they occur.

Later, when a solution

suggested early in the argument is accepted, the party who proposed the
soluton may say, "but that's what I said long ago."

However, confirma¬

tion of the relationship, whether positive or negative, is the primary
goal and so dissipation of some information is necessary for the rela¬
tionship to run its course towards resolution.
The third definition is psychologically based.
of meanings unifying people into a primary group.

A family is a set
Biology is fundamen¬

tally the generation and maintenance of families, but the essential,
defining bonds of families are psychological or mental/emotional.

It is

not just the actions of birth, adoption, marriage and other events that
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create a family, it is the meaning generated around those events that
creates a family.

A birth probably has some similarity of meaning for

almost all people, but it certainly has differences of meaning for all
people.

It is these unique patterns of meaning that are the bonds of

family.

Meaning is the stuff of relationships, so a family may be

called a pattern of relationships.

The relationships include the mem-

bers, not merely connect them to one another.
The fourth definition refers to the functions of families; its
relationships with components and contexts.

A family is the primary

human social group which generates its members' and species' reasons and
abilities to survive.
text.

Further, a family reflexively co-creates its con¬

Families fulfill this function through their own direct actions

and/or indirectly through their societal and cultural institutions.
Some of the terms require clarification.

"Generates" does not mean

causes, but that the interactional conditions of a family are like a
garden which provides soil, seeds, sun and water for the growth of the
system it is linked with.

Members and species are included as some type

of primary family group is seen as necessary to the survival of not only
the components of families, but to their larger human context as well.
Reasons and abilities to survive refer to the belief that families are
the arena for the construction of meaning that makes life worth living
and the skills to pursue that meaning.

A poignant example is from post-

World War II Europe when the infant death rate of orphans in a hospital
dropped dramatically when they were picked up and cuddled once a day.
That this is not a family example makes it all the more powerful.

It
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illustrates the minimal relational bonding necessary to make life
liveable.

The adequacy of developmental functioning of a particular

family can only be determined by an observer's reference to their own
and a family's societal and cultural contexts.
their context has been explained earlier.

Families co-creating

More specific developmental

functions of families will be discussed later.
This variety of types of definitions of families is offered as suf¬
ficient to allow the meta-model of this study to describe the diversity
of family structures in American society.
Development
When one picks up a test on some sort of developmental theory and
tries to find a definition of development, it is reminiscent of an
archaeological dig, as one sifts through considerable rubble and finds
only conceptual shards.

The sociologists who have defined the family

development field, define development as "change over time" (Hill and
Rodgers, 1964, p. 171).

In the Piagetian stream, Blasi (1976) claims

that development is well defined and then states that "development is a
sort of change" (p. 30).

The sort of change is defined not by direct

statement, but by process of elimination.

Blasi implies that develop¬

ment has to do with the structure of a system and how it is transformed.
Loevinger in the same volume (1976), more clearly equates development
and structural transformation; this is a shard of some value, but it is
still treated as a shard.

Development needs to be more explicitly

defined if the problems of current family development theory--diversity
and complexity--are to be remedied.

The concept of structural
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transformation has been championed by Piaget and has been widely dis¬
cussed among philosophers and scientists (Giddens, 1975; Harre, 1970).
Structural transformation is at the heart of the definition of develop¬
ment in this study; a definition which also accounts for the range of
operation of development and the role of an observer.
Development is a concept describing the process of emergence of
successive, novel organizational patterns (structures) over the life
course of a particular system.

These transformations of structure are

manifested as a system provokes or responds to changes in itself or its
environment.
Concept.

The definition requires an explanation of terms.
Development as a concept means that it is a descriptor

used by an observer to organize their perspective of the observed.
Developmental theories may or may not correspond the reality of change
that particular system experiences.

So, developmental theory is a

punctuation of a particular class of changes of a system and thus is of
the realm of epistemology, not the ontology of the observed system.

The

point is that development describes what an observer "sees," not what a
system really "is."

(Interestingly, the most famous developmental

theorist, Piaget, was apparently fond of saying, "I don't give a damn
about reality" (Gruber and Voneche, 1977, p. xxii).)
Process.

This term indicates that development describes a con¬

tinued series of related events.
development cannot occur.

That is, there is no period in which

Further, process means development should not

be examined statically, but in the ongoing manifestation of a system.
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Emergence.

This term means that with the ongoing process as a

background, developmental changes are novel transformations and some¬
times appear sudden and unpredictable to an observer and to a parti¬
cipant.

Compositely, the process of emergence suggests that development

should examine the dynamic regime of a system that maintains change and
order simultaneously.
NoveJL
organization.

Developmental changes are unique permutations of a system's
This implies that these changes are irreversible.

Organizational patterns (structures).

The organization of a system

is its essential relations.

The pattern that actually manifests those

relations is its structure.

Structure always coheres with organization,

but it has infinite possible permutations.

Development concerns changes

of structure, not changes of organization.

(In this meta-model these

patterns are described using the concept of rules, which is explained
later.)
Life course.

This term relates/differentiates development with

learning and evolution.
system.

Development concerns the entire life of a

It does not focus on the change of organization across a class

of systems-evolution, but it contributes to it.

In general, as develop¬

ment is to evolution, so learning is to development.

Learning elabo¬

rates a developmental structure until the structure must reorder itself
to accommodate the greater information it has assimilated.

An individ¬

ual life course may include more than one family life course.
In summary, this sentence means development focuses on an observ¬
er's punctuation of the continual transformations of structure of a
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system.

What constitutes the structure of a family will be outlined in

the next section.
The second sentence sets forth the general generative conditions of
system development and some of those terms bear explanation.

This sen¬

tence means that development occurs in a recursive, not linear fashion.
Manifested.

This term is used to avoid any linear causal asser¬

tions in how structural transformations occur.
Provokes or responds.

These terms indicate that a system is viewed

here as neither primarily adaptive nor controlling in its relation with
its context.

A system plays an active role in its development by inter¬

acting to maintain its identity.

Any particular change has its genesis

in interaction whether the interaction is punctuated as having origi¬
nated within the system per se or from its context.
Itself or its environment.
tant.

The source of a change is not impor¬

Any event that encourages structural transformation of a system

is of developmental concern.

This view is based on the notion that a

system can be viewed as organizationally closed (only the system itself
can determine what kind of changes are permissible) and structurally
open (within the parameters of structure, which are set by the organiza¬
tion of a system, there are infinite structural possibilities in re¬
sponse to contextual perturbations).
For a family example of a change in structure, parents may interact
with a school in a way that leads to the restructuring of their rela¬
tionship with their child and each other.

The parents may set new

standards of performance for the child and they may expect themselves to
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work more as a team, which may qualitatively change the relational
structure of the family.
change:

The question may arise as to who started this

the school complaining, the parents setting limits or the child

misbehaving?

It is irrelevant, as the point here is that no matter who

is viewed as provoking or responding to a change, or whether the change
comes from a social, psychological or biological source a family is an
active, not adaptive, system that determines its developmental restructuring by reference to its own organization.
On a more specific level, a developmental change is any change that
encourages a change in the structure of a family.

This definition of

developmental change eliminates predictability and normative events as
criteria.

In the section defining a family, meaning has been identified

as the content of family structure.

(In the next section rules will be

suggested as a means to describe meaning.)

However, it has also been

stated that meaning of relationships is always undergoing revision.
Does this mean that development is always occurring and are all changes
developmental?

It is always possible for development to occur.

All

changes could be viewed as contributing to development, but that would
be like counting grains of sand on the shore--one could provide an
accurate description, but of what use would it be?

The position here is

that the observer applying a developmental theory must specify what
constitutes a significant change in the meaning structure of a family.
For example, a parent notices that their oldest, a teenage, starts to
dress more nicely, is paying more attention to the opposite sex and is
less willing to stay home.

The parent realizes the child is growing up
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and starts to have different expectations in terms of responsibilities
and privileges.

The child notices a difference in the way their parent

treats them and begins to relate to the parent differently.
developmental change occurring?

When was

The first time the child dressed nicely

and the parent said "look at you!" and the child was embarrassed (a
novel event)?

The second time when the parent said, "Is this going to

be a regular thing" (a redundancy)?

Or after six months when the child

smiled with pride when the parent said, "You look nice, as usual" (a
pattern!)?

The structure of the family relationship-the meaning con-

necting parent and child—is changing at each step.

The value here is

that it is important for developmental understanding to be able to do
an even more detailed microanalysis than the brief example presented
here.

However, at other times it is necessary to do a macroanalysis to

create a broad developmental picture.

Most important to this choice of

level of observation is the observer understanding their own purposes.
At the beginning of this section change over time was offered as
the current definition of family development.
merely too general.

This is not inaccurate,

Indeed, the context of development is time.

How¬

ever, time is not real, it is a descriptor of the reality of change.
Time measures changes.

Trillionths of a second now exist because a

change of position of a particular atomic particle can be detected.
Time measures change by contrasting contexts.

The Renaissance is marked

as a particular time period by contrasting it with the Middle Ages and
identifying the changes that took place.

By contrasting contexts, dif¬

ferences in the pace and regularities of change are identified.

Until
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recently the type of time measured by clocks was based solely on the
Notions of celestial bodies.

How, however, the motions of atomic

particles is used as a basis of refining those measurements because the
motions of the particles appears to be more regular.

By contrasting the

regularities of change across contexts, endurance is yielded.

The

concepts of years and seasons are based on the comparison of the regu¬
larities of change of our natural environment, with the pace of change
of our own biology and the stars.

[Change is difference with motion.]

Different types, paces and regularities of change from different con¬
texts are contrasted with each other, are "averaged" to yield time and
endurance in order to recursively measure change.

Piaget notes that the

measurement of time rests on uniform velocity, but uniform velocity
rests on a unit of time (Gruber and Voneche, 1977, p. 571).
calls this a vicious circle that keeps us from defining time.

Piaget
Here, .it

is merely a tautology that reveals that the concept of time is of the
domain of epistemology.
Returning to the definition of development as change over time, the
above definition of time changes the definition to change over change.
It may be confusing, but it is still accurate, if exceedingly general.
Development compares one type of change--in this case, change of family
structure--with other types of change--in this case, societal, cultural
and individual change.

The changes, endurances and regularities of

family strucutre cannot be understood without reference to those other
contexts.

One can think of the relationship of these different types of

change as a "linguistic equation" which yields development.

For a rough
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analogy, it might read "family change divided by societal/cultural
change multiplied by individual change."

The point of this explanation

of the relationship of time, change and development is to substantiate
the claim that development is absolutely relative to its context, which
is an observer's perspective.
Rules
The most prominent proponents of rules to describe social or devel¬
opmental processes, Piaget and Wittgenstein, preferred not to define the
concept explicitly.

Rather, they defined them implicitly by example.

Piaget, in the seminar work. The Moral Judgement of the Child (1965)
used the rules of a boy's marble game to begin explanation of the devel¬
opment of morality.

Piaget later used the terms scheme and schema to

describe cognitive operations (Eckblad, 1981).
trasted with rules later.

These terms will be con¬

Wittgenstein used rules to explain the learn¬

ing of the language game (Brand, 1979).

He defined rules by "pointing"

at them via examples and said "that what is being pointed to here is
something indefinite" (Brand, 1979, p. 128).

Both of these theories

have viewed rules as a basic part of socially constructed reality.
Today, in family therapy, rules are a controversial concept, for
the following types of reasons:

(1) rules are an imposition on reality

by an observer and are not necessarily part of the observed's reality;
(2) the nature of a rule is vaguely defined; (3) even among those who
use the term do so in widely different ways.

In this study, these

objections are viewed as the very reasons to value the concept of rules:
(1) rules are most useful when specified to belong to the level of
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observation and even a participant then, can use rules to observe their
participation; (2) rules describe relations and when rigidly defined are
fundamentally altered into entities; (3) the widely varying and compet¬
ing uses of rules allows a rich context for creating new knowledge and
perspectives.
A rule, in this study, is a consolidation of meaning of a relation¬
ship made by an observer.

Rules are not entities, they are a relational

principle, used here to describe family interaction and development.

A

child who, when asked "what color is that?" contrasts their knowledge of
colors, identifying similarities and differences, and consolidates their
knowledge into a statement of "blue."
about the relationship of colors.

Blue, in this case, is a rule

Rules are used to simultaneously make

generalizations and distinctions.
Rules transform/connect isomorphic meaning across levels and in
divergent material.

When a father says to a child "don't bother your

mother now," the father has judged the meaning of his wife's current
activity, speculated on the effect of the child's interaction with his
wife, decided what action would best fit the current relational struc¬
ture of the family and consolidated that meaning (and more) into his
statement.

This type of statement is not seen here as primarily regula¬

tive, although it will have that effect; it is a consolidated statement
of meaning about the family rule structure under certain possible
(future) conditions.
irrelevant.

Whether rules are conscious or unconscious is

As observers of our own and others' actions, we can use

them at all levels.
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A rule structure is a pattern of rules connected by a more encom¬
passing rule.

In the preceding example, it could be said that the

father used a rule to determine the meaning of his wife's activity, an¬
other rule about the child's interaction and so on.

It can further be

said that he used a rule on a different level of relationship--the
family as a whole—to connect all the "smaller" rules into a coherent
pattern and then to construct his actual statement.

Just like systems

exhibit a wholeness of meaning, so rules unify the meaning of an occur¬
rence into useful form.

Just like a system can be seen as a subsystem

on a more encompassing level, so rules can be fitted into a more encom¬
passing, coherent structure.
observer as a single rule.

That structure can be expressed by an
The rule of rules notion that the Milan

family therapy group used in the 1970s is an example (Palazolli et al.,
1978).

A rule structure can be fitted with other rule structures into

yet a more encompassing rule structure.

Occam's razor--do not multiply

concepts beyond necessity—is a rule about the use of rules and rule
structures.
A rule is a simplifying mechanism.

Some kind of simplifying mech¬

anism is held here to be necessary to operate in the complexity of the
world.

The authors of On Scientific Thinking (Tweney et al., 1981)

state "we do not know why nature ought to be simple, but we strongly
prefer it that way" (p. 402).

Reference to physical, biological and

social systems as dissipative structures offers an explanation of the
necessity of simplifying mechanisms to system survival.
interact, a wealth of information is exchanged.

As two people

Watzlawick et al.
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(1967) cite a study that counted 10,000 bits of information exchanged in
a one second interchange.
information?

How do systems manage this enonnous amount of

It is believed here, that systems sort through all that

information using a dissipative process to determine which information
best fits with the structure at the moment.

In general, a dissipative

process contrasts the different bits of new information among itself and
with the system's structure.

Whatever elaborates and/or confirms the

structure is retained in some form and the other less useful information
is dissipated, no matter how valuable it appears to outside observers.
In this way a dissipative system simplifies its relation to its context.
Name calling and threats in an argument are a good example.

At the time

they occur they elaborate and confirm the momentary structure of the
relationship--the argument--and apparently good ideas for resolution of
the problems are ignored.

Later when the relationship structure is

focused on preserving the relationship over the long term, apologies are
made and the previously ignored ideas are utilized.

The point here is

that ignoring good suggestions and forgetting nasty remarks are part of
the necessary dissipative process of social systems.
Further, a rule structure is not static, it is reflexive and thus
is constantly being elaborated.

A rule structure is one example of what

Jantsch (1980) calls a process structure.

When the elaboration becomes

so complex that it can no longer be organized by its initial rules, a
system must reorganize its structure according to a more appropriate
rule.

So, systems of meaning are constantly establishing a structure,
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elaborating and complexifying it and then resimplifying the structure
using new rules.
The "nounish" definition of rules-a consolidation of meaningcould be misleading, for rules are more of an ordering principle than a
statement of order.

This position is similar to Piaget's statement that

structures are at once structured and structuring.
tual, rather than real existence.

Rules exhibit a vir¬

This means they are observer based

(epistemological) and temporary (reflexive).

To further clarify the

concept of rules it will be useful to contrast it to some other concepts; laws and schemes.
Most research is part of the search for universal laws.

Some of

the physical sciences have had success "discovering" what are currently
seen as laws, while the social sciences have evidenced universal failure
in the search for nontrivial laws.

(Therefore, it may be wise to avoid

laws in the social sciences, following Fred Perry’s advice on tennis
never change a winning game, always change a losing game.")

Rules are

frequently used as a way to talk about the structuring of systems
without having to resort to laws.

Some of those who search universal

laws in the social sciences regard rules as a subspecies of laws, while
others claim that rules and laws are not directly or coherently related
(Toulmin, 1971).

If anything, laws are a subspecies of rules based on

the definition of rules in this study.

It must be admitted that the

notion of laws is somewhat repugnant to the epistemological view of this
study.

While the laws of Newton appeared to be laws for a long time, so

did the "law of the flat earth."

Laws, thus show themselves to not be
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universal, as they exhibit exceptions and are not eternally useful.
Laws, like other concepts, will do until something better comes along.
Eckblad (1981), drawing on Piaget, uses scheme to describe cogni¬
tive and interactive operations.

A scheme is "analogous to a program-a

series of operations performed in an orderly sequence, capable of being
repeated again" (Eckblad, 1981, p. 12).

A scheme, like rules in this

study, is a "tool; for process description" (p. 11).

Unlike rules, a

scheme is a unit, an entity, not purely a relational term, and thus of
limited utility in this study.

However, the concept of laws would bene-

fit from being portrayed as schemes.
Many family theorists have used the concept of rules (Bateson,
1972, Broderick, 1979), in particular, rules of transformation.

Giddens

(1979) describes rules of transformation as a guiding principle that
allows us to distinguish equivalences in divergent material or across
levels of systems.

To return to the example of learning colors used

earlier, the color blue is taught by showing a child blue in many dif¬
ferent situations or objects.

The concept of blue, then, is taught

through a series of transformations.

The differences of the situations

or objects allow a child to learn how to transform blue in divergent
material.

Admittedly, there could be many kinds of transformations and

other kinds of rules, but at the level of generality of this study rules
of transformation are an adequate description.
To describe the operation of rules, Wittgenstein and others are
useful; sources.

Rules originate in a linguistic domain.

Rules are

learned in the application of them, thus a rule always has implications
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for action, be it physical or mental action (Wittgenstein, from Brand,
1979).

This is part of their relational nature.

reflexive.
the rule.

As such, rules are

They guide a person in interaction, which in turn modifies
This shows their virtual existence.

um of reproduction of rules (Giddens, 1979).
aries, as they describe relations.

Interaction is the medi¬
Rules have no exact bound¬

Wittgenstein claims that inexacti¬

tude and exceptions are necessary to the reflexive utility of rules.
"Exception is a property of rules.

If there were no exceptions there

would also be no rules. ... If in following my rules I no longer am in
agreement with reality, then I look for new rules which 'fit' better"
(Brand, 1979, p. 127).

The distinction between a linguistic domain of

rules and a scientific one of laws is important because they assume
different views of the cosmos.

Science, in general, searches for undis¬

covered order, while language creates it.
ment beyond which we cannot go.

"The rule is the final ele¬

It is not possible to penetrate behind

the rues, because there is no behind" (Wittgenstein, in Brand, 1979, p.
127).
Jackson (1967) made fashionable the use of rules in family therapy.
He referred to families as rule-governed systems.

While there are many

other possible views this is a fundamental and sufficient view of the
nature of family systems and justifies family therapy as an approach to
human social problems.

Viewing families as rule-governed systems has

enabled therapists to work successfully with family units and it answers
one of the three problem questions of this study:

How must a
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developmental framework be formulated to be theoretically congruent with
the way systems-based family therapies?
However, the notion of families being governed or regulated by
rules has met a fair degree of disagreement in the family therapy field
over the past few years.

This objection is justified as rules do not

regulate any thing or event.

They express meaning in the eyes of a

particular observer.
Going beyond the notion of regulation, Toulmin (1971) discusses the
relevance of rules as a descriptor of human conduct.

He does not dis¬

tinguish them as tools for observers, but still provides a useful expla¬
nation of how they operate.

He states seven uses of rules.

He places

the uses on a continuum based on the extent to which a person is in¬
volved in the formation of the rule.

To be most informative for this

study, the seven uses have been condensed into three groupings.
states that:

Toulmin

(1) rules provide (a) descriptions and (b) explanations

for general regularities of occurrence; (2) human behavior can be char¬
acterized at times as (a) rule-governed and at times (b) ruleconforming; and (3) humans are capable of (a) integrating and automa¬
tically applying rules, thus allowing more complex mastery, (b) consci¬
ously applying rules to achieve a chosen goal, and (c) devising rules to
improve performance or to fit and master new situations.

This provides

a sense of the range of usage of rules in human conduct.

To further

simplify this complex understanding of the operation of rules, the three
groupings are further condensed into the term rule-guided.

To state

that human social systems are rule-guided allows rules to be used
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fluidly to describe many levels and perspectives of interaction.
Throughout the meta-model rule-guide will be used as a general descrip¬
tor of the range of usage of rules.
A rule, it has been said, is the consolidation of meaning of rela¬
tionships made by an observer.

Meaning is the stuff of relationships

and the consolidation of meaning is not an exhaustive description of the
meaning.

And despite the multiplicity of rules they cannot be an

exhaustive description of a relationship.

Although they can portray a

sense of wholeness, rules are a partial description or particular punc¬
tuation.

Rules are tools for an observer; it is the relationship itself

that guides a participant.
reflexive.

Kelly (1955) states that a theory should be

One should be able to use the same terms to describe the

actions of the theorist/observer as they use with the observed.

Rules

provide that opportunity in this study.

Levels
A systemic definition of levels is nowhere to be found, yet it
seems that everyone who uses the term systemically knows what it means.
Generally, people talk about higher and lower levels.

However, this is

not satisfactory for the meta-model of this study, as those spatial
analogies are of limited utility for epistemological constructs.
Levels are qualitatively different orders of our perception of
reality.

The question arises, different from what?

other orders of reality (levels).

Different from

Levels are one way to draw the dis¬

tinctions necessary so the world is not experienced as one undifferenti¬
ated mass.

However, the criteria of those distinctions are specified by
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an observer rather than the reality of the phenomenon under observation.
It is a totally referential and epistemological term.
levels, it is a unified experience.

Life has no

Only comparison of how an observer

perceives various phenomena to be differentially ordered yields a notion
of levels.

Thus, levels beget levels.

Some explanatory examples are in

order.
For example, animals are called higher life forms in contrast to
plants.

(Higher is not seen as valuable here as animals would be

pretty hard up for oxygen if plants did not produce it.)

They have dif¬

ferent organizing qualities and so are different levels of living sys¬
tems.

However, plants and animals are more like each other than either

of them is like bacteria.

These distinctions are made only by contrast¬

ing different existing systems according to their organizing qualities.
Thus, levels beget levels.

Further, mammals are of a different level

than reptiles.

And humans can be distinguished as of a different level

than the apes.

How far can one proceed with these distinctions?

men of a different level than women?

Many ancient religious traditions

and current religious practices would say yes.
would say yes.

Are

Economic conditions

The values here say no, but they are different fields

within the same level.

Levels have no basis in reality, they are punc¬

tuations of our perceptions of reality.

Giddens (1979) states that

there are either one or infinite levels of structure, meaning that we
can either see the wholeness of life or we can draw endless distinctions
within the phenomena under observation.
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Kelly (1955) insists that establishing differences is not merely a
Natter of comparing two objects or systems.

He claims that a minimum of

three is necessary as similarities and differences clarify each other.
If, in some imagined vacuum of existence, there were two balls of dif¬
ferent colors, we would know neither of the similarity of shape nor the
difference of color until a third object of different shape and similar
color to one of the balls came into view.

As Kelly says "similarity

does not exist, except as it has a reference axis" (1955, p. 306).

This

principle supports the importance of context in determining how levels
are distinguished.

In family development theory it raises the question,

the typical or normal family is typical or normal compared to what?"
Not only does normal define deviance, but deviance also defines normal¬
cy.

In the meta-model of this study, levels will be used to specify

particular frames of reference and therefore one will only be able to
define normalcy in reference to a particular, limited context.
As a number of levels are related into framework a hierarchy is
generated.

The principle that allows the levels to be ordered is the

context of the hierarchy.

Depending on the ordering principle, the

hierarchy can be linear or reflexive.

The frames of reference of the

meta-model are organized in reflexive hierarchies.

Bloomfield (1983)

identifies five common ordering principles of hierarchy:

inclusion,

complexity, dominance, situational variance, and generativity.

Families

are most usefully portrayed, Bloomfield claims, as generative hier¬
archies.

A generative hierarchy is one in which one level generates the

following level.

Parents generate their children, their reasons and
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abilities to survive, and the parents were in turn generated by previous
generations.

Interaction between parents and children affects how the

parents raise their children, and affects the parents' reasons and abi¬
lities to survive, so a generative hierarchy is reflexive.
The basic concepts and how they operate are critical to a full
understanding of how the meta-model operates.

As they are combined they

will generate novel principles of development.

Criteria for Family Development Theory
The following content criteria of a theory of family development
are based on the epistemological and values assumptions grounding this
study, the critique of the current developmental framework, and the
definitions of basic concepts.

By addressing the issues first identi¬

fied in the problem statement these criteria of adequacy provide a meas¬
ure for family therapists to compare the value of the meta-model of this
study with the FLC.
To adequately describe the diversity of family structurs and the
complexity of family process in a manner which is theoretically congru¬
ent with systems-based family therapies, a theory of family development
should:
1.

Acknowledge that it describes what an observer sees rather than

what a family actually is.

This criterion and the following examples

are consistent with the assumptions that descriptions are incomplete,
objectivity is not possible and reality is only knowable from a point of
view.

From the realm of physics, Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle
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(Capra, ,975) states that we cannot identify the ,ocation of a particle
1,1

t1me

5PaCe s’mu'tane°usly.

This principle has been critical

^ dlSt1"9UiShin9 b6tWeen °'3server and observed and can valuably do so
1n fam"y theraPy‘

Pdla20lli et «!• 0978) note the importance of dis¬

tinguishing between the reality of a family's experience and what a
family shows a therapist.

This does not mean that an observer cannot

experience the reality of a family, only that a relationship with that
reality is unique and partial.

While it is highly respectful not to try

to define a family's reality for them, that is not the only value behind
this criterion.

It is further claimed, along with Palazolli et al.,

that such a view improves the effectiveness of a theory by distinguishing between observer and observed.
2>
sees.

Sp-ecify Barnes of reference used to describe what an observer
Frames of reference allow more specific evaluation of a theory by

identifying the conditions under which it operates and the general
values of an observer applying it.

For example, if the traditional FLC

is identified as portraying American, white, middle-class, two-parent,
nuclear families, then other family forms can be contrasted with this
model without deviance being implied.

Without specific frames the unin¬

tentional pragmatic effect is that the life cycle of other family forms
is implicitly characterized as supplements or deviations of the "normal"
FLC.

Further, if the values of the observer applying the theory are

noted--in this case, an American, white, middle-class male--then one can
ask how might the application by an observer with a different cultural
background be similar or different.

In their book Stepfami lies, Visher

no
and Visher (1979) note the pain and confusion of stepfamilies as they
try to approximate the normative, nuclear family.

They further discuss

how professionals unintentionally comply in perpetuating the notion that
stepfamilies are somehow pathological.

To be congruent with the system¬

ic value that families can restructure themselves in a functional
arrangement, developmental theory should use multiple norms according to
the society and culture of the family being observed.

It should be

noted that there is always an unspecified frame of reference that an
observer cannot specify, but the effectiveness of theories is improved
by the articulation of newly discovered frames.
3‘

ijse relational constructs (i.e., patterns, interaction, organ-

j_zing principles, etc.) to discuss how family structures are transformed.

Systems theory uses relations as a fundamental descriptive

concept.

The FLC defines its stages by membership configurations.

Changing relationships are implied, but are secondary.

The individual

orientation associated with western thought (and represented in the FLC)
constrains a relational view as primary.

For example, Whitaker's (C.

Whitaker, 1983, personal communication) provocative comment that he "no
longer believes in individuals, they are only fragments of families," is
most often met with quizzical disbelief.

The belief here is that the

individual orientation is grounded in a view of life as a grouping of
things or objects.
events.

It is preferable to describe life as a series of

It is important, in the relational view, to draw on Piaget

(Gruber and Voneche, 1979) to view systems not only as structured, but
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also as constantly restructuring. Therefore ,wi
y
ineretore, development of families is
seen as occurring through interaction.
4‘

Of families and nH,e.

..

The current famlly deVel0pment f™«* views families as closed systems, but that is
only a partial picture.

A family does construct its own identity as a

dosed system, but how that identity is specifically embodied (a fam¬
ily's structure) is determined through interaction with its contexts.
For example, a lesbian couple with children self-defines its basic
spousal and parent-child relations, but the quality of those relations
is affected by such factors as acceptance by extended family, attitudes
of neighbors and school officials, etc.

Being headed by women, the

structure of such a family is negatively affected by existing economic
conditions.

The structure of all family forms can be impacted by inter¬

action with contextual factors such as jobs, local values, even severe
weather, etc. and thus these should be considered developmental factors.
An observer must judge when contextual factors are encouraging a trans¬
formation of family structure and consider it a developmental event.
5‘

Describe development of all cultural and structural variations

of family forms in a non-deviant manner.

The value behind this criter-

ion is that all families can (but will not necessarily) produce func¬
tioning human beings and contribute to society.

There are no deficits

or excesses of structure based on membership, only on adequacy of func¬
tioning.

For example, while many people state that it is easier to

raise children with two parents, if those parents cannot resolve
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conflicts with regularity they may find it easier to h
■ ,
,...,
0 11 easler t0 be single parents.
While single parents may handle stress frnm
i
«= stress from the larger context differ¬
ently than two parent families, they can do a perfectly adequate job of
raising children.

The societal expectations that single parent families

function poorly does affect self-perception and functioning (see Levine,
for an excellent discussion of how expectations affect the func¬
tioning Of children of single parent families), but that is very differ¬
ent than stating that there is something innately wrong with the struc¬
ture of single parent families.

Another related value supporting this

criterion is the belief that it is necessary for a class of systems to
exhibit diversity of structure across its individual members in order to
survive and reproduce.

On a biological level, incestuous reproduction

endangers survival by reducing the diversity of the gene pool.

On a

social level, the lack of diversity of opinions in cults is the basis of
so many people fearing them.

Further, developmental theory should

recognize explicitly that individual families must differentiate them¬
selves in some way from their cultural norms.
6*

Depict the developmental influence of any event or factor that

encourages restructuring of a family.

The FLC only identifies the so-

called major life transitions as having developmental impact.

Yet Haley

(1973) and Carter and McGoldrick (1980) claim that development is the
context and goal of therapy.

If both of these statements are accurate,

then there are either big gaps in the theory or families must be fit to
the theory.

The major transitions certainly have developmental influ¬

ence, but they vary from culture to culture and family to family.

And
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other occurrences may have equal influent

r

m/o +

For example, unpredictable

M ai influence.

vents like migration, getting or losinq a ioh r iw
y ur losing a job could significantly
7Ctaf8m11y-

subtle level, the redundant Interactions

at lead one spouse to unexpectedly ask for divorce, or on a more posi¬
tive note, the family time and effort invested in developing a child's
athletic skill, are examples leading to developmental restructuring of a
family.

Any event that contributes to the structural transforation of

a family should be considered a developmental event, not just major,
predictable occurrences.
7'

and through states

M1nuch1n

(1974) states that the membership of subsystems is not nearly as signif¬
icant as the relationships between the members and with other subsys¬
tems.

Translated to the stages of the FLC, this means that the member¬

ship configuration of a stage is not as significant as transitions
through and between stages.

The FLC theorists choose to emphasize one

unifying theme of a stage-its membership configuration-and do not ade¬
quately distinguish the constant fluctuations of each stage.

A family

is continually in transition in that it is always encountering and
generating new information, which reorders its relationships.

While the

FLC theorists do not explicitly claim that any stages are stable, they
leave that impression.

As previously mentioned, stability is an inade¬

quate metaphor for a family.

The theme of a stage endures, but it is

the constant transforming of a system that should be the focus of
development.
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8'

ixam1ne fami1y development across time spans from thg

^O^Jiei^road.

The FLC focuses on a two generational scherce

in its stages and assumes the involvement of a third generation.

A de¬

velopmental framework should be able to accomodate multiple generations
of a family's history and very brief episodes, as they can affect the
structure of a family.
\ore generations.

For example, many families are aware of five or

That awareness contributes to the meaning of family

membership and members define themselves in relation to that meaning in
their actions by affirming it and/or attempting to change it.

In terms

of episodes, an outstanding achievement or a single scrape with the law
can change the way family members interact with one of the children.
Each episode is a fluctuation in a stage and the numerous fluctuations
in a stage give the stage its order and meaning.

The point is that the

development of family structure had many sources and they should be
accounted for in family development theory.

Systemic Principles of Development
This study offers four general, systemic principles directly rele¬
vant to the development of living systems and families in particular.
The principles describe the generative conditions of system development.
These principles have been implicitly suggested in the definition of
concepts and family development criteria.

They directly inform the

meta-model and will be briefly summarized and exampled.
1.

Systems maintain order through fluctuation.

tal to a non-equilibrium, non-stable view of systems.

This is fundamen¬
Fluctuating is

used in this study to describe the operation of systems, rather than
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equilibrating, as it does not imply that equilibrium is a goal of sys¬
tems.
um.

Structures are seen here as embodying a symmetry, not equilibri¬
For example, each wave and valley in the ocean is a fluctuation in

a particular order of the seas.
the order.

It is those fluctuations which create

Earlier, the fluctuating relationship between a parent and

teenager was offered as an example of order through fluctuation.

Each

exchange between parent and child is a fluctuation that shapes the
structure of the relationship.

A severe argument and a loving recon¬

ciliation lets both know what range of emotional intensity is possible
in the relationship.

The rules that each draw from that experience

become part of the structure in that it informs them about what their
future actions might lead to.

Order through fluctuation is at the heart

of the dissipative process of living systems.

From a developmental

perspective, a simple observational principle one can draw is that,
understanding order by following fluctuations means seeing in sequence.
2.

Systems seek a blend of novelty and confirmation to enable

development.

Bowler (1981) states that "it is the novel characteristics

of molecules that make living systems possible, just as the novel char¬
acteristics of human psyches make culturespossible" (p. 19).

Jantsch

(1980) calls for a new information theory based on the interplay of
novelty and confirmation and states that the novelty aspect has been
ignored relative to confirmation.
system development.

Here both are viewed as necessary to

For example, when a young child learns to use a

fork, imitation is a limited view of the motivational factors.
child is engaging in a novel experience and at the same time is

The
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confirming their belonging with their social system by engaging in
similar action.

A system must confirm its structure in relation to its

organization primarily and confirm that it fits with its context secon¬
darily.

The interplay of novelty and confirmation elaborates and

complexifies a structure, eventually forcing a re-ordered, simplified
structure capable of handling greater complexity.

In a repetitive argu¬

ment, people activate the same pattern searching for novel solutions
that would allow them to transform the pattern, all while the repeated
pattern confirms the relationship.

It is important to note that what is

novel and confirming is determined by the structure of a system, not the
broader context.

This principle reorients developmental observation

from examining how the history of a system led to this structure (be¬
cause many histories could have led to it and only one unique history
actually did lead to it) to how this structure prepares a system for its
future.

To aid development observers should examine what is novel in a

system, not what is normal.
3.

Systems must continuously transform themselves in order to

maintain their autonomy.
imperative.

Change has no direction, but appears to be

On an atomic level, both Capra (1976) and Zukav (1979)

point out that atomic particles are apparently continuously transforming
themselves into one another and back.

Translated to living systems,

continual change means transformation from one structure to another in a
manner which preserves the integrity of organization.

From the actions

of repeatedly transforming food into energy to the continual negotia¬
tion, confirmation, and renewal of relationships, family members
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participate in the ongoing transformation of their families.

Structur¬

ally, this means that as the first step in developmental change, systems
break the symmetry of their own structure.

A grandparent, insisting on

disciplining a child after being asked not to, is breaking what they
perceive as the symmetry of the family structure.

A parent yelling back

at the grandparent or complaining to their spouse is also symmetry
breaking.

These types of actions lead to an elaboration of structure.

In systems of meaning, like families, it is the interplay of generalization and distinction that elaborates a structure.

Eventually, the

meaning (rule) which makes the structure viable can no longer support
the wealth of elaborated information and the structure must transform
itself.

Parents who say, "I'm no longer going to tell you every detail

of your chores, from now on you do it or else . .
say.

and children who

Stop lecturing me, I know what to do," are both transforming

relational structure at a micro level.

When structure transforms itself

it is simplified by virtue of a unifying rule and is then generally
capable of handling greater complexity than the previous structure.
elegant discoveries of science exhibit this quality.

The

Eckblad (1981),

identifying principles relating to complexity as a motivator, suggests
that people have a limit to the amount of complexity they can handle and
that they prefer to operate near that limit.

Further, as someone inter¬

acts their capacity to handle complexity increases and restructures
their limit to a greater level.

This continual reflexive transformation

of simplicity into complexity into simplicity and so on is fundamental
to a developmental perspective.

The critical transformations into new
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developmental phases or stages are those which show the ability to
handle more complexity much more simply.

Jantsch (1980) cites studies

that indicate that what a structure transforms itself into is unpredict¬
able.

It is coherent with the systems organization, but can be mani¬

fested many ways.

The observational principle which can be drawn from

this discussion of transformation is that a developmental perspective
means looking at the possible, not the predictable.
4.

Diversity of structures across a class of systems is necessary

to maintain the transformative potential of the class.

This is an

underrecognized principle in developmental theory and in family develop¬
ment in particular.

Most developmental theory efforts are aimed at dis¬

covering and maximizing similarities, such as seeing the unity in diver¬
sity.

Emphasis on universal or normative theory building implicitly

devalues this aspect of development.

Bateson (1972) asserted the impor¬

tance of differences in the operation of mental systems.
Keeney (1983) has formulated a rallying cry:

Out of this

draw a distinction!

The

value of individuals differentiating themselves has long been recog¬
nized.

While this principle is recognized on a biological level, as in

maintaining the diversity of the gene pool, it is not strongly promoted
on a social level.

For example, agricultural scientists have expressed

worry that because farmers understandably pick the varieties of corn
with the best yields, we are in danger of ending up with only two or
three types of corn.
headed for extinction.

If that were to occur, corn would be irreversibly
The offspring of incest having higher risk of

biological deficiencies is another example that the lack of diversity
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inhibits the transformative potential of the class.

On a social level

Cronen offers an example reflecting this principle.

Imagine a situation

in which every statement made was agreed to by everyone present.

There

would be no way for any of the ideas expressed to be elaborated.

They

merely could be restated and intensified.
would become very boring.

Very quickly interaction

Complete agreement all the time would mean

death for a social group (V. Cronen, personal communication, November
1985).

Throughout history it has been different ideas and new organiza-

tions of ideas that have changed governments and cultures.

Social sys¬

tems are constantly negotiating how much diversity they can handle while
still maintaining their identity; rarely is the necessity of diversity
recognized.

The interplay of similarities and differences is essential

for system development at any level.

The observational principle that

emrges is that "nobody's normal, everybody's different" (B. Jackson,
personal communication, March 1983).

This chapter has presented the definition of basic concepts, cri¬
teria for theory of family development, systemic principles of develop¬
ment.

The next chapter presents the frames of reference through which

family development occurs, a process model of the development of rules
in families and an explanation of how the model operates.

CHAPTER

v

META-MODEL OF FAMILY DEVELOPMENT
Chapter IV laid the groundwork for the heart of this study, the
meta-model of family development that is presented here in Chapter V.
The meta-model consists of a three phase, rule-processing model and two
frames of reference through which it operates.
The rule-processing model describes family development by examining
how rule-guided interaction leads to continual restructuring of a family
system.

As it uses rules to describe family development, it is referred

to as the Family Rules Model (FRM).

In this model, rule-processing

cycles through three interactional phases:

establishing, consolidating/

diversifying, and contracting.
The two frames of reference indicate the FRM's range and nature of
operation.

One frame of reference is the four interrelated social

systems which are contexts of rule-guided, family interaction:
culture, family, and individual.
Systems.

society,

These systems are called Rule Source

The other frame of reference is represented by different

temporal levels of family interaction:
and episode.

generation, life course, stage,

These punctuations are called Family Time Frames (FTF).

It is useful to repeat that this representation of family develop¬
ment theory is called a meta-model, because (a) it can be used to con¬
struct other family development models and developmental models of other
types of social systems, (b) for each social system under observation it
can generate a different model revealing the uniqueness of each case,
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P ocessing model remains the same as it generates different models,
but the frames of reference change in each case.

The meta-model oper¬

ates like a generative grammar which can be used to describe the content
of widely varying situations.
The order of presentation in this chapter is as follows.

First, a

general comparison between the FRM and the FLC will serve to sharpen the
contrast between the two and introduce the meta-model.

Second, the two

frames of reference will be discussed as the contexts of family develop¬
ment.

Third, the phases of the FRM will be described.

Fourth, how

systems make transitions between phases will be elaborated.

Fifth, dia

grams of the FRM will be offered to provide further conceptual clarity
on the operation of the meta-model.
One of the reviewers (Hoffman) suggested that the FRM should be
more explicitly contrasted with the FLC, to clarify its differences and
thus its value.

Therefore, to introduce the FRM it will be useful to

briefly identify some of the theoretical and practical differences
between it and the FLC, the current developmental framework of family
therapy.

The FRM is a cyclical, recursive model prescribing how rules

can be used to describe the interaction, identity and transformation of
family systems.

The FLC is not actually cyclical, it has a linear set

of fixed stages describing membership configurations.

The FRM is a tool

for an observer to describe what they see as families interact, as it
forces an observer to specify their frames of reference.

The FLC
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ignores the effect of an observer and claims to describe what typically
occurs in "the family."
value free.

The FRM is content free, although it is not

It reveals the uniqueness of each family by forcing the

observer to specify the content of family interaction.

The FLC speci¬

fies the content of development for an observer and thereby stresses the
similarities of families and ignores the differences that make each
family unique.

By emphasizing the uniqueness of each family the FRM is

a non-normative model.

More precisely, the FRM views families as self-

norming as they differentiate themselves in relation to their contexts.
The FLC is a normative model based on one society, one culture, one
family.

These differences summarize the claim that the FRM offers a

more useful model to describe the development of the diverse range of
American families, and the complexity of family interaction.
The one other major difference that bears clarification now is the
use of phases and stages.

The FRM uses phases to describe the cycle of

different types of rule-guided interaction.

This term is preferred over

stages primarily due to the connotations associated with stage in devel¬
opmental theory.

Stages have come to imply a series of distinct enti¬

ties, locked in a particular order.

Phases are used here with the

intent that they are more fluid, are overlapping and can be recycled.
It could possibly have been the other way around in that phases could
have been used in developmental theory and become reified like stages
have been.

If stages were seen as the more fluid, less reified term,

they would be used in this model.

However, the use of stage is based on

a physical analogy to a raised platform used for performance.

Stage in
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its derivation means a place to stand, and so it is too static to de¬
scribe the continual changes of family relationships.

Phase is based on

a temporal analogy of passing and/or recurring sequence of events.
Phase in its derivation, means to bring to light, to show.

Therefore,

phase is more congruent with the assumptions grounding this study as it
can be seen as implying that when some thing or event is brought to
light or shown, one receives only a partial portrayal of that thing or
event.
Despite these criticisms of the FLC, it can be a more useful guide
to the development of certain types of families if it is integrated into
the FRM.

That is, if the FLC stages are circumscribed by the rule-

processing phases of the FRM and the frames of reference of the FLC are
specified, then it is seen as only one possible model of family develop¬
ment out of many and it loses many of its normative implications and
much of its rigidity.

As the meta-model is presented the differences

between the FLC and the FRM shall become clearer.

How the FLC can be

improved by subsuming it under the FRM will be presented in the section
on diagrams of the FRM.

Frames of Reference

With encouragement from Bateson (1972) family therapists are fond
of saying the meaning emerges from context.

This takes on special sig¬

nificance when systems which are constituted of meaning--!ike families-are at issue.
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A family's organization is autonomous; its identity is independent
in that it refers only to itself to determine how its resources are
related in a viable pattern.

However, a family's development, its suc¬

cessive, structural transformations which maintain its organization, do
not occur in a vacuum.
text.

These transformations respond to a specific con¬

A system's context is its source of maintenance and organization

of a system determines what types of structures are permissible.

It is

not so simple a matter as the system and context respond to and shape
each other in a recursive manner.

For example, interaction of family

members may be influenced by the values of a church or a political
party.

That family, in turn, may act in such a way as to lead the

church or party to question its values in some cases or reconfirm them
in others.

These types and effects of interaction may appear quite

obvious, but they have never been considered an aspect of family devel¬
opment.
If family development does not occur in a vacuum, but in a specific
context for each family, how then might a theory of family development
describe those contexts without suggesting that families fit the values
of a particular context?

Indeed, this is a major problem of the FLC.

Throughout this study there has been an emphasis on a level of general¬
ity which allows all families to be included and at the same time
allows each family to be described uniquely.

Addressing this issue, the

meta-model of family development described in this chapter is devoid of
particular content.
not value-free.

As the previous chapters attest, the meta-model is

The meta-model is a tool for an observer, in that an
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observer must specify the content of family development in each case in
which the meta-model is applied.

As the contexts and model of family

development are presented the claim of being content-free will become
clearer.

The following contexts of family development are general

enough to include all families.

There are two sets of frames of refer¬

ence presented as the context of family development.

These two types of

frames are viewed as sufficient to describe how family development
recursively occurs.
The first set of frames of reference is four interrelated social
systems through which family structure is shaped:
family and individuals.

society, culture,

The interaction of these social systems is the

source of meaning which forms the structure of a family.

The example

above of church and family interaction results in new meaning for the
family and thus new structure.

Since this study describes meaning in

families by using rules, these four social systems are called Rule
Source Systems (RSS).

These are the arenas or systems that are the

source of rule-guided family development.
The second set of frames of reference is four temporal levels which
contribute different types of rules to a family structure:
life course, stage and episode.

generations,

These temporal levels are punctuations

or frames through which an observer can describe a family's identity and
structure.

They are called Family Time Frames (FTF) as a family struc¬

ture is viewed differently according to which level is used.

These are

the conduits for different levels of meaning in rule-guided interaction.
The FTF will be described following the presentation of each RSS below.
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Rule Source Systems
Each RSS Will he described by defining (1) its identity, (2, its
:nCt7’(3)
and context, and (4, how its value! and
Pace of change affect family development.
SSI**

For the purposes of this study, society is the most

inclusive political/economic context to which a family perceives itself
to belong.

To state that "I am an American" or "I am a Nigerian" is a

statement of societal identity.

The primary function of all RSS is to

negotiate the best conditions for its self-perpetuation with its inclu¬
sive context.

This means any system must work to insure the survival of

its context as much as it works for self-survival, as no system can
exist without a supportive context.

In the case of a society, its

inclusive context is the natural environment and the network of other
societies.

Thus a society must work to preserve its natural environment

and the larger societal network in some form in order to insure its own
survival.

In order to fulfill its primary function, each RSS creates an

environment that provides opportunities for the perpetuation of its
components.

The conditions which best promote an effective blend of

differentiation and belonging of components will be the most successful
environment.

The components of a society are its cultures, families,

individuals, and societal institutions and movements.

While certain

aspects of cultures transcend societies, a society is the context of a
particular aspect of culture, thus culture is viewed as a societal com¬
ponent.

The similarities and differences of Black African and Black

A \erican cultures or of Italian Catholic and Irish Catholic cultures
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serve as examples of the preceding statement.

Those who are members of

a dominant culture in a society may well experience society and culture
as one in the same.
Societal institutions are those which primarily promote the political/economic survival and well-being of the society and its components,
like corporations, schools, and the military.

Societal movements like

the nuclear freeze and yuppies are reflexive events that are not insti¬
tutions, but which shape the values of institutions and thereby of
society.

These societal institutions and movements do reflect a certain

cultural flavor.
society.

That is due to the reflexive influence of culture on

There may be supra systems in which societies participate,

like the United Nations, but due to their lack of influence they are not
seen as relevant to family development.

A society is distinguished from

the other RSS by its emphasis on intentional structuring of a political/
economic system promoting the survival and well-being of itself, its
components and its context.
Regarding a family and how it is transformed, a society's values
and pace of change are the critical issues.

Values (rules) of a society

are at once its structure and its means of structuring.

The values of a

society significantly affect the rule structure and transformations of a
family.

A family is connected with its society through values which

have to do with survival and physical well being.

The values of a

society are not only represented in the laws and governing institutions,
although they are a part of a society's rule structure.

They would

include such values as the wel 1-documented African emphasis on rugged
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individualism or the Chinese e.phasis on collective cogent as .eans
for survival.

These types of values impact the rule structure of a

family; how its members relate to one another, what skills they develop,
how parents raise their children, etc.

The point for an observer is

that in describing the development of a family, they should account for
particular societal values and their impact on a family's rule struc¬
ture.
The pace of change of a society is a context of family development.
The timing of particular issues in a family is influenced by the socie¬
tal context.

For example, American society has a more extended and

accentuated adolescent period than most so-called third world societies.
For many American families adolescence means experimenting with being an
adult, yet still having many of the freedoms of a child.

In societies

like Vietnam and Nicaragua, adolescence may mean doing the same activi¬
ties as an adult, from fighting a war to working in the fields.

Clear¬

ly, societal change dramatically affects family rule structure in these
types of situations.

Families themselves may or may not see societal

change as a factor of family development, but any family that talks
about changing with the times or not changing just because everyone else
is, is acknowledging the impact of the pace of societal change.

At

different periods or in different societies, the pace of societal
change may appear to be a constraint or accelerator on familial change.
These types of normative pressures help families decide how quickly they
want to change, by serving as a background for families to differentiate
from.

However, these normative pressures do not force decisions, only
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families themselves do that.

Different families at the same time may

experience very different effects through their relationship with
society.

An established Boston family probably would experience their

family development more smoothly and slowly than a Cambodian family that
recently immigrated to Boston.
In summary, if an observer wants to facilitate a family's own
direction of their development, then it is useful to acknowledge the
family's relationship with the values and pacing of change of their
society and to also acknowledge the observer's relationship with the
values and pacing of change with their society.

Here, the criterion

which identifies the societal factors is those issues which concern the
physical survival and well-being of a family.
Culture.

In its general use in this study, culture is the patterns

of practices and values that define us as human.

More specifically,

particular cultures are the distinct practices and values which evidence
a unique manifestation of humanity.

Specific cultures are discerned

from one another by contrasting patterns around different human activi¬
ties, like sleep and like religious beliefs.

The primary function of

culture, given its societal context, is to promote the development of
our essential humanity.
humanity to grow.

Culture is the environment which allows our

In contrast to the use of the term, society, in this

study, culture has more to do with the meaning of our lives and society
concerns our physical survival.

Further, society is viewed as being

more intentionally structured than culture.

Cultural practices emerge

out of repeated interaction which give them meaning.

We may create a
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society, but we recognize a culture.

Despite these distinctions, socie¬

tal and cultural concerns are frequently merged.

The distinctions about

society and culture in this study are meant more to be useful in under¬
standing family development, rather than a claim about the true natures
of these systems.

Another observer may draw these distinctions differ¬

ently; the important point is that distinctions between varying types of
contextual influences should be made.
Clearly, in actualization the boundaries connecting and distin¬
guishing culture and society are quite fluid.

The above definition of

culture—the manifested patterns of our essential humanity-could be
construed as incorporating society.

While some aspects of culture tran¬

scend society, this study is concerned with specific cultures, which
rely on a specific society as a context.

To say, "We are Hispanic" is a

statement of cultural identity which transcends societal boundaries.

To

say, "I am Puerto Rican" begins to identify the societal context, but
Puerto Rican culture in New York is different than in San Juan.

As with

all RSS, the context of culture includes the natural environment and
other like systems.
The components of a culture are families, individuals, and cultural
institutions and movements.

Religion and the arts are cultural institu¬

tions which reflect their societal context.

The movements for women's

rights. Black rights, and the moral majority are viewed as cultural
\ovements whose major function is particular societal impact.
in the section on society, for those of a dominant culture the

As stated
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experience of society and culture may indeed be synonyms.

Host clear¬

ly, culture and society exhibit a reflexive relationship.
The values of a culture inform a group of people that they are
human and how they are uniquely so.

Cultural values generally make a

nore immediate impact on the rules guiding family interaction than
societal values, as families are major conduits of culture.

The inter¬

action of subcultures or culture groups, which may be a church, a dance
class or a group of friends, is also a source of cultural values.

Cul¬

tural values are not compiled anywhere; they exist in the practices and
minds of people.

These values range from the particular ways of greet¬

ing people to deeply embedded beliefs about the nature of life.

High-

water (1980) points out how fundamentally different cultures can be when
he claims that native people live in a multiverse, not in the universe
of white western culture.

Mbiti (1976) suggests that African culture

emphasizes harmony with nature, while the technological cultures stress
control over nature.
ages.

These types of cultural values evolve over many

A family system must differentiate itself within its cultural

values, but those values are the starting point for familial and indi¬
vidual identity.

A family rule structure is fundamentally influenced by

cultural values.

A family system blends its members' perspectives on

their cultural values into a unified and unique rule structure.

One

cannot understand the development of a family without a perspective on
how that family belongs to and is differentiated from its culture.
Values of a culture change more slowly, in general, than the rule
structure of a family.

While fads, like fashion changes, and cultural
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events, like Michael Jackson, seem to strike like lightning, they are a
long time in incubation and much time passes before their effects are
understood.

The pace of cultural (and societal) change can be used to

explain the phenomenon of family homeostasis.

As a family changes, its

cultural values serve as a background against which a family can make
distinctions.

Whether or not a family agrees with particular cultural

values, by using them as an anchor or measuring stick, the pace and
nature of family changes are modified.
An observer cannot know all the different values of all the differ¬
ent cultures with which they come in contact.
what all their cultural values are.

A family does not know

But an observer, by generally

recognizing the impact of culture on a family rules structure and sort¬
ing the cultural from the familial in each case, can come to display a
deeper understanding of how families structurally transform themselves.

Fami1y-

Family has been defined as a set of meanings unifying

people into a primary social group.

A particular family is self-defining

regarding which meanings organize which relationships in which way.
That is, that while many families will have parent-child relationships,
each family self-determines what that relationship means and how it is
to be structured.
In previous theories the context of family development was not
clearly identified, although a particular family unit was clearly por¬
trayed as connected with its extended family.

In this study, it is the

totality of a family that is considered a context of development.
Totality means not only entire extended family, but also those no longer
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alive and those not yet born.

As a family is a set of meanings, its

totality includes members' sense of familial history and their expectations for the future.
The primary function of families has been defined as generating its
members' and species' reasons and abilities to survive.

More specific

functions of a family relative to its members and itself as a whole are
promoting differentiation and belonging, providing socialization and
protection, insuring growth of the system and the maintenance of bounda¬
ries.

It is these types of functions that make families the "matrix of

identity" (Minuchin, 1974, p. 47).

Functions which connect a family

with this context include contributing to the survival of its context
and drawing resources from the context for its own survival; to some
extent fitting is structure to the context and simultaneously shaping
the context.

The missing child and anti-drunk driving movements are

examples of familial functions being fulfilled in the larger context.
These family-originated efforts will eventually result in a reshaping of
societal and cultural values.

The functions of families are in some

cases fulfilled by them, but in other cases families delegate some of
their functions to societal or cultural institutions, like schools or
churches.
The context of families is its natural environment, society and
culture.

Families have a reflexive relationship with their context in

that they are influenced by it and reshape it as well.

The high inci¬

dence of divorce in American society is reshaping that society and its
cultures.

Divorce was made more possible by economic (societal)
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conditions.

Many women who got divorced would live with their children

P0Verty, ^ 3t 16331 th6y Would llvequestionable.

m previous times that was

Now these so-called single parent families are changing

government policy and cultural values.
development issue.

Divorce is certainly a family

If seen in this circularly causa, context, it is an

illustration of the necessity of examining development in terms of
reflexive, contextual interaction.
In this study, it is not quite correct to say that individuals are
the components of families.
which are its components.
who participate in them.

It is the relationships unifying families
These relationships include the individuals

But it is individuals who make statements of

familial identity when they say, "I am an Ikaanga" or "I am a Johnson"
or

It's always been like this in this family."
The values of the totality of a family obviously form the founda¬

tion of a particular family unit's rule structure.

As families are

still most frequently formed by the joining of two individuals from two
different families, it is not always easy to make this foundation coher¬
ent.

The values of the families of origin are the initial rules which

guide interaction of individuals as they form a primary social system.
Eventually, through rule-guided interaction a new family of choice does
find a way to make the rule structure of both families fit together
tolerably.

These families of origin rules, like the closely associated

cultural values, always serve as a backdrop for a family of choice and
its members to differentiate from.

Throughout a family unit's exis¬

tence, the rules of the larger family serve as guides for particular
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interactions.

A man in raising his son may wonder what his father would

have done and how should he act similarly or differently.

Further, he

may be aware that his great grandfather was abusive to his grandfather
and that he wants to avoid those types of actions at all costs.

These

kinds of rules from the family at large help guide a family unit in particular interactions.

This is boring.

The pace of change of the totality of a family may or may not be
slower than a particular family unit.

For example, Aunt Jane and Uncle

Henry may complain about the other family units in their extended family
changing with the times and ignoring the values that helped this family
survive through the Great Depression.

So, while the total family

changes. Aunt Jane and Uncle Henry are an anchor to the past trying to
slow the pace of change.

The totality of a family exists, not in his¬

tory, but in the minds of those now alive.

If a family member changes

their perspective about their total family then that total family has
changed.

The extended family usually changes more slowly than one fam¬

ily unit, but this does not mean that the extended family is a con¬
straint on family development.

The death of an elderly family member

may bring the extended family closer together and encourage change in
family units.
The pace of change in a family, whether an extended family or a
particular unit, is not steady and consistent, but fluctuates.

Occur¬

rences sometimes seem discontinuous and sometimes emerge with seemingly
smooth regularity.

An observer cannot predict how the pace of change of
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a family will change, but by expecting fluctuations in that pace can
track more closely how structure is transformed.
Individuals.

Individual persons, as the locus of human identity,

are both a biological entity and a social unity.

The components of an

individual, for the purposes of this study, are their biology and the
endless interactions they engage in.

While an individual's name is a

statement of their identity, clearly their sense of identity, like the
other RSS, is much deeper than their name.
through an endless sequence of interactions.

Their identity is defined
Thus an individual's

identity emerges through enactment in various contexts, not merely
through statements in a vacuum.
Individuals are only to be understood in relation to other indi¬
viduals and larger social systems.

The contexts of an individual are

their natural environment, society, culture and family.

They exhibit

reflexive relationships with their contexts, affecting the world they
live in as it affects them.
individual level.
history.

Reflexivity is perhaps easiest to see on an

Many individuals have shaped the course of human

Most people know that they both change and are changed by

those they love.

This integrated (unarticulated) understanding of

systemic reflexivity is not surprising.

What is surprising is that it

is not applied more broadly.
The theory of family development in this study is in response to
linear and hierarchical theories of family development.

While they are

the locus of human identity and are the only biological entity among the
RSS, individuals are not seen as primary among these social systems.

In
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interaction no social system is always or even mainly primary.

Hier¬

archical primacy of the RSS shifts with the meaning of interaction.

All

interaction occurs between individuals, but this does not make them the
primary unity of human social interaction.

Meaning is primary.

One

merely has to watch an upset customer treat a phone company employee as
if they were the phone company to realize this point.

A claim for indi¬

vidual primacy is a claim for primacy of biology over meaning in human
life, and is antithetical to the values of this study.
The general function of an individual as a biosocial unity, like
the other RSS is to contribute to the perpetuation of themselves and
their context.

As a biological entity an individual's drive for sur¬

vival is more immediate than other social systems, but the need to
insure the survival of their context as an integral aspect of their own
is very similar to the other RSS.

The mere fact that individuals per¬

severe through the continual societal, cultural, and familial conflicts
they experience would seem to be adequate documentation of their com¬
mitment to contextual survival.

As the particular functions of indi¬

viduals as biosocial unities are so widely varied and are not the topic
of this study, they will not be elaborated here.
It should be obvious to all that the values of individuals affect
the structural transformation of their families.

The examples of indi¬

viduals in reflexive interaction cited throughout this study should
serve to make the point here.

Many critics of a systemic approach

complain that the individual is lost, or at least their freedom of
choice is lost, in a systemic picture.

Here, an individual's rule
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structure (identity) is describable using the same terms as the other
RSS.

An individual is at times viewed as a system in its own right (an

autonomous identity), and at other times as a subsystem of another sys¬
tem (a relational component).

Since the focus of this study is family

development, individuals are most frequently viewed as a subsystem, and
culture and society are viewed mainly as contexts.
Individuals are capable of changing more quickly than families.
However, an understanding of systems reveals that in a family, some in¬
dividuals will change faster and some more slowly than the family unit.
For example, one parent may decide that a child should be punished for
an action and so is accelerating the pace of thange.

The child responds

to constrain the pace of change by justifying their actions and ulti¬
mately appealing to the other parent.

The parents then argue for a

while and then decide on a different punishment than originally in¬
tended.

Regarding this example, the family as a whole changed more

slowly than the first parent wished and more quickly than the child
wished.

Any RSS can serve as a constraint or an accelerator to family

change, depending on how its rule structure fits with the family at that
point in time.

To understand how structural transformations occur in a

family it is useful to be able to distinguish the sources and their
effects on a family rule structure.

Family Time Frames
It has been claimed that the context of development is time (and
that time is a way to describe change).

That is, that an observer com¬

pares change in one system with change in other systems to understand
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development.

More specifically, it has been claimed that the context of

family development is four interrelated social systems.

That is, that

the structural transformation of a particular system-a family-is
understood by contrasting it against a background of other changing
systems—society, culture, individuals.

The regularities of change of

each of these four systems is qualitatively different and these differ¬
ences allow an understanding of family development.

A further under¬

standing of family development can be gained by punctuating in more
detail the qualitatively different types of change within a family.
Just as temporal concepts like hour, day, season, year allow us to de¬
scribe our existence in more detail, the temporal concepts of genera¬
tions, life course, stage and episode allow us to describe different
types of family meaning and change.
These four temporal concepts are called Family Time Frames (FTF),
and are an elaboration of family as a Rule Source System.

They are

punctuations or temporal levels of a family's experience.

The idea of

generation is a way of describing a great deal of family history with a
few words, while a stage describes a shorter period of family experience
in much more detail.

They are convenient distinctions to discuss more

specifically the variety of rules and rule structures (meanings) that a
family draws upon to guide its interaction.

Each FTF describes rule

processes at a different level and at a different rate of change.

The

rules handed down through the generations of a family are of a different
nature than the rules that emerge during an episode of a family unit.
Rules of broader FTF show greater endurance and they generally change
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m0re Sl0Wly than briefer 0nes-

FTF allow an examination of how a family

maintains its identity across time frames fro, the very broad to the
very brief.

The rules of episodes are always changing, but the rules

that guide a family's life course ("Every member of this family goes to
college" or ". . . obeys the rules of the house") change much more
slowly.

The slow changing rules provide a family a source of meaning so

they can know what it means to be a member of that family (an identity),
while the rapidly changing rules provide a source of meaning for that
identity to be confirmed and expanded.

For example, a son knows that

ultimately he will obey the rules of the house, but an interaction with
his mother may modify those rules.

Thus, as the family rules are

changed, the son's identity is confirmed by his obedience of the rules
and his identity is expanded by his helping to modify them.

Like the

RSS, the relationships between the FTF are reflexive and the broader
frames are inclusive contexts for the narrower, component time frames.
The life course of a family unit is the context for many stages.

While

the life course influences what happens in a stage, the life course is
also changed by each stage.

Below, each FTF will be defined by (1) the

type or level of rules it describes, (2) how this time frame connects
various family subsystems (a life course time frame connects a family
unit with its extended family), and (3) how reflexive rule development
happens at this level.
Generations.

The generational time frame refers to the rules of,

to adapt Hoffman's term, the mythic family (L. Hoffman, personal commu¬
nication, September 1983).

These rules then, are myths.
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The mythic family consists of those no longer alive and those not
yet born.

Thus, myths connect a family not only to its history, but to

its future.

The expectations for children and grandchildren yet to

come signify the initial transmission of family mythology into the
future.

Someone who vows to carry out the dream of a recently deceased

family member, is also using family mythology to guide the family into
the future.
The myths of the generational time frame provide the unifying
themes for an extended family, and so these rules connect the mythic
family to its extended family.

The talk at a family reunion about how

"this side of the family is different than that" or "how much we all
have changed since Grandma started these reunions" are meanings that
unify and distinguish extended and mythic family.

Myths transformed

through generations help form the foundation of a family's identity.
These myths are not deterministic of a family's identity, but are used
to guide interaction and form a unique family structure.

Myths are

deeply embedded in the relations of family with various aspects surfac¬
ing as they fit current interaction.

For example, when a grandparent

says to their grandchild, "If, I had said that to my grandfather he
would have slapped my face," a mythic rule is being used to guide pre¬
sent interaction.

When a new college graduate states, "I wish my

grandfather were alive to see this" the generational family is the con¬
text that gives meaning to the graduation.

As a parent says to their

adolescent child, "Wait 'til you have children" they are creating a
\ythic family as a frame for the meaning of a disagreement.

Whether
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mythS 3re "trUe" - "0t - irrelevant.
fSmlly ^ interaction
duced in the past.

Myths are meanings that guide a

and other systems.

Myths are not pro¬

They exist only in the present in the mind of the

family and they are changed in the present by interaction.
Rules of this temporal level link a family to its cultural identi¬
ty.

For example, during a recent campaign a national political candi¬

date, Geraldine Ferraro, referred frequently to her deceased father and
his Italian culture that provided the conduit for her family to develop
Its values.

The generational time frame is the most inclusive time

frame and thus these meanings are generally subject to the least and
slowest change.

However, when a person learns new information about

generations past, this time frame can change as quickly as any other.
As used in this study, the generational time frame puts family history
in a new perspective.
nor free of it.

A family is neither determined by its history,

Its history exists in the present in the mind of the

family and while under constant revision, forms a foundation upon which
a family unit builds its structure.
Life course.

The life course of a family is the time span de¬

scribed by the Family Life Cycle.
a generational perspective.

This time span is only cyclical from

From the perspective of a particular family

unit this period is a one time experience.

Most often, the life course

of an individual will include more than one family life course--a family
of origin, a family of choice, perhaps a divorce, and then perhaps
another family of choice.
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The life course time frame refers to the rule structure that marks
the lifelong identity of a specific family unit.
basic enduring structure of a family unit.

These rules are the

A rule structure is a com¬

plex of rules, a pattern of meanings, that requires a considerable quan¬
tity and redundancy of interaction to develop.

While a rule structure

is always being revised, a certain quality of it endures throughout the
life of a particular family unit.

This enduring quality is the unique

identity which indicates what it means to belong with this particular
family unit.

Reflecting on their family of origin, a person can identi¬

fy a number of values that characterized that family unit.

These gener¬

al values and the relation between them are like the tip of an iceberg
which indicates what the family rule structure is like.
structure is not like a constitution.
display.

A family rule

It is embedded rather than on

The rule structure is evidenced by general values that guide

and are modified by interaction.

A self-defining family unit—a

divorced, nuclear, homosexual or extended family—negotiates its rule
structure as its members interact with each other, their kin network and
their larger social context.

For example, imagine a twelve year old

coming home and reporting to their parent, "You should have heard what
'my friend said to his mother."

When the parent says, "I never want to

hear you talk to your parents that way," the child replies, "You don't
have to tell me, I'd never say something like that."

This example

illustrates parent and child using embedded life course rules (the
family rule structure concerning respect) to guide their discussion and
the content of the discussion reconfirms the rule structure.
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Hoffman (personal communication, April 1985) likens a family to a
beehive.

The hive, she claims, is not the physical structure that the

bees create, but the pathways that the bees create which are organized
around the physical hive.

Many churches define themselves in the same

manner; they are not their buildings, but the spirit and actions of
their members as a whole.

In this analogy a family rule structure is

not its members, but their interaction and meaning.
The life course of a family unit is the context for a number of
stages and numerous episodes.

But the stages and episodes bring novelty

to the life course of a family and thus reflexively impact the rule
structure.

The life course time frame connects the extended family to

and distinguishes it from its particular family units.

The unsolicited

and unappreciated advice from one adult sister to another regarding how
to raise children can demonstrate this point.

The one sister's assump¬

tion about the right to give advice and the other sister's eventual use
of the advice show how the life course time frame connects extended
family.

The lack of appreciation by the other sister of her sister's

style and continual insistence on giving advice shows the need for
family units to differentiate themselves.
The generational time frame is the context of a family life course,
and usually includes many life courses of its various family units.

A

family rule structure is generally more malleable to change than its
generational myths as those myths are the basis of the rule structure
and thus offer a broader and deeper sense of identity.

However, a

family may find it more important to change its generational myths than

145

change its rule structure, for each family unit must differentiate
ltS6lf ^ S°me S1'9nifiCant Wa* °r the "Vths may threaten the identity of
the family unit rule structure more directly.

A family unit that wants

to immigrate to another country may be breaking with many myths about
the extended family staying close together and in their home culture.
'magine that parents whose daughter changed religions let the daugh¬
ter know that her children were going to go to hell.

The daughter and

her husband may vow never to let her parents see their grandchildren in
order to preserve the autonomous meaning of their family unit.
Stage.

The stage time frame refers to rules that reflect major

social/biological themes of family interaction.

A stage, in this study,

is defined by a major, but temporary, interactional theme.
only defined in contrast to other stages.

Stages are

A family frequently is en¬

gaged in more than one interactional theme at once, so there can be
multiple, simultaneous substages.

A two parent family may have an

adolescent member and thus there is a subsystem experiencing what has
been frequently called an adolescent stage.

At the same time this fam¬

ily may have a child under two and so there is a subsystem experiencing
a stage frequently called early childhood.

The spouses, having been

married for fifteen years, are experiencing as a subsystem, a stage
frequently called middle marriage.

As these subsystems interact as a

family whole, there is a theme blending the stages into a unique inter¬
actional pattern (stage) which defies easy categorization based on
typical biological or social emphases.

So stages, as part of this

lodel, are not defined by typicality or norms, but by the interaction of
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the family being observed.
as substages.

The so-called typical stages are seen here

Stages are used here for lack of a better tent.

The ten

Phase is used as an integral part of the central model of this study and
to use it again here would be confusing.
Rules of a stage are used primarily during the existence of the
particular, temporary, interactional pattern.

One might like to recre¬

ate the passionate meanings of the halcyon days of early romance at a
later time in a love relationship, but those rules can only be reignited
occasionally and for briefer durations.

These initial enthralling mean¬

ings (rules) do impact the lifelong family rule structure, as evidenced
by such phrases as "what happened to the excitement in our relation¬
ship?

or

I always remember the look in your eyes the first time we

met."
Each time a child of a family first starts school, the interaction
of parents, child and siblings alters and renews what it means to be a
member of that family.

However, that "entering school" interaction is

guided by expectations (rules) of what this event means to all involved,
beliefs (rules) about who this child is, values (rules) of the parents,
et cetera, all of which are integral aspects of the overall family rule
structure.

Therefore, stage rules are of a different level than the

organizing rules of the rule structure.

Being temporary in relation to

life course rules, these rules are more short lived than the myths and
rule structure which contextualize them.

As myths define a generation¬

al/extended family and a rule structure defines a family unit, stage
(and substage) rules defines a family subsystem.

As a family actualizes
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a major interactional pattern, the emergent meanings unify the interactmg members into a subsystem

It is the consolidated meanings around an

"entering school" event that actually define who is part of that subsys¬
tem and in what way.

A stage restructures family interaction, but does

not reorganize the essential defining bonds of a family.
A family function like obtaining food and shelter does not define a
ge.

How a family fills this function does have developmental impact,

but the nature of this lifelong function is changed by the successive
Stages of family life.

While most of the examples in this section have

involved typical occurrences in many families, unpredictable and unique
events can occasion a stage.

And due to multiple, simultaneous sub¬

stages operating a family always creates a unique overall interactional
pattern or stage.
ERlsode.

The episode time frame refers to the rules that serve as

markers or guidelines of specific interactions.
frame of briefest duration in this study.
organized around a focal subject.

An episode is the time

An episode is any event

It can be extremely brief, like two

family members passing in the hall, or of longer duration, like a wed¬
ding.

The manner in which family members pass in the hall both gener¬

ates meaning and is guided by rules of the relationship.

For example, a

father and son may regularly bump into each other in fun as they pass,
while sister and brother pass each other without apparent acknowledg¬
ment.

Each of these examples exhibits an aspect of meaning of the

relationship.

As these episodes are repeated over time, the meaning is

a guideline of action and the action specifies how individuals are
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connected in relationship.

Episodes may be repetitive or cyclical.

A

series of episodes .ay core to be unified by a the.e which identifies
the series as a stage or substage.
Episodes are the arenas of action through which all meaning is
generated.

As one reviewer stated (Doherty), "episode is a fuzzy con¬

cept, but it has to be fuzzy" so it can describe varying types of
events.

All the examples cited in the above time frames are episodes

illustrating a particular level of meaning.
past or in the future.

No events happen in the

All events occur in the present in episodes or

are mentally reconstructed or anticipated as episodes in the present.
An episode focuses family relationships through the interactions of
individuals.

In family development, the context of meaning of episodes

is stages, life course and generations.

However, as episodes are the

arena of action of all levels of meaning, episodes reflexively affect
the rules of these other temporal levels.

Episodes are the fluctuations

that order the meaning which unifies a family.

Episodes can be the

elaboration of a stage or mark transition between stages.

Episodes con¬

nect individuals of a family into relationships and subsystems.

All

members of a family interacting at once are a temporary subsystem of the
family unit which endures for a much longer period.
Meaning markers or guidelines of the episode level are constantly
being renegotiated.

Every time father and son pass in the all, bumping

or not bumping into each other, the meaning of the relationship is ela¬
borated.

When father says "not now" and son respects that request, they

have negotiated a meaning for the relationship in this episode.
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EPlSOdeS are the S°UrCe 0f red^dancy necessary to create interactional
patterns and thus rules.

The guidelines that endure through repetitive

episodes become part of the stage rules.

When a mother says to a teen¬

age child, "I told you not to talk to me like that," and the child says,
"Well, don't treat me like a two year old then," they are negotiating
guidelines for episodes which will become rules guiding interaction in
this stage.
The four FTF and the four RSS serve as the variable contexts of the
meta-model of family development of this study.

They are variable so

that as the model is applied to each family a unique, non-nonaative
model is created.

The next section presents the Family Rules Model and

a description of how it operates.

Family Rules Model

To describe the central model of this study, first the three phases
(of eve) will be defined, second, transitions connecting the phases will
be discussed, and third, diagrams of the model and its frames of refer¬
ence will be presented.

Phases
The three phases of the FRM will be explained in the following man¬
ner.

Each phase will be defined by identifying (1) the primary interac¬

tional emphasis of a system, (2) the genesis, (3) operation, and
(4) completion of the phase.

This definition will be supplemented with

examples and various analogies about a systems relationship with its
context.
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The flrst phase of the FRM is the ESTABLISHING

' ”•,i* pr,”r'

„„

«...*.«th, l,!lc
foundation of a family's idpnti+w
y
ldentlty-

Mtttrnt fomtnj thi
tu
These patterns can be described by

both members and outside observers by rules, so the primary task is
establishing the basic rules and rules for changing rules of a system.
The genesis of an establishing phase occurs as t,,„ „
y
occurs as two or more parties
interact in a novel way and a fit of their current identities (rule
Structures) is made.

For example, the parties may be two young or older

people about to become lovers, or the parties may be a single teenage
mother, her newborn baby and her mother, or they may be two young people
and their families participating in an arranged marriage, et cetera.
Each party already experiences a system of meaning (an identity) which
defines them as an individual social system, and which connects them to
other social systems-their family, culture and society.

Every individ¬

ual and other type of system has an operative identity whether they
consciously know it or not.

That individual identity is shaped by, but

not dependent upon, years of reflexive interaction with the values of
one s society, culture, and family.

No matter how it happens, once the

parties' identities fit together in some way a temporary system is
formed.

For example, some movies portray how pleasant conversations

lead to the discovery of common values and other movies show how appar¬
ent conflicts encourage a strong attraction between two people.

If,

through interaction, each party's identity fits with the other's in some
way, then the parties suspend the primacy of their particular individual
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system of meaning in search of a new and greater unity of meaning.

For

example, the rush of feelings experienced by someone who is falling in
love, is the experience of suspending their current unity of meaning and
creating a new and greater unity or system.

The confusion of someone

during their first day on a new job is a similar experience.
The operation of an establishing phase involves continual reflexive
interaction, through which the creators of a family system negotiate and
agree upon basic rules and rules for changing rules.

This negotiation

and agreement are pervasive in a system and while most of it is uncon¬
scious, on the whole the question of consciousness or unconsciousness is
irrelevant to the formation of rules and rule structures.

For example,

one romantic partner says to the other, "Do that again, I love it when
you move your head that way," and the other replies, "I didn't know I
was doing it and now I'll feel funny doing it."

This exchange shows how

rules may be created and used in an establishing phase.

The head move¬

ment was attractive and thus had meaning which connected the two part¬
ners.

Presumably, this meaning was created on an unconscious level (a

rule), and only noticed by the one partner after many repetitions
(another rule).

Expressed as a conscious statement of meaning (yet

another rule), it altered the meaning of the action for the other part¬
ner (more rules) to the extent that the second partner expressed the new
meaning in another rule.

This reflexive interaction leads to the emer¬

gence of an unspoken rule structuring concerning how one communicates
about meaning in this relationship.

The structure is not a regulative

structure; it is an expression of meaning which unifies all the more
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specific rules about an aspect of the relationship.

The rule structure

guides future interaction, but is also modified by it.

For example, in

a succeeding interaction, as one of the partners is smiling for an unapparent reason, the other says, "What are you smiling about?"

The other

initially replies, "nothing," but with encouragement says, "I was just
thinking how cute you are," and hastily adds, "but I don't want you to
feel self-conscious."

The other partner responds, "I like it when you

think I'm cute, I just don't want you to tell me how to be cute, I just
don't want you to tell me how to be cute, like how to move my head."
These episodic examples are one illustration of how a system establishes
its rules and rule structure through reflexive interaction.
As these types of interactions are repeated concerning many differ¬
ent subjects, meanings are created, revised and fitted with other simi¬
lar meanings into an overall rule structure.

As systems members inter¬

act, the system continually and simultaneously seeks novelty and confir¬
mation.

Novelty fuels the necessary transformations that a system makes

to maintain itself and confirmation supports the basic pattern (organi¬
zation) that makes a system a system.

If one wants to confirm the rela¬

tionship, then they act congruently with the structure.

If, however,

one wants to change the relationship in some way, then, relative to the
structure, one introduces novelty.

While both of these emphases are

continual, what is generally noticed during an establishing phase is the
search for novelty.

Many of the cliches of lovers show the emphasis on

novelty and confirmation:

"I've never loved anyone like I love you," "I

feel like I've known you all my life."

The search for novelty is
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dominant during an establishing phase as events are experienced as new
or chaotic (like culture shock).

The complex, reflexive interplay of

novelty and confirmation is a dissipative process, which establishes the
basic rules of a system.
The following analogies describing how a system operates--its
"focus," "energy usage," and "territory"-will further elucidate an
establishing phase.

During this phase the "focus" of the system is on

the system per se to the exclusion of its context.

The system is con¬

cerned with establishing its autonomy which defines it and enables it to
be self-perpetuating.

In one sense, as a new system establishes autono¬

my it is the context of itself and its members.

For example, when two

people fall in love they are frequently oblivious to action in their
surrounding context.

The notions of lovers losing their appetites,

becoming physically clumsy, forgetting about other important aspects of
their lives are all examples of how previous context is ignored and how
an establishing phase affects the behavior of systems members.

The

"territory" of a system is explored and defined during the initial
phase.

Through the dissipative process, system members interactionally

agree what values will be a part of the system and which will not.
These values, meanings or rules are the "pathways" (Hoffman's sugges¬
tion) or "territory" of the system.

So during this phase, the "energy"

of the system is predominantly devoted to creating the meanings that are
the system—rules and rules for changing rules.

"Energy exchange" with

the environment is a very secondary, but still necessary action.
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Having babies provides an example of these analogies of "focus,"
"territory" and "energy."

When a baby, particularly a first baby, is

born into a two parent family, generally other actions in life pale in
importance (temporarily).
baby first.

Members "focus" on what's necessary for the

As people interact with the newborn, both they and the

baby "explore" the new system and the interaction creates guiding rules.
Perhaps the baby likes to be held upright when gassy and upon discovery
a proud father "marks the territory" by proclaiming, "See, I got him to
stop fussing!"

The system as a whole reserves its "energy" to insure

the baby's survival.

Generally after a birth, parents devote more

"energy" to insuring a secure future for their family.

More specifical¬

ly, in many cases the mother gets up at night with the baby, not just
for feeding, but also so the father can continue to work productively.
However, the particular caretaking arrangements are influenced by the
societal and cultural values a family incorporates in its structure.
All of these patterns of meaning and actions are uniquely established
through the interaction of the particular family being observed.
Quite obviously, during an establishing phase, a system's rule
structure increases in complexity.

However, the key variable in the

viability of a system is not the complexity of structure of the system
per se, but how well that structure can manage complexity in itself and
its environment.

The endurance of a system is determined by how well

its successive structures can manage the complexity the system generates
itself and encounters in its context.

The question arises, how does a

system know when its basic rules are established?

That is, when is an
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establishing phase fulfilled or completed?

This theory states that an

establishing phase is complete when the system's rues are unified into a
whole (an identity), but this requires explanation.

The functions that

a particular family system must fulfill to establish its identity are
initially determined by a blending of each member's individual identity.
An individual's identity connects them with certain societal, cultural,
and familial values.

Through years of reflexive interaction with soci¬

etal, cultural and familial values an individual social system has con¬
structed expectations (rules) of how a family system should be mani¬
fested.

(What the relationship should be affects a partner's actions

in the relationship, but what the relationship actually is also changes
a partner's expectations about relationships.)

Quite obviously, those

expectations exhibit both similarities and uniquenesses to other indi¬
viduals.

When two people are attracted to one another, their expecta-

tious about relationships fit together in some significant ways by
definition.

However, due to the overall uniqueness each person's set of

expectations, they will also experience some conflicts of expectations.
As individuals interact, modify each other's system of meaning and
thereby manifest an actual relationship, the relationship draws on both
persons' expectations to uniquely organize their system.

Built into

this organization are certainly criteria about what functions should be
fulfilled in a relationship.

The organization determines how many and

to what extent those functions must be fulfilled in order for the system
to become a primary factor in one's life.

This point is critical:

the

unique organization of a social system makes that system self-norming.
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So, an establishing phase of a system is completed when its basic rules
are unified into a whole, but only the system in question can know when
that occurs.
Consolidating/diversifying.

The primary interactional emphasis

during the consolidating/diversifying phase is unifying and elaborating
a system's rule structure relative to its context.

This is a dual

directed phase as two different types of rule-guided interaction occur-consolidation or unification and diversification or elaboration.

Whe¬

ther these are viewed as simultaneous or sequential interactions is not
important.

What is important is that these two directions are comple¬

mentary and inseparably linked.
The genesis of this phase occurs as a rule or rule structure is
established.

Interaction of the system shifts from a concentration on

making rules/meaning to using the rules to consolidate and diversify the
system.

As a system's basic rule structure is established, the system

no longer has to invest most of its resources in generating rules and
then invoking and making rules develops an economy.

For example, a

parent shows a child where and how to put her toys away and then helps
her do it a couple of times.

When the child is told to do it on her

own, she finds toys that were not assigned a place, and she says,
"where do I put this?"

The parent answers, "Find a good place to put

it, just like we did with the other toys."
asks the parent, "Is this a good place?"

The child finds a place and
After the parent replies

"yes," the child repeats the request a couple of times.

Finally, in

this ideal example, the child stops asking and in a little while starts
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singing to herself.

Shortly, the parent comes in the room to find the

child not only putting away her toys, but "putting away" the family's
plants and magazines in unusual, but, to the child, good places.

On an

episodic level, this example illustrates the beginning of a consolidat¬
ing/diversifying phase in a number of ways.

The child and parent first

created (established) a rule about putting away particular toys in
particular places.

They then agreed to have the child do it on her own

(a consolidation).

She then set about applying (diversifying) it.

When

the child found toys with unknown places, she and her parent made a new
rule, based on the first one, with much less effort than it took to
establish the first rule.

After making a rule so easily (it showed an

economy), the child began using the rules about toys easily (economical¬
ly) and she stopped asking.

Then the child thought to herself for a

while about which things should go where (a consolidation of the newly
diversified rule) and when she started singing she had consolidated the
veaning of this activity and was diversifying it by "putting away"
practically everything.

This entire sequence was itself a diversifica¬

tion of a previously consolidated meaning about how and why to please
parents or if one prefers, how and why to raise children.

On a broader

temporal level the genesis of this phase occurs as rules are linked in a
unified whole; a rule structure emerges which gives a family a sense of
identity.
The operation of a consolidation/diversification phase involves the
repetition of the above type of interactions at many temporal levels.
When a father says, "My father taught me this and his father taught him
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this," he (with his son)

is consolidating rules at a generational level.

And when he goes on to teach his son the same information, but in cir¬
cumstances different than his father and grandfather faced, he and his
son are diversifying rules on a generational level.

The notion of

economy of rules means they are invoked during this phase with signals
which carry far greater meaning than the effort used in sending the
signal.

For example, when a husband and wife are out socially they may

exchange certain looks, one of which means, "don't talk about that,"
another which means "let's go home."

Or when one or two adult siblings

asks "you were always like that" it is a signal which invokes the meaning of an entire rule structure.
Consolidation and diversification of rules and rule structures make
each other possible.

More than that they make each other necessary.

rules are unified into a whole, diversification is demanded.

As

The ongo¬

ing transformation of systems requires that all systems must seek
novelty and confirmation.

As systems seek novelty in this phase (diver¬

sify) they must confirm the organization of the system by consolidating
new rules with the existing unified whole.

There are infinite rules

that could emerge as a system interacts with itself and its context, but
all rules refer to the unified whole or consolidated rule structure to
determine which types and patterns or rules can exist and still maintain
the basic identity of the system.

They do this through the dissipative

process of social systems, the sorting, retaining and rejecting of vari¬
ous information.

For example, a teenager says to a parent, "I know what

you will say, but can I . . .?"

When the teenager says, "I know what

159

you will say" they are marking the identity of the system; they "know"
the rules and

know" that the system will continue to endure.

But, if

they "know" what do they ask, and why do parents so often listen?
Because they both also "know" that the system must diversify itself.
Every so often a novel situation emerges (novel to one or more parties)
and the system must fit the rule structure and the novel situation
together.

This results in change in both the structure and situation,

and thus a system diversifies.

For an example from another social

realm, the U.S. Supreme Court refers to the Constitution to determine
which laws and verdicts are constitutional given the novel situations to
which they apply.
As always interaction is rule-guided in this phase and as always
the interaction has reflexive effects on the rule structure which ini¬
tially made interaction possible.

(The statement that a rule structure

makes interaction possible is true by definition.
organized in some way to be viable.

A system must be

The manifestation of this organi¬

zation is described by a rule structure.)
Using analogies of "focus," "energy," and "territory" this phase
can be further elucidated.

During this phase the focus of the system is

no longer on the system per se to the exclusion of its context, but on
interaction between system and context.

Consolidating/diversifying

encourages a system to expand its territory as rule-guided interaction
emphasizes exploration of the unknown territory of the context.

The

energy of the system is invested in broadening the horizons of the
system relative to its context and maximizing the skills of the system.
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Through jobs, school, friends, societal and cultural institutions a
family system grows, interacts more productively and becomes more rooted
in its context.
of the system.

This expansion is an elaboration of the relationships
The growth of skills via jobs and school is a most obvi¬

ous family example.

For a cultural example, after Hoses "established"

the ten commandments, the Hebrews spent many years in the desert elabo¬
rating and applying Judaic law.

This diversification always referred to

the judge s sense of the consolidated whole as represented in the ten
commandments.
Events during this phase do not appear as completely sudden or
sharp as in an establishing phase.
become the rule in the family.

Expansion, growth or novelty has

Therefore, during this phase novelty and

confirmation hold equal dominance.

An adolescent may come home pro¬

claiming "you'll never guess what happened today," but this type of
event has come to be expected in the family.

To the adolescent, how¬

ever, they are establishing a new individual identity.

The novelty is

qualitatively different to them than to the family as a whole.
Any structure has limits to its consolidation and diversification.
As a system completes this phase its structure reaches its ma imum com¬
plexity.

This maximum is self-determined by the organization of the

system.

A family system evidences its greatest quantity of rules and

its greatest complexity of order of rules.

The system's ma uimum ability

to handle complexity in its environment is also reached in this phase,
but it is not directly correlated to the complexity of structure.

For

example, the U.S. government's complexity of structure appears to be
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almost inversely related to its ability to handle complexity.

As well a

family with a preponderance of explicit rules and routines often limits
its ability to handle complex interaction.

To say that this phase sees

management of greatest complexity is not a statement of any ideal goal
or that all family systems manage complexity well.

It means that, rela¬

tive to the establishing phase that a particular system experienced, the
consolidating/diversifying phase will necessarily allow greater manage¬
ment of complexity.

This then is a statement of how the model operates.

Any structure has limits to its consolidation and diversification
according to the resources of the system.

While a most obvious example

is a biological one of the need for sleep, social systems also find that
their structures of meaning are only able to accommodate a certain quan¬
tity of meaning.

A consolidating/diversifying phase is completed as

that limit is reached and the third phase emerges.
Contracting.

The primary interactional emphasis of a CONTRACTING

phase is maintaining the essential identity of a system (a "contract" of
\eaning) in relation to its context as the system's ability to manage
complexity diminishes (its resources "contract").

So, a contracting

phased implies both meanings of the English word--an enduring agreement
and a shrinking of the system.

Both meanings are derived from a word

which means to draw together.
The genesis of this phase occurs as a system's rule structure is
elaborated to its limit.

The limit is reached as a system s resources

diminish or no longer fit the context and in response its rule structure
declines in utility.

The so-called leaving home/empty nest occurrence
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provides an example.

In the normative FLC model (which does apply to

some families) leaving home is a diversifying stage, but as it occurs
the empty nest syndrome supposedly emerges and this is a contracting
stage.

So, contracting overlaps with diversifying.

Without the person

who left home, the family of origin's rule structure no longer fits the
context.

In place of the previous typical interactions with the now

absent member, some members may experience loneliness and be comforted
by others, while other members may engage in activities which they
could not do before.

Interaction between the remaining family members

changes significantly and the rule structure changes with it.

(My

family got a St. Bernard when I was the first to leave home and did it
explicitly to replace me.)
During the operation of a contracting phase the rule structure in¬
volving daily interaction with the launched member contracts or shrinks
and is reduced in usage.
pear entirely.

However, that rule structure does not disap¬

When the absent member returns in body or in the memo¬

ries of those remaining, the rule structure is to some extent reacti¬
vated.

Many adults find that when they return to their family of ori¬

gin, they act in some ways like they did when they were children.

In

this sense as the rule structure shrinks it also leaves a contract or
agreement about how the launched member fits into the family rule struc¬
ture.

This is how a contracting phase operates in both senses of the

English word.

In another example, after receiving a complaint from

their parent about how they are raising their children, an adult child
tells their parent, "the world has changed since I was a kid, parents
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and children relate differently these days.
excellent relationship."

The kids and I have an

The grandparent, acknowledging their adult

child's authority as a parent, but not acknowleding defeat says, "I know
you have to handle things as you think best, but I think you were raised
with some pretty good values."
good values.

The parent replies, "sure you taught me

Those are the same values I use in raising my kids; I

don t dispute that.

It s just that the way a parent gets some of those

values across has changed."

In this example the generational rule

structure has contracted to the point that it does not seem in existence
to either the parent or grandparent.

However, through a conflict of

rules it becomes clear that the essential values of that original rule
structure still serve as a contract between the generations of this
family.

Imagine at a later date this same grandparent is listening to

one of his grandchildren complain about her parent.

Grandpa says,

"when I was a boy I didn't even think about complaining about my par¬
ents, but times have changed and you can talk about these things out
with your folks.

I'll help you figure out what to say, but you've got

to go say it."

The teenage girl says "thanks Grandpa, I knew I could

count on you."

The values that have endured as a contract of meaning

over the generations of this family provides the guilding rules for this
interaction.

As situations arise the contract can regenerate new rules

to fit the situation.

The example has a happy ending, but the contract¬

ing phase can just as validly describe situations without a solution.
For example, suppose in this situation, Grandpa had said to this grand¬
daughter, "young lady I don't care if times have changed, you still have
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to respect your parents.

Don't ever talk about them like that again."

And suppose the granddaughter had run out crying "you don't understand."
The generational rule structure would have still been contracted (not
directly useful in this situation) and a contract of meaning still would
have linked the three generations together.

However, the nature of the

contract that is passed on from Grandpa to granddaughter would have been
very different in this case.

In the happy ending, it might have been

expressed as something like "the family will find a way to resolve these
things, one way or another."

In the unresolved scenario, it might have

been experienced as "parents and children are in an eternal battle."
In the above examples. Grandpa represented the generational family
and its myths.

To him the context appeared new and unknown.

typical during a contracting phase.

This is

Novelty emerges in this phase from

the new and unknown relationship between the system and context, but a
system's emphasis on confirmation is dominant in this phase.
To continue with the analogies of "focus," "territory," and
"energy," the focus of the system shifts from the emphasis on connec¬
tions and expansion with the context during a consolidating/diversifying
phase to insuring that system and context remain distinct during a
contracting phase.

The energy of the system is focused on preserving

the autonomy of the system.

An aging mother may lay down clear and

strict conditions for her daughter's visits.

In this way the mother

maintains clear boundaries and forces herself to make her own decisions
and not become too dependent on her daughter.
the family system narrows.

The contextual circle of

Territory is not so much explored as it is
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defended.

On an episodic level, people who, after an ardent gets

their dlStlnCt b0Undar1es as th« resolution threatens to make their
boundaries less clear.

This phase marks the decreasing complexity of

the rule structure of a system and a decline in the system's ability to
handle complexity.

In the face of the decreasing complexity, behavior

nay be extremely rigid or fluid.

The stereotypes of older people engag¬

ing in very detailed routines can show rigidity and the loss of memory
illustrates fluidity.

These behaviors are efforts to maintain the

autonomy of a system and are part of a contracting phase.

A contracting

phase is experienced first as a breakup of the existing rule structure
and then a reorganization of the system at hand.

Breakup does not mean

that the experience is negative, for even all good things must come to
an end.
Many developmental theories state that performance in succeeding
phases or stages depends on performance in previous ones (Duvall, 1971;
Erickson, 1968).

Synne as far back as 1965 referred to this as the

epigenetic principle (1984).

This claim is based on a normative view of

development which insists that systems must complete certain tasks or
types of tasks in order for the next stage to go well.

The notion of a

contracting phase is offered as a better explanation of how historical
interaction influences present interaction.

The contracting phase does

not carry the normative and deterministic implications that the epigene¬
tic principle does.

It maintains a link with history, but puts deter¬

mination of meaning and action in the present.

As an observer examines
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the development of a system, can ask what resources and flexibility to
generate new options does the contract with the past provide.
A contracting phase is completed as the contracted rule structure
reestablishes meaning on a new level and the cycle of transformation
continues.

For example, a funeral marks the overlap of contracting and

establishing phases, as it acknowledges the contracting changes to come
and provides support and direction for facing those changes.

On a soci¬

etal level, Ronald Reagan's presidency asserts that consolidation/diver¬
sification of the U.S. government has gone on long enough.

He has

worked to contract the meaning of what government does in many respects
and has reached back to an earlier time to establish his vision of how
government should operate.

He has drawn on a contract of meaning that

says national defense should be the primary and perhaps only action of
government.
Individuals may live through the contracting of a number of family
life courses.

It is through those individuals' lives that new systems

are established and the cycle of life continues.
These three phases describe the Family Rules Model of system devel¬
opment.

To further elucidate the operation of the FRM, transitions con¬

necting the phases will be explained.

Transitions Between Phases
The phases of the FRM have been described by outlining the genesis,
operation and completion of each phase.

The phases evidence continuity

as the genesis of one phase emerges out of the completion of a preceding
phase.

The brief definitions and examples explaining the phases hint at

167

how transitions between phases occur.

Another type of explanation will

further elucidate the manner in which the interactional emphasis of one
phase necessarily is transformed into the next phase.
The FRM operates at the four temporal levels identified earlier:
generations, life course, stage, and episode.

That is, the generations

of an extended family, the life course of a family unit, a stage of a
family subsystem, and an episode can each be punctuated as evidencing an
establishing phase, a consolidating/diversifying phase, and a contract¬
ing phase (see diagram on page 180).

While the specific interactions of

a transition from an establishing to a consolidating/diversifying phase
look quite different in a generational frame than they do in a stage
time frame, transitions at all temporal levels show some general simi¬
larities, which will be explained below.
A family system can be said to have made a transition between
phases when the interactional mode of rule generating has been trans¬
formed.

The interactional mode of a family system changes through the

coordination of meaning.

The concept of coordination has been borrowed

from Pearce and Cronen (1978), but they cannot be held responsible for
its particular use here.

In this study, there are two levels involved

in the coordination of meaning.

One level is the degree of agreement

evidenced among the subsystems of a system (a meaning/psychological
level of content) and the other level concerns how a system uses its
energy resources (a physical level of context).
Interactional agreement does not require conscious acknowledgement
between parties.

Just as the great share of rule making occurs at an
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unconscious level, agreement is a reflexive,
exive, interactive process between
subsystems in which consciousness is irrelpv

each spouse and yet the pattern of interaction serves the relationship
overall.

The "assertive" spouse may see it as a sign of their love, a

so tries to be very assertive.

The "passive" spouse may interpret it ,

a sign of their spouse’s individual needs, and so lets it continue as
long as it does not interfere with their
r own needs.

These different but

fitted meanings allow the system to endure, and thus illustrate agree¬
ment.

That endurance of the system through fitted meanings is the meas

ure of agreement, not whether subsystems share the same conscious mean¬
ing.
The organization of a system has been claimed to be autonomous and
yet, for survival, the structure of a system is clearly dependent on
contextual factors in some significant way.

If the energy exchange

between system and context ceases, so does the system.

Energy exchange

is the pattern of interaction between system and context which fuels
the continual transformations which are necessary for a system to main¬
tain its autonomy.

The energy exchange required for continual trans¬

formations does not determine how the transformations occur.

That is,

energy exchange does not compromise a system's organization.

The

169

organization of a system determines what type of energy exchange is
acceptable, so what the system is dependent upon is the availability of
raw sources of energy.

For a simple biological example, the biological

orgamzation of human beings and mosquitoes determines what types of
energy sources they each prefer.

If these two systems tried to switch

methods and sources of energy exchange neither would survive very long
as their structure would prohibit it.
How systems come to agreement has to do with autonomous aspects of
their operation:

how their organization structures information flow.

Energy exchange has to do with interdependent aspects of their opera¬
tion; interdependent because the context determines what energy is
available, while the system determines how it is used.

The point of

view in this study is that systems simultaneously exhibit autonomy and
interdependence.

It is the interplay of these two levels, autonomy and

interdependence, and more specifically, agreement and energy usage,
which promotes the transitions between phases of interaction in social
systems.

The interplay of agreement and energy usage in social systems

creates different types of coordination of meaning, which in turn en¬
ables transitions to be made.

In this study it is sufficient to dis¬

tinguish three different types of coordination to explain how phases of
the FRM are connected.

The three types of coordination are evidenced by

(1) simple agreement on two or more levels of relationship, (2) agree¬
ment to disagree, and (3) agreement by default.

These types of coordi¬

nation have certainly been previously identified in many other places
and in many other ways.

What is new is identifying them as necessary
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conditions which must be fulfilled for develops! transitions to
occur in families.
IH Simple aqreenentonjgo^rjrogje^.

When two or more

parties experience agreement about a particular episode and simultane¬
ously experience agreement on other levels of meaning-stage, life
course, generation-then they are capable of changing their interaction¬
al emphasis to the next phase.

An example is an agreement to marry.

The largely unconscious process of fitting together of values that
readies two people to commit themselves to a shared future shows agree¬
ment on the stage level of their individual lives.

As they agree upon

the date and other details they make that stage level manifest in epi¬
sodic agreements.

This demonstrates agreement on two levels, and as

long as there are no relatively major conflicts on another level (life
course or generations), then the system will change its interactional
emphasis to the next phase.

From this point the example concerning

marriage will be continued in two directions.
First, say that the parents of both young people support the marri¬
age and further, the extended families of both are supportive.
evidence of agreement on life course and generational levels.
agreement involves the totality of this family.

This is
This

Agreement on all these

levels of family meaning will necessarily change the interactional
emphasis of this family.

The totality of this family—both extended

families which are organized around the marital pair--will complete a
contracting phase and initiate an establishing phase as the two young
people dramatize leaving their families of origin and establishing a
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family of choice.

Agreement through all these levels of family meaning

does not guarantee how long such a new system will endure, although it
can help.

As novelty is continually introduced into the system, the

agreement can quickly dissolve on any level.
maintained through fluctuations.

The order of the system is

As the system interacts with its

context, episodic fluctuations can reorder the meanings unifying the
system at any level.

Imagine a newlywed stereotypically reacting to

their first argument by saying, "Everything was so perfect on our wed¬
ding day, but I was wrong about you and so was my mother."

So, while

agreement on all levels is a nice experience it does not necessarily
indicate the quality of interaction over the long run.
In the second direction of the example, say the parents do not sup¬
port the marriage.

However, to the young partners, values conflicts

with their parents have always been useful to differentiate themselves.
So the conscious disagreement could be a sign to the young people that
the larger family system is encouraging them to move ahead, since it has
done so in this manner so many times in the past.

The pragmatic meaning

of interaction determines what counts as agreement.

In this part of the

example, the pragmatic meaning indicates that apparent disagreement is
part of the identity of this family, and so to move ahead with the mar¬
riage could very well be in agreement with the family meaning.
are two important points in this part of the example.

There

One is that

systemic agreement is not merely what happens in obvious interaction,
but is determined by the patterns of meaning that bind a family to¬
gether.

The other point is that each system self-determines what
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constitutes agreement.

If the young people knew that conscious dis¬

agreement indicated systemic disagreement then the meaning and resulting
action of the second part of this example would be quite different.
This type of agreement indicates not only a fit of the content of a
relationship (episode level), but also consensus about the purpose of a
relationship (stage and/or life course level).

This type of agreement

responds to aesthetic concerns of a family, as it unifies a family at
all levels.
[2) Agreement to disagree.

When two or more parties agree on one

level, but disagree on another level, they will come to the next inter¬
action phase on the level which they agree.

There is a variety of ways

in which this can occur, which will be explained and exampled below.
Two parties could agree on what type of interaction should occur or
what its purpose should be, but not on what the content should be, and
yet they could make a transition to the next phase.

For example, a

stepparent and their stepchild could agree that the stepparent has the
right to set tasks for the chi 1 d--agreement on the stage level—but dis¬
agree on timing of a particular task—disagreement on an episodic level.
The rule about stepparent and child interaction was established long
ago, as this relationship is in a consolidating/diversifying phase.

The

argument the two are having over the task is a diversification of the
rule.

However, the underlying agreement about their relationship allows

the two of them to move to the next phase and form a contract about what
is to occur.

The stepparent finally says, "I don't want to hear any
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more.

Do it now."

The stepchild grumbles about "unfairness" and other

Principles, but turns their attention to completing the assigned task.
Two parties could agree on what content should occur, but not on
how it should happen or what its purpose should be.

For example, two

lovers may agree to a sexual encounter-agreement on an episodic levelbut not on how it should happen or why-disagreement on a stage level.
One partner may believe that the relationship could benefit from the
novelty of a "lustful" experience, while the other thinks that it is not
novel at all and the relationship needs the type of confirmation that
only a "sensitive" encounter could provide.

Despite the disagreement on

the more encompassing level-the stage of the relationship-this couple
will move on to the next episodic phase.

They will move on from an

establishing phase-"lefs make love"-to a consolidating/diversifying
phase in which they determine how or even if they will actually fulfill
the meaning they established.

If they can fit their different percep-

tions of the stage of their relationship together they will proceed
with their intentions.

If they cannot come to agreement, their diversi¬

fication will undo the meaning they established by moving on to a con¬
tracting phase in which neither gets their desires fulfilled.

At any

rate, no matter what the course of action, they will make a transition
to the succeeding interactional phases.
The notion of agreeing to disagree has been around for a long time.
And it can be used much more complexly to describe relational comnunication.

It has been used here to illustrate discrepant meanings on the

different levels of the FRM.

One could punctuate the levels differently
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and still demonstrate the same effect of developmental transition, for
it describes how purpose and content levels of relationship are related.
There are a number of cliches that express this type of agreement, such
as, "vive la difference," and "you go your way and I'll go mine."

This

type of agreement responds to pragmatic concerns of a family, as it must
use its discrepancies to continue its transformations.
(3) Agreement by default.

In any interaction between people there

is a limited quantity of energy which can be utilized to negotiate
agreement.

When two or more parties cannot agree on the content or

purpose of their interaction before they exhaust the finite energy
available to them they necessarily move on to the next phase.

They do

not agree on what to do, they do not even agree on what not to do, but
they must continue to construct meaning through interaction.

For ex¬

ample, an adult child and their parent have an argument which they can¬
not seem to resolve.

One of them finally says, "we aren t getting any¬

where, let's talk again later."

While each party continues to fire

parting shots, the unresolved discussion winds down.

These people

realize they have exhausted the energy available to them and thus lost
the perspective and abilities necessary to resolve the conflict.

On a

stage level of interaction, an example of this type of agreement is
parents and teenagers who no longer feel that they can communicate.
They are repeatedly unable to reach agreement and come to experience
alienation from one another as the consequence of default agreement.
Vicious cycle interactions evidence this type of agreement.

When

after failing to reach a working agreement, a social system agrees by
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default to move on to the next interactional phase, that system is even¬
tually drawn back to the unresolved issue to again attempt coordination
of meaning.

If a system repeatedly attempts resolution without success

they continually move through a cycle of episodic phases:

establish¬

ing—consolidating/diversifying—contracting, without getting anywhere
on the broader stage level.

Systems experiencing such trouble appear to

be in a very early stage of development as people argue about seemingly
petty issues and at a maturity level far beneath them.

Indeed, they

have never established some very basic rules, thus the appearance of
immaturity.
The notion of "leaving the field" in family therapy, either physic¬
ally or psychologically,‘is another example of agreement by default.
Very serious symptoms can result from coordinating meaning primarily on
a default level.

War between nations is a default agreement, as coun¬

tries muster all their resources and risk their survival when disagree¬
ment threatens their interactive system.

Usually divorce is most use¬

fully seen as a default agreement, although a case can be made tat some
are agreements to disagree.
However, this type of agreement can exhibit a positive tone as it
can serve as the context for the two other types of agreement.

For

example, two people falling in love may be perfectly willing to continue
to explore and establish their relationship, but they finally agree,
"It's been a very special night.
we're exhausted.

It's too bad it can t continue, but

Let's go to sleep."

Or one of them may feel this way,

but while the other is exhausted, they may want to continue anyway and
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feels slightly disgruntled that their partner insisted on stopping.
Agreeing by default can also emerge from the other types of agreement
when people do not seem to know when to quit.
may decide to have a play fight.

For example, two brothers

In the course of the fight, one does

something considered dirty fighting and the other reciprocates.

In

short order, one or both is crying and the play fight comes to an un¬
happy end.

They moved from simple agreement-play fighting-to agreeing

to disagreeing—dirty fighting-to agreement by default-quitting by
tears.

Many times people can resolve a problem, but they still have

high energy levels and persist in using that energy until they and their
agreement are exhausted.

This insistence can lead to an agreement by

default and an undoing of the previous agreement.
When a social system cannot create a coherent meaning structure,
that is, come to agreement within itself, the system must refer to its
context for resolution.

So, as agreement has to do with the aesthetics

of a system and disagreement has to do with pragmatics, default is a
type of agreement which refers to a system's relationship with its con¬
text to enable the system to move on to the next phase.
Agreement by default is different than agreeing to disagree, in
that, in default the lack of resolution is the current focus of the
relationship and the participants are drawn to reattempt resolution,
whereas, agreeing to disagree emphasizes agreement in the relationship
and the tolerance of differences.

Clearly, these distinctions are drawn

by the particular relationship in question, not some supposedly objec¬
tive measures.
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An example will illustrate the difference between the different
types of agreement discussed here.
argument.

Imagine a husband and wife having an

They have completed an establishing phase by agreeing to

focus on a particular subject.

During the consolidating/diversifying

phase of this episode they disagree so much that the wife runs off to
the bedroom crying.

This separation marks the contracting phase of the

episode and the contract of meaning about this interaction is completed
by an agreement by default:
anger.

the ending of active argument by tears and

Now, suppose the husband stomps off to work without making fur¬

ther contact with his wife as he believes that she is trying to manipu¬
late him.

The agreement by default continues.

This default agreement

could continue for a long time as they negotiate other issues or that
night the husband may come in and apologize and his wife says "well, you
should."

They have now moved from default to agreeing to disagree and

this allows them to negotiate a solution.

Suppose alternatively, that

the husband does not stomp off to work, but follows his wife and com¬
forts her.

The couple is now agreeing to disagree and have thereby

established a new episode.

They both make apologies (are in agreement)

and begin to work toward agreement about the original subject.

These

types of episodic examples provide the simplest and clearest examples of
how phase transitions are made, but the other temporal 1evels--stage,
life course, and generation--also operate in the same manner.
These explanations of phase transitions operationalize the FRM.
Further conceptual clarity will be provided by explaining the diagrams
of the meta-model which follow.
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FRM Diagrams
The following diagrams are intended to provide further conceptual
clarity of the meta-model.

They are a more simplistic representation of

the model than the preceding explanations as they visually portray the
meta-model in two dimensional form rather than in the more numerous
dimensions in which family life occurs.

That limitation should be

continually considered as an observer attempts to use the diagrams to
understand the model and apply them to families.
look somewhat like a bell-shaped curve.

Also, the diagrams

It would be unfortunate if that

were interpreted as implying some sort of normalcy.

The diagrams are

not meant to characterize any real or ideal family, but only aid under¬
standing of the meta-model by simplifying its presentation.
The horizontal axis of the diagrams represents time:
rate of change across numerous contexts.

the average

The vertical axis represents

the accumulation of structure (a quantitative measure) or the complexity
of structure (a qualitative measure) of a family system.

An observer

could punctuate the structure of a family either quantitatively or qual¬
itatively depending upon their purpose.
This first diagram presents the FRM in its simplest form:

as a

cycle of phases at one temporal level devoid of any frames of reference.
It is intended to show that the complexity of structure of a family
system increases through the establishing phase and well into the con¬
solidating/diversifying phase.

As a system reaches its limits of diver¬

sification the complexity and utility of its rule structure begin to
break up and decline.

During the contracting phase it continues to
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diminish, but at the end of the cycle the complexity of the remaining
rule structure is greater than at the beginning of the establishing
phase.

This is intended to illustrate the contract of meaning which

remains at the end of a cycle.

At the completion of a contracting phase

the level of complexity levels off and begins to hint at another rise.
This suggests that the system engages in a new establishing phase, at a
new level of meaning, based on the contract from the previous cycle.
The model does not necessarily follow this neat curve as one applies the
model to specific systems.

Systems could show significant fluctuations

of complexity, rapid rises and drops depending on the system and situation it encounters.
The second diagram adds a second temporal level to the first dia¬
gram.

This demonstrates that each phase of the FRM can be portrayed as

exhibiting a briefer cycle of phases within it.

Each consolidating/di¬

versifying phase has a set of phases under it:

an establishing, a con¬

solidating/diversifying, and a contracting phase.

Clearly then one

could add unlimited cycles of the FRM above or below to picture broader
or narrower temporal levels (see the fifth diagram).
The third diagram illustrates how the FRM can incorporate the FLC.
At the top of the diagram the frames of reference of the FLC are speci¬
fied, making clear that it only applies to certain types of families.
While some might claim that middle-class Black families (and others)
would also follow this model, here it is preferable to generate two
separate models and thus underinclude families rather than overinclude
families in each diagram.

This approach allows an observer to make more
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detailed examinations of each type of family and avoid assumptions of
overly general similarities.

The typical stages of the FLC fit rather

easily under the broader rule-processing phases.

Each stage exhibits an

interactional theme that associates it with one of the three phases of
the FRM.

It should be notd that under each FLC stage one could put

cycles of the FRM.

So, for example, the stage of launching is part of a

broad consolidating/diversifying phase in the life course of a family,
but the launching stage would also have an establishing phase, a consol¬
idating/diversifying phase, and a contracting phase under it to describe
it in more detail.

To minimize confusion, this emphasis was not in¬

cluded in this diagram, but it is portrayed in the fourth diagram fol1owing.
The fifth diagram presents the meta-model in its most general
manner.
other.

There are three temporal levels shown in relation to one an¬
This diagram suggests the reflexive relationship between the

different temporals levels.

The relationship of the levels is intended

to point out that the fluctuations of the briefest level--episodes-directly affects the fluctuations of the next level--stages--in turn
the fluctuations of stage level interaction impact the outcome of the
next encompasing level--life course.

Order through fluctuation moves

from the briefest level to the broadest level and yet the broader, more
enduring levels are the context for the briefer ones.

This means that

there is no primacy of any temporal level, except as specified by an
observer.

More temporal levels can be added, but it was assumed that

three is adequate to convey the relation between levels.

At the top of
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the diagram are the two sets of frames of reference, presented in their
most general form.

They can be used to describe a particular family by

specifying how they interact within the different frames.

Further, an

observer can use the frames to describe themselves and thus more clearly
represent the values used in observing a particular family.
These diagrams illustrate how the meta-model can be used as simply
or complexly as a particular observer wishes.

At their best use the

diagrams are capable of portraying the uniqueness of each family in a
non-normative manner, characterizing how a family is related to its con¬
texts, and suggesting how an observer's values affect their description
of a family.
The theoretical meta-model has been presented.

It has been con¬

structed to account for the diversity of structure and complexity of
process of American families, and to describe these families in a manner
congruent with the broad systemic theory base of family therapy.

The

brief examples presented throughout only hint at its application.

It

was not an intention of this study to discuss applications of the meta¬
model at any length, but a brief application is outlined in the next
chapter.

The purpose of the study was to offer the meta-model as a

theoretical, generative grammar that could be used by observers to
describe any family or group of families that they wished.

chapter

VI

APPLICATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This dissertation is a theoretical study.
capable of generating hypotheses and models.

It presents a theory
While the study does not

substantiate the value of the theory by a test of rigorous application,
in this concluding chapter two brief sections related to application
will be presented.

First, the comments of the reviewers will be summa¬

rized with a discussion of how their comments affected the version of
the meta-model detailed in the dissertation.

Second, a developmental

assessment of a family in family therapy will be offered.

Lastly,

implications for further research will be discussed.

Reviewers' Comments
A condensed (25 pages) version of the meta-model was sent to five
reviewers (see Appendix).

These reviewers are known as leaders in the

family therapy field through their publications, speaking and/or posi¬
tion in national family therapy organizations.
their responses.

Four of them shared

Three of the four said they thought that the condensed

version could make a positive contribution to family development theory.
One of these three was quite specific in his comments, while the other
two were more general.
This one reviewer (Doherty) said he "liked it a lot," it was
"clearly an improvement over the current theory," and "it is a good
contribution to the field."

At the time of this work, Doherty was Chair
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of the Program Committee of the American Association for Marriage and
Family Therapy.

He stated that those positive comments were the context

for the suggestions he could offer to improve the model.

First, he

thought that the criteria for adequacy of a theory should be stated more
clearly and strongly, so that an observer could better judge what might
make this theory better than others.

Second, he noted that he found

most of the definitions of terms to be a useful improvement on current
notions.

The emphasis on the sequence of structural transformations in

the definition of development he viewed as particularly helpful.

He

thought the idea of punctuating family time frames was good and he found
the particular distinctions valuable.

While he initially said that

episode was defined in a fuzzy manner, as it was further explained he
stated that

it has to be fuzzy" and that fuzziness should be indicated

in the definition.

Broadening the context of family development by

including society, culture, and individual he said was also useful.

In

terms of the FRM, he said that the phases made sense individually and as
a collective sequence.
almost self-explanatory.

The establishing phase was quite apparent and
The consolidating/diversifying phase he saw as

a new twist, but he was most impressed with the concept of a contracting
phase.

He thought this was a "important contribution to the understand¬

ing of development" and the dual meaning of the phase provided an
explanation for continuing development.

The transitions between phases

he "did not find compelling" because use of the term agreement seemed to
imply a role for consciousness that he did not believe was necessary.
He suggested the term accommodation instead.

Finally, he said that the
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critique of the FLC was accurate, but harsher than it needed to be.

The

FLC was not intended to be congruent with systemic theory, and he said
that disclaimer should be included in the critique.
The suggestions that this reviewer made were generally incorporated
into the final version of the meta-model.
transitions was strengthened.

For example, the section on

While the notion of various types of

agreement was still used to explain change in social systems, a clearer
statement about the irrelevance of consciousness in such transitions was
included.
The two other reviewers (Coyne; Hoffman) who were generally posi¬
tive about the meta-model were not as detailed in their comments.

Coyne

has offered numerous workshops across the country representing the Men¬
tal Research Institute perspective on family therapy; Hoffman has writ¬
ten a major book on family therapy and is a well known theorist.

Both

thought it had potential for a positive contribution to the field, but
in the form they read, it was too abstract to be understood by a wide
audience.

They acknowledged that the condensation could only contain

the essentials of the model, but wanted to see more examples.

Coyne

said, "it was abstract, but there is definitely a good contribution in
it."

He said he would "like to read an application of it."

In particu¬

lar, he thought the inclusion of societal and cultural factors in
development was important.

He thought that the definition of rules was

good, but warned that rules are too often interpreted as having regula¬
tive power and he could not agree with that.

Hoffman indicated that she

found the definitions to be congruent with her perspective of systemic
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theory, but she had trouble with the denseness of the writing style.
She thought the content was fine for a dissertation, but was challenging
about what style should be used to disseminate the theory to family
therapists at large.
of a family.
events.

More specifically, she agreed with the definition

"Families are not entities, but a temporal succession" of

She saw the emphasis on novelty as important.

While she liked

the definition of development, she believed that the term was so loaded
with unacceptable meanings that a novel term should be used to describe
the type of changes that the meta-model addresses.

She agreed that

transformation would be a better term and suggested that the transforma¬
tional view of this theory should be more clearly contrasted with the
traditional developmental view.
The criticisms of these reviewers about abstraction strongly influ¬
enced the final version of the meta-model.

While it was always expected

that the final version, which is eight times longer than the condensed
version, would contain many more examples illustrating how the model
vight operate, the comments of these reviewers insured it.

The fact

that the level of abstraction obscured some of the content of the model
for these reviewers has led to the conclusion that it was probably a
mistake to expect even the most knowledgeable readers to be able to get
a comprehensive sense of the meta-model in such severely reduced form.
Given the assumption that it would have been unrealistic to expect
reviewers to read ny effort that was much longer, perhaps this conversa¬
tional method is of limited value when the material represents such a
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new perspective and requires significantly more length to be fully
expressed.
The fourth reviewer (McGoldrick) did not find the condensation of
the meta-model to be valuable as "the level of abstraction which you
seem to find helpful.

I don't know how to use."

McGoldrick is the co¬

author of the major book on the FLC in the family therapy field.

She

believed that the FLC continues to be an adequate framework for family
therapy.

As presented she thought that the meta-model was not useful.

Specifically, she repeatedly stated that the meta-model ignored the
value of family history.

Further, she disagreed with the notion of a

family as a self-defining group, but did not state her alternative view.
These comments, although negative, also influenced the final ver¬
sion of the meta-model.

They emphasized the importance of drawing the

distinctions between the traditional model of family development and the
meta-model presented here as strongly and clearly as possible.

Further,

they served as confirmation that the values of an observer should be
clearly stated as they have a significant impact on what one observes.
In sum, the reviewers' comments were valuable in initially confirm¬
ing the general value of the meta-model.

Overall, they supported the

need for family development theory to better account for the diversity
of structure and complexity of process of families, and to account for
those factors in a manner more congruent with systemic theory.

Three of

the four reviewers believed that this meta-model had the potential to
address those needs.

Obviously, this is not an empirical review, but

the process achieved the desired results as an initial indication of the
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potential value of the content of this meta-model.

The major difficulty

with this particular use of the conversational method was the amount of
material that was condensed in such a limited space.

Perhaps, more

readers reviewing just sections of the meta-model, which were more fully
explained and exampled, would have offered a more detailed and clear
analysis of the theory.

FRM Developmental Assessment Outline
Any developmental framework, to be useful in family therapy, must
be valuable in guiding assessment and directing treatment.

The FLC pro¬

vides general, normative categories that do aid in therapy, but tend to
fit families to the theory and the therapist's experience is usually a
\ore valuable guide than the FLC.

The FRM must be adapted to fit the

family being observed and it can provide some directions that a thera¬
pist had not previously considered.
This section offers an example of how the FRM can be used for
developmental assessment.

Five beginning family therapists, all of

whom had less than two years experience in systemic therapy, were
taught the FRM in a 33 hour course that basically followed this disser¬
tation.

Drawing on a family that was currently in their treatment, one

assignment was for every student to do a developmental assessment based
on the FRM.

Each student presented their initial assessment to the

class and then revised it with input from the other students.
line of the assessment was provided.

An out¬

Following, the assessment outline
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will be described first, and then one of the assessments done by the
students will be presented.
As development concerns the successive structural transformations
that a system experiences in relation to its context, a developmental
assessment focuses on Structure and Context, and the Functions which
connect them.
Under the category of Structure there are four subcategories which
elucidate how the concept is used.

One is the organizational phases

that an observer perceives a family as experiencing.

This means that an

observer examines the interaction of a family and decides whether they
are best described as in an Establishing, Consolidating/Diversifying, or
Contracting phase.

The observer makes this decision about the family in

a Generational, Life Course, and Stage time frame, and uses Episodic
examples to illustrate their decisions.

Since Episodes are continually

moving through cycles of phases it is not useful for the assessment to
say that a particular family is, for example, in an Establishing phase
in this Episode.
The second subcategory is the critical Patterns of Interaction or
critical Relations of a family that an observer chooses to represent the
identity of a family system.

These Patterns or Relations can be de¬

scribed by drawing on the meta-model, and indicating how this particular
family is making transitions between phases of development (agreement,
agreeing to disagree, or agreement by default).

And they can be de¬

scribed by using the techniques of any school of family therapy.

A

micro-analysis of the structural school (Minuchin and Fishman, 1981), a
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problematic sequence of interaction of the MRI school (Weakland and
Fisch, 1982), a hierarchical description a la Haley (Haley, 1981), the
systemic myths of the Milan school (Palazolli et al., 1978), a multigenerational analysis of the Bowenian school (Bowen, 1976), or any other
systemic formulation can be used to describe a family under this subca¬
tegory.

As should be evident, some of these schools will emphasize

Patterns in different time frames.

The Bowenian and even the Milan

school may use the generational time frame to discuss a family much more
than the other schools.

The structural school may use the life course

or stage time frame more than the others.

The brief treatment schools

of MRI and DeShazer (1985)i ay primarily use the episodic time frame to
describe family interaction.

This subcategory. Patterns, involves

whatever interactional history an observer chooses to include up to the
present.
Third in the Structure category is the Challenges or Events that a
family faces.

This category examines a family from the present to the

near future and is connected to the Functions of a family relative to
its Context (see Functions below).

The question is, what issues is a

family facing that present a conflict between its Structure and Con¬
text?

This may include potential conflicts with the larger social

service system, with extended family or between family members, et
cetera.

How a family handles these Challenges and Events can be guided

and evaluated by the developmental principles suggested in Chapter IV
(order through fluctuation, novelty/confirmation, continual transforma¬
tion, and diversity across a class of structures).
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The fourth subcategory is the possible Directions or Consequences
that a family may experience as a result of how they handle the events
they are facing.
the future.

This subcategory extends a family interactionally into

There are, of course, multiple possible directions for the

future, but this grouping is a reminder to observers that systems are,
as Piaget notes, at once structured and structuring.

This last struc¬

tural grouping implies the importance of viewing development as a resursive process.

Some family therapists prefer not to speculate on possi¬

bly future directions as an affirmation of the multiplicity of possibi¬
lities and of the self-definitional power of the system being observed.
The view here is not necessarily incongruent with those values, for an
observer may prefer to have a family chart these Directions.

In a

developmental assessment of a family it is important in some way to
account for where interaction, intervention and other changes might
lead.
These four subcategories provide a dynamic and variable description
of structure.

The second category of this developmental assessment.

Context, also has four subcategories that elaborate the meaning and
influence of contextual factors.
Context, in this developmental assessment, means examining the
impact on family interactions of the values and timing of change in the
four Rule Source Systems.

Each individual member of a family as a bio¬

social unity exhibits a unique pattern of values and the pace of change
that they prefer is in some significant way different from the other
individuals.

A common criticism of systemic family therapy is that the
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individual is lost.

This emphasis counters that criticism, but does not

grant primacy to individuals over any of the other Rule Source Systems.
While it is obvious, it is necessary to mention that the values and pace
of change of the totality of a family influence the development of its
particular family units.

Likewise it should be clear by this point in

the study that the values and timing of change of the culture and
society with which a family is connected influence its structural trans¬
formations.

All of these subcategories have been fully explained in

Chapters IV and V.

Neugarten (1968) has suggested that developmental

changes can occur on-time or off-time according to the cultural/societal
norms of the system being observed.

This perspective refutes that nor¬

mative view by expanding the levels of context and by holding that while
the structure of family systems are influenced by contextual interac¬
tion, those family systems are self-norming and thus determine what
structures are permissible for them to embody at what points in time.
Context examines how other systems affect family development at a
general level, while the third category, Functions, evaluates the speci¬
fic connections of a family and its context.

The specific functions

listed below are not claimed to be a complete view of a family's rela¬
tions with its context.

One could punctuate a seemingly endless stream

of functions and still sense that there is more that a family does to
insure its survival.

And more than any other category, the functions

that an observer uses to evaluate a family reveals the observer's
values.

The five sets of complementary functions offered below are

examples of the types of relationships a family engages in to survive.
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The primary function of a family has been defined as generating its
members' and species' reasons and abilities to survive.
family co-creates its context.

As well, a

Such events as the exchange of meaning

(communication), the selection of particular meanings (decision-making),
and the restructuring of meaning (problem-solving) are basic processes a
social system uses to maintain its autonomy and are not functions per
se.

The phenomenon of a subsystem differentiating itslef in a way that

realigns the systems toward some goal (leadership) is also an autonomy
maintaining process.

Further, while punctuating different domains of

system operation (cognitive, affective, instinctual, spiritual, et
cetera) may be interesting, it is not necessary to describe the Func¬
tions which mediate between Structure and Context.

How these processes

operate is of relatively little concern as long as the Functions of a
social system are fulfilled.

All that having been said, the following

five sets of complementary functions are by no means claimed to be an
exhaustive description of a system's relation with its context.
These functions, which are nearly self-explanatory, have previously
been identified in Chapter V.

The functions necessary for a family to

fulfill in relation to its context include promoting differentiation and
belonging, providing socialization and protection, insuring the growth
of the system and the maintenance of boundaries.

Further, a family must

contribute to the survival of its context and simultaneously draw re¬
sources from the context for its own survival, and a family must fit its
structure to its context, but also shape that context.

While a family

is a self-norming system, the adequacy of fulfilling these functions is
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determined by negotiation between a family and its contexts.

This

recursive negotiation results in changes in both family and context.
The suggested developmental assessment based on the FRM can be
summarized as follows:
1.

STRUCTURE - a description of
A.
B.
C.
D.

2.

CONTEXT - The developmental impact of values and timing of
A.
B.
C.
D.

3.

Organizational phase - in Generations, Life Course, Stage
time frames with Episodic examples
Relations of patterns of Interaction - historical
sequence to present and types of coordination used to
vake transitions
Challenges or Events - issues of the near future, evalu¬
ated by developmental principles
Directions or Consequences - the possible, multiple
responses a family may make to intervention, interaction
with other systems and other changes

Biosocial factors of individuals
Totality of family meanings
Culture and subculture
Society

FUNCTIONS - An evaluation of how a family promotes
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Belonging and differentiation
Socialization and protection
Growth of system and maintenance of boundaries
Fitting and shaping context
Contributing to and drawing from contextual resources

Assessment Case Example
The following case illustration did not use every possible tool
that the assessment outline suggested, but certainly made use of enough
to offer a picture of its utility.

The assessment was done according to

standards of the agency for which the work was done.
gories outlined should be apparent.

Most of the cate¬

First, the assessment will be
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presented and then the comments of the therapist about the value of the
assessment will be offered.

The names have been changed to protect the

confidentiality of the clients.
Identifying information:

The A family was referred to a public

sector mental health center for therapy for their youngest boy, Gregory
14, and for the family.
officer.

The referral was made by Greg's probation

Greg is a Caucasian male who lives with his divorced mother

Christine, 38, sister Karen, 18, brother Robert Jr., 17, and his mater¬
nal grandmother Joanne, 60.

Greg's father, Robert Sr., is living with

his sister, one town away where he works as a policeman.
Presenting problems:

Greg was referred for therapy to address

problems of truancy and illegal behaviors.

The illegal behavior in¬

cluded entering the home of an elderly woman and shooting out lights,
windows, television, et cetera, and two weeks later hiding in a depart¬
ment store until after closing, then stealing a rifle and ammunition,
shooting the rifle inside and being apprehended shooting the rifle out¬
side the store.

Greg's father then came to the police station and

returned him home.
Greg and his mother argue frequently about who decides what Greg
will do.

Greg regularly wins these arguments.

Greg's brother, Robbie,

is also on probation for stealing guns and mopeds, and using marijuana.
He is assigned to a state program that monitors the daily activity of
adolescents.
Relevant history:

Robert Sr., whose one brother is a policeman.

became a policeman in 1975.

According to Christine, he then began
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coming home late and spending time with other women and prostitutes.
Robert and Christine got divorced in 1978.

Robert was supportive as a

father and had consistent contact with the kids until he and his ex-wife
could not resolve a child support conflict in 1981.

Shortly after

Robert began to withdraw from his sons, Robbie was first caught for
theft.

In 1983, with the child support conflict still unresolved, Greg

and Robbie began new episodes of illegal activities.
Family assessment:

Several events over the past ten years indicate

that this family is in a contracting phase of development both in their
life course and in the extended (generational) family.
In looking at the generational organization some key episodes have
been the deaths of three of Greg's grandparents over a four year perod.
His paternal grandfather died in 1979 of cirrhosis of the liver.
paternal grandmother died in 1982 of a heart attack.

His

His maternal

grandfather died in 1981 of lung cancer and also suffered from alcohol¬
ism.

Further evidence that this extended (generational) family is con¬

tracting is that Christine's mother has moved into her home since the
grandfather's death and Robert moved in with his sister shortly after
the divorce.

In the face of shrinking membership the family has drawn

together, but they don't appear to have restructured themselves yet in
the face of these deaths.
In the life course of the A family unit, evidence of the contract¬
ing process is that Karen and Robbie are both considering leaving home.
Although the arguments involving Greg and his mother sometimes focus on
him leaving the home, he probably will be there for several more years.
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One gets the sense from this family that "the good old days" are over
and people are waiting to get on to the next stage in their lives.

The

divorce, a natural contracting process, never seems to have been com¬
pleted.

Christine presents herself more as an estranged wife, with

jealousy and anger toward Robert, rather than a divorced mother who is
living her own life and parenting her children with her ex-husband.

In

their current stage this family has had difficulty establishing the
rules of the contracting phase.

The contracting episodes in the genera¬

tional family and in the life course of this family unit, seem to make
it difficult for them to establish new growth and expansion.
The illegal activities can be viewed as a pattern of interaction
which assists the parents in resolving several issues of the divorce.
On the one hand the illegal activities bring Robert back into the pic¬
ture and on the other hand they require Christine and Robert to renego¬
tiate, at some level, their new positions of parents who are still
parents together, yet divorced.

Another pattern relevant to this case

is the theme of cops, robbers, guns and molls.

The term molls, a female

accomplice in crime, is used because both mother and grandmother ex¬
pressed ambivalence about the boys' therapy and court appointments to
the extent that they had "forgotten" to tell Greg about one court date,
complained that Robbie's monitoring program was bad for him, and didn't
support Greg in attending the adolescent activities program probation
had assigned.

The complaints could be valid, but they show that deci¬

sions are made by default.
the "molls" with the "cops."

Guns seem to be important because they link
Both boys were involved in stealing guns.
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Guns allowed the boys to talk about the police, particularly their
father.

Robert Sr. is rarely discussed in the family unit and several

times at family meetings to even bring up his name was to elicit a
distracting response such as Robbie leaving the room.

All these inter¬

actions are evidence that the family makes decisions by default and thus
have had problems restructuring themselves in the face of the contracting episodes.
One of the themes which becomes more vivid in looking at this fam¬
ily over several generations is that sex determines destiny.

In this

family it seems as if women are strong and competent, and that men are
weak and passive.

In family meetings, the boys, who have had no diffi¬

culty in being aggressive in other settings, are passive and defer to
either their mother or grandmother.

For generations and on both sides

of the family, men have underfunctioned and been alcoholic, or criminal¬
ly involved.

This multi-generational pattern of gender determining

destiny could be a cultural influence from either the paternal side
which was Scottish or the maternal side, which was Swedish.
This family is clearly in conflict with the values of its societal
context, which is made all the more interesting by the fact that a num¬
ber of family members are or have been policemen, charged with enforcing
society's values.

Further, the boys began independently engaging in

"grown up" activities (guns) well before the accepted time.
Some very significant events which face the family are the deaths
of the three grandparents and an uncle.

It seems as if the deaths of

the three grandparents were mourned inadequately due in part to the
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divorces.

The family is still struggling with knowing how the meaning

of these deaths affects their relationships with each other and what
family values can be passed on from them.

One gets the sense that the

richness and benefits of the grandparents' lives have not been passed on
to other family interactions.

It is very tough for Christine and Robert

to complete their divorce and for Karen and Robbie to leave home.

Given

the strong contracting influences it will be difficult for people to
move on in their lives until there is some sort of agreement about the
meanings of these events of the past ten years.
Useful directions to explore in therapy might include:
(1) Exploring with Christine unresolved divorce issues between she and
Robert, helping them to form a "contract" about their divorce.

A

consequence of not working through the divorce issues would be that
the memory of the "good old days" would be preserved.

If they were

to come to agreement and Robert were to become more appropriately
involved with the family, it would run the risk of a new history
being developed, which may not be as special as the current his¬
tory.
(2) Pursuing with the family the differences and similarities between
\en and women toward exposing the myth that "gender determines des¬
tiny."

Again, this runs the risk of changing the family's self¬

perceptions, which are very deeply rooted in family and cultural
history.
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(3) Giving assignments to the family to talk about the special contri¬
butions that the deceased grandparents have made to them.

This

would be particularly helpful if the grandmother, who was also
divorced, could be involved, asking her to tell stories and anecdotes.
Treatment plan:

Individual therapy as indicated, group therapy on

a bi-weekly basis to promote positive peer relationships and prevent re¬
occurrence of illegal activities.

Family therapy on a bi-weekly basis,

or as indicated to address the above directions.

The content of this developmental assessment was based on the FRM
meta-model, while the narrative form was standard for the agency for
which the therapist worked.

The therapist quite fully addressed the

categories of Structure and Context.

The issues identified under Func¬

tions were not directly expressed, although they are implicit.

Some

professionals may question the frequent use of "it seems . . ." and
other similar phrases, but from the FRM perspective it is precisely what
is required as it is a reminder that an observer has a partial and dif¬
ferent view than the actual experience of the family.

The treatment

plan is not unusual in any way, but the premises which guide the treat¬
ment are unique to the FRM.

Following are a number of questions and

answers from an interview with the therapist who did the assessment.
Question:

How did the FRM assessment tool help you in understand¬

ing this case?
Answer:

In general, it helped me organize a lot of information

into a structure.

Initially, there was so much diverse information I
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didn't know what to do with it.

It pulled a lot of facts together and

made it easy to make them meaningful.

I would have missed some impor-

tant things without it.
Q:

Can you be more specific?

A:

Well, for one, all the contracting stuff I would have missed,

like the death of the grandparents.

And that the father moving in with

his sister and the grandmother (moving in) with the mother were, along
with the deaths, all part of the same contracting pattern.

Not until I

started using this developmental model could I look at the deaths and
divorces and find a meaningful explanation for those interactions.
Also, the model somehow helped me recognize that the golden days were
over for this family, that there was a sense of emptiness that had to be
addressed. . . . Some of the pieces I had somewhat of a handle on, but
the model helped clarify a number of themes, like "sex determines des¬
tiny" and how guns pulled the family together.

It (the FRM) made it a

lot easier to look at cultural variables, because those themes were very
much a part of the family's culture. . . . From a biological point of
view, the kids should be in consolidating/diversifying phase, but psy¬
chologically, given all the contracting going on, the evidence said that
the kids were on the way out of the home earlier than they might normal¬
ly be. ... I saw that this family was stuck and unable to establish
rules for the contracting phase of their lives.
Q:
family?

Did this understanding affect how you intervened with this
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A:

Definitely.

I don't know if you can really quantify it, but I

felt that it contributed to about 60% of the directions.

It was unlike¬

ly that they would've been there without the model. . . . Specifically,
from this information (on the contracting phase) I could ask, how the
deceased grandparents had helped your family.
women similar and different?

And how were men and

The emphasis on the positive and other

techniques were there from other family therapy training, but the parti¬
cular questions came from the model. . . . Without this understanding I
would have just focused on the divorce, which hadn't gotten that far.
... The model helped me focus on the importance of contracting-both
the loss of members and marriages, and the need for agreements for the
future.

ful.

Q:

So, do you think this influenced the results of the therapy?

A.

Yes, the answers to the questions about men and women were use¬

It helped the family recognize the pattern on their own.

I think

they also recognized, in some way, as I did, that the deaths of the
grandparents were not mourned due to the divorces and with both kinds of
contracting episodes going on (deaths and divorces) it made it very
difficult to grow into a new system.

The most important result was that

the long term disagreement over child support was resolved.

There now

is more regular and appropriate contact between the father and kids.
The kids are also free to call him.

I terminated very successfully with

them.
Q:

What do you think the overall value of the FRM is?
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A:

I

really like the model.

I

think

it

can be the

basis

for

a

whole new school of family therapy. . . . More than any other model it
simplifies more information about families more effectively and meaning¬
fully.

It's the best hat rack I've found to hang my ideas on and it has

just the right places to hang hats on-l've never been as consci¬
ous of cultural variables as I have been with this model and that's a
valuable learning. ... It can be applied to any kind of social system.
• • . This model gives a breadth of understanding with clarity and simpl i city.
This particular application of the FRM strongly emphasized the
generational family as the context for the experience of the specific
family unit.

This was an unexpected emphasis in this case which re¬

sulted from the model.

However, one does not have to examine a family

in its totality to gain full utility from the FRM.

A brief therapist

could observe a family interacting only in the Episodic time frame of a
single therapy session and conclude, for example, that this family can
adequately establish rules about a particular subject, but in the next
interactional phase their tolerance for diversifying from those rules is
very limited.

To be more specific, after there is an agreement and one

member starts to act on it, another member indicates that action is out
of bounds of the established rules.

This family will spend much of its

time confirming its consolidated rules and little successful efforts at
introducing novelty needed to provide vitality to those consolidated
rules.

Further, this brief therapist could notice in the next session

that this family reaches initial agreement rather quickly, but continues
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to focus on the subject until disagreement emerges.

Given the small

tolerance for diversity, this family, the observer notes, cannot agree
to disagree.

This starts the search for agreement and confirmation all

over again and provides some small measure of novelty for the system.
This abstract example is a brief indication of how variably the FRM
can be applied.

It can be applied to any social system, but must be

fitted to the system in question and will reflect the values of the
observer.

One more brief example will serve to illustrate.

The FRM was recently used to assess and prescribe directions for
the clinical program of a state funded mental health center.

Beginning

four years ago a new Clinical Director implemented a new clinical treatment model.

There was no unified model operating prior to that.

Current and new staff worked diligently at understanding and applying
the model over the four years until they developed expertise.

At a

recent agency-wide meeting all agreed that the clinical model was the
strongest aspect of the agency.

There were, however, many complaints

about the administration of the agency focusing on the administrative
efforts of the Executive and the Clinical Director.

This led the Clini¬

cal Director and the two other administrators over him to conclude that
since the clinical model had been successfully established that the
efforts of the Clinical Director in the future should be primarily
administrative.

On the surface this makes some sense, but in light of

the FRM it could spell disaster for the clinical model.
The clinical model has just completed its establishing phase and is
about to embark upon a consolidating/diversifying phase.

Referring to
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the diagrams of the FRM, the establishing phase represents one temporal
level in the life of the agency.

The life of the agency, which is 13

years old, is represented on a broader temporal level.

Underneath the

establishing phase of the clinical model is a complete cycle of subphases—establishing, consolidating/diversifying, contracting.

When the

agency staff agreed that they were happy with a clinical model that was
a "contract of meaning" that signaled the completion of the establishing
phase.

As the clinical program moves into the consolidating/diversify¬

ing phase it will diversify around whatever meanings form the center of
its identity.

If those meanings suddenly shift from their clinical

strength to an administrative emphasis, then the clinical program will
diversify into a mushy eclecticism.

Further, as a new interactional

phase begins the first subphase is establishing, which prescribes the
predominance of novelty.

If administration is the core emphasis, then a

plethora of new administrative policies, procedures and paperwork can be
expected.

If, however, the clinical model is recognized as the strength

of the agency and it continues to be the center of its identity, then a
new round of clinical innovation is called for.

This innovation would

elaborate the current model, not be a radical departure from it, as
diversification refers to the consolidated identity of the system for
its guidelines.

Both the clinical director and one of his superiors

agreed that this analysis provided a useful perspective on the future of
the clinical program and the agency as a whole.
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There are many other ways that the FRM
require years to understand which

can be applied, but it will

situations

can benefit the most from

it.
As the preceding application examples should make clear, the FRM is
more a conceptual tool than an empirical one.

Its value lies in the

subjective judgments of those who use it as a guide.

It can be sub¬

jected to empirical tests, but those tests would indicate the variabil¬
ity of those subjective judgments.

There is no intrinsic truth to this

meta-model, as it is just one possible punctuation of the development of
social systems.

In the perspective of this study, this is not seen as a

weakness, but a strength consistent with the assumptions of the study.
This is an heuristic device whose value will be determined by the therapists who use it.
The FRM is a meta-model of family development that is capable of
describing the development of any social system.

It portrays develop¬

ment in a unique fashion, as its phases are represented by verbs and
oriented to interaction, rather than titled by nouns that suggest the
static stages of many other theories.

Initially, this emphasis on

recursive interaction makes the FRM appear fuzzy to someone used to the
more static perspective of other theories.

This meta-model was designed

to more adequately account for the diversity of structure and complexity
of process of American families than the current developmental framework
for family therapy, the FLC.

It was also intended to do it in a manner

congruent with the systemic theory base of family therapy.

It is

claimed here that it more than adequately meets all of those criteria
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constructed in such a way to add another important feature.

The

™ is a tool for an observer to indicate what they see, not whatis
occurring in the observed system.

This distinction is vital if social

theory is to understand its effect on the observed.
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